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Glossairy of Chinese Phrases
1) Chan Kuo : the Warring States period.
2) Cheng bu ju ch'i (jE : The way of normal is less than the way of
of extraordinary; the use of surprise is 
superior to that of common.
3) Cheng-Ch*i (j£-^ ): Normal or Common and Extraordinary or Surprise;
direct and indirect.
4) chi-mi ' loose rein; regional autonomy.
5) chi-suo-bu-yu-wu-shih-yu-jen ( : not to do to others
as you would not wish done to yourself.
6) chi-yu-li-er-li-jen. chi-yu-ta-er-ta-.jen ( =
Wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; 
wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.
7) chia t'ien-tzu j lln chu-hou : controlling the Son of
Heaven in order to dictate to the vassals.
8) chiao-hsiang-li mutual aid, mutual benefit,
9) chien-ai ' ^ ) : universal love.
10) chu-luan shi : despotism.
11) Ch'un Ch'iu • the Spring and Autumn period.
12) chun-tzu ( ^ - ^ ) :  superior man or gentleman.
13) fei-kung anti-offensive-attack, anti-aggression, condemnation
of offensive war.
14) Ho-Tsung the Vertical Alliance, an east-west alignment, in which
one joins with a number of weak states in hopes of 
attacking a strong one; a system of collective defense.
15) hsia (>i^: the knights-errant.
16) hsiao-jen (/J'/^): small man, mean man.
17) hsiao-k'ang (4'^^): small tranquility.
18) hsin (i'^): trustworthiness, good faith, sincerity.
19) hsin-jen office of diplomat, advisor on foreign policy and
international relations.
20) hu-t'ung-yu-wu ( ) : exchange of different needs.
X
21) hui-meng cheng-chih ■ ^he politics of conference and alliance,
22) i-i-chih-i ^ )  : using barbarians to check barbarians.
23) jen-ts *u (X— ^-) : benevolence.
24) juo-kuo-wu-wai-chiao ( weak state has no diplomacy.
25) ku-wei-chin-yung ; yang-wai-chung-yung ( : The ancient
wisdom is for present use; the foreign knowledge is for Chinese use.
26) là ritual, courtesy, propriety, moral; Chinese measure of
distance and one ^  equals to one-third mile; utility, 
gain, profit, benefit, interest.
■27) li-chih )g ) : rule of ethics; rule by virtue.
28) lieh-kuo (^>J^): the states with equal sovereignty in the Chinese
feudal system.
29) Lien-Heng : the Horizontal Alliance, a north-south alignment,
in which one serves a strong state for the purpose 
of attacking a number of weak ones; a policy or 
strategy of "divide and rule" in the concept of the 
balance of power.
30) luo-ching-hsia-shih (J^||-'h>a): dropping a stone into the well where
a person fell in and was drowning.
31) nei-yu wai-huan ( : inside disorder and outside calamity.
32) nung-chan agriculture and war; farmer and soldier.
33) ^  ) : hegemony; hegemonism.
34) Pa Tao ^^) : the way by force, rule or control with force, the way
of hegemony.
35) Pai-Ho open and close, direct and indirect, positive and nega­
tive, yang and yin.
36) Shang-T'ung |s] ) : Universal Equality.
37) sui-pu-chung, pu-yuan-yi ( ̂  : Although he might not have
reached his goals exactly, it is not far from the target.
38) Szu-hsiang ( ^ ^ ' )  : the thought; the concept.
39) ta-kuo-pa-chuan-chu-yi big-power hegemonism or the
big-nation hegemony,
40) Ta-T'ung ): Great Harmony.
xi
41) Tao (j^): the Truth, the Harmony, the Order, the Way, the natural law.
42) teh : the virtue, the goodness.
43) The Three Chins (-^•^): It refers to the three states, Han, Chao, and
Wei which are fragments of the former Chin state.
44) t'ien-hsia ): all-under-heaven; the world.
45) t'ien jen ho yi ( ') : the union of man and nature.
46) tsun-wang jang-i ("^ ' respecting the central authority of Chou
^  monarch and protecting the Chinese confe­
deration from the barbarian invasion.
47) tuo^k'ai-hao-shen-ti-chien-she-she-hui-chu-i-tsu-kuo
' erming high and achieving greater, quicker, better and 
more economical results in building socialism.
48) Wang Tao Ci-i^): the way by virtue, rule or control with virtue, the
way of kingship.
49) Wu Pa ): the five hegemonic leaders.
50) wu ti-kuo wai-huan che kuo heng wang ^  : A state
without an adversary and external threat is apt to perish.
51) wu-wei ): inaction, do-nothing.
52) Yang (^&) : the male, the active element, the challenge, the form or
heaven, the direct way or force.
53) ) : justice, righteousness.
54) Yi ( § }  ) : the change, the dialectics.
55) Yin (p^): the female, the passive element, the response, the matter or
earth, the indirect way or force.
56) yuan-chiao chin-kung ( : associate with the afar and/or big





A leader is best
When people barely know that he exists.
Not so good when people obey and acclaim him. 
Worst when they despite him,
"Fail to honor people.
They fail to honor you;"
But of a good leader, who talks little.
When his work is done, his aim fulfiled,
They will all say, "We did this ourselves".
Lao Tzu, "Tao Te Ching", Chapter 17
Rivers and mountains are beautiful 
and made heros bow and compete to catch the girl - 
lovely earth.
Yet the emperors Shih Huang and Wu Ti 
were barely able to write.
The first emperors of the Tang and Sung dynasties 
were crude,
Genghis Khan, man of his epoch
and favored by heaven,
knew only how to hunt the great eagle.
They arc all gone, ^
Only today are we men of feeling,
Mao Tse-tung, "Snow"(Feb,, 1936)
"In the soundless calligraphy of Chinese ideograms, lucidly
arranged, he records his vision of nature and man. Old and new China
3come together in his fresh poems in the traditional style," 
(Professor Willis Barnstone on Mao's poems,)
- 1 “
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1 .  ACADEMIC CONTHOVKKSiK.S ON 
CHINESE CULTURAL CONTINUITY
China is an old councry witli a long iiistory of civilization. 
Throughout past history there have been a great number of drastic social 
changes and ideological breakthroughs. Within this dialectical process of 
development there existed several major fluctuations, such as the breakdown 
of Chou feudalism succeeded by the classical periods of Spring and Autumn 
and of the Warring States (771-221 B.C.), the dictatorial Empire of Ch'in, 
the turmoil of periods of barbarian invasions (approximately 300-580 A.D. 
and 900-1150 A.D.), the importation of foreign Buddhism, the barbarian 
dynasties of the Mongols and Manchus, and the modern Western military and 
ideological challenges. The impact of Western challenges and modern impe­
rialism and colonialism on Chinese life and ideology have been particularly 
tremendous. They have consequently motivated the great response of Chinese 
nationalism in collaboration with traditional concepts of internationalist 
thought.
For the Chinese, the adoption since 1949 of a foreign ideology, 
Marxism-Leninism, is regarded as an extraordinary action. It replaced an 
ideology--the blend of Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism, which had 
dominated Chinese history for two thousand years. Under the influence of 
this new ideology, today's China has been profoundly changed during the 
past two decades in all phases of life and society. In the light of 
Chinese history this has been a major landmark or historical turning-point. 
Not surprisingly, the current academic study of China has been controversial, 
both in its various and conflicting approaches and in its differing views 
as to the true nature of political and cultural developments in China.
.In a gci.ci-al review, there are four schools of academic approaches
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stuüying Communist China and its ideology today. Professor James Chieh 
Hsiung briefly describes them as: "(1) the 'complete break' theory, which 
denies any continuity whatsoever with the past; (2) the 'recurrence of 
history' theory, which views the Communist regime as the latest turn of 
the dynastic cycle; (3) the 'textual study' approach, which compares Mao's 
writings with those of Marx and earlier Marxist writers, and the actual 
conditions of the Chinese revolution with the basic tenets of orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism; and (4) the 'originality' approz^h, which is closely 
akin to textual study and seeks to determine whether 'Maoism' contains
4original elements or merely rephrases earlier Marxist-Leninist positions''. 
In fact, the key questions of this subject are: (1) Is there any cultural 
or ideological linkage between old China and new China?; (2) if there is, 
to wh.at extent has the traditional legacy influenced contemporary Chinese 
life, and in which fields of political and social activities and public 
policies is there a persistant traditional continuity? To answer these 
questions we need an over-all and comprehensive study of China, not only 
of her traditional concepts but also of her contemporary policies and 
attitudes within a dynamic framework. Within this general framework, 
this dissertation is particularly devoted to the subject of traditional 
concepts which may have affected current Chinese perceptions of modern 
world order and China's foreign policy,
A) The Case for the Continuity of Chinese Culture
One group of scholars, including John K. Fairbank, C.P. FitzGerald, 
Mark Mancall, 0. Edmund Clubb, and Robert S. Elegant, have argued the 
continuity of Chinese culture and the Chinese ways of life which could 
hardly be disrupted in light of its profound role in the age-old Chinese 
civilization. They regard the contemporary Chinese Communist revolutionary
-4-
move-ment and reforms as similar to those of past Chinese history. Current 
Chinese policies in domestic and foreign areas not only have certain 
linkages to the traditional concepts and heritages, but simultaneously 
they reflect uniquely Chinese responses to modern Western military, 
economic and ideological challenges.
Particularly in the field of international politics and in the 
Chinese perception of world order, many scholars feel that the traditional 
Chinese concept or world order does survive in the current Chinese view 
of world politics. To a certain extent, China has been following the 
traditional model in dealing with foreign relations and the world politi­
cal system,^
However, this group of scholars' study of Chinese communism has 
its limitations, which perhaps might apply to most of the China observers. 
The term "traditional", to which they refer, is limited only to the school 
of Confucianism in general, and to a limited historical period from the 
Han dynasty to the Ch'ing dynasty. In fact, they mainly ignore, in their 
historical study and interpretation, other prominent schools of thought 
such as Taoism, Mohism and Legalism, which were especially important during 
the contending Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods prior to the 
Ch'in dynasty,^ Accordingly, their studies are handicaped by the lack of 
an overall, dynamic view of current Chinese communism and the new phases 
of China, The drastic and revolutionary changes and reforms of the past 
two decades have made it very difficult for this group of scholars to 
argue their case convincingly. Alternatively, their interpretation tends 
to fall into the "recurrence of history" theory which overemphasizes 
continuity from the pre-Communist past and ignores new problems and their 
resolution in a new age. They argue that the development of Chinese history
-5-
is cyclical, and thus that the modern Chinese Communist movement is still 
exactly in the traditional pattern of cultural continuity, lliis view is 
particularly apparent in the study of Chinese concepts of world order.
B) The Case against the Continuity of Chinese Culture
In contrast, another group of scholars tends to divide Chinese
culture and history into sharply separated parts: the pre-Communist and
the Communist periods, which they regard as completely unrelated in content.
This view particularly rejects a relationship between the traditional Chinese
concept of world order and Communist China's concepts of foreign relations.
The representatives of this group include Benjamin Schwartz, Albert
7Fuerwerker, and others. They argue that to cope with the new challenges
and conditions in modern times the Chinese Communists adopted whatever was
practical and realistic. The old concepts and traditions are simply obsolete
and out of date as guides for dealing with modern problems. Particularly,
they treat the traditional Chinese concept of suzeraignry and the tribute
system in foreign relations as obsolete in the modern international legal
and political system.
Objecting to this view, Professor James Chieh Hsiung comments:
"The 'complete break' view is too simplistic: it overestimates the
Communists' ability to wipe out everything 'old' and create a 'new' nation
8totally divorced from its past cultural matrix." It is important to note 
that a nation with so deep-rooted a culture and so ancient and highly 
developed a civilization as China's would find it impossible to discard 
its traditions entirely within such a short period of time.
Moreover, the "complete break" theory has defects similar to those 
of the "recurrence of history" theory due to limitations in the scope and 
the length of the historical period taken into account in this approach to
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the study of China. This inadequacy consequently results iu an isolated
viewpoint, often mere blind speculation on current Chinese questions. As
Professor Hsiung comments, "Anyone attempting to understand Communist
China without an adequate knowledge of its political culture, therefore,
is like the fabled blind man trying to 'see* the whole elephant by feeling 
9its trunk or leg". In addition, in the study of comparative politics of 
East and West, some scholars tend to measure different Eastern social 
systems and their ways of life on the basis of Western criteria. Obviously, 
the socio-political realities of those countries are thus seriously 
distorted and incomprehensible. Tliis is particularly true of China when 
certain scholars attempt to evaluate the Chinese political system through 
the psycho-cultural approach.
C) The Continuity of Chinese Culture: Another View
In accordance with an ancient Chinese philosophic principle, the 
Book of Changes says: "When there comes the end, change is needed. By 
change there is a way (ch'iung-tse-pian, pian-tse-t'ungj'. During the past, 
whenever there have been many crucial issues and obstacles blocking the 
process of Chinese historical development, it was often this idea which 
proved the key concept which wiped out the difficulties and paved the way 
for China's cultural consistency and continuity.
Obviously, the issues of modern times are different from those 
of the ancient not only as to conditions and circumstances but also in 
fundamental nature. In order to meet new problems and conditions, the 
ancient Chinese civilization has been in a process of transformation in 
the beginning of twentieth century, and particularly since the establish­
ment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949. But certain legacies do 
survive radical change. The adoption of modern Marxism-Leninism by the
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Chinese Communists may be simply an attempt to reinforce their ancient
wisdom to cope witli the new problems and Issues of today. It is believed
that past and present, old and new, and Chinese and Western are actually
Interrelated In a complex, blended organic whole composed of human
intelligence. Thus Mao Tse-tung gives as his general principle on China's
overall policy: "The ancient wisdom is for present use, and the foreign
10
knowledge is for Chinese use, (ku-wei-chin-yung, yang-wei-chung-yung)"
On the point of the consistency and continuity of Chinese history, Mao Tse-
tung also points out that Chinese history, from the age of Confucius down
to the modern age of Sun Yat-sen, can not be chopped into pieces. It must
be given an overall and critical study to its development.^^
Accordingly, Mao’s principle is eclectic and dynamic in adopting
whatever is good for China, This view of synthesis Is consistent with the
traditional Chinese intellectual spirit. Similar to the great synthesizer
of antiquity, Ksun Tzu, Mao blends traditional Chinese concepts and teaching
with modern thought, Marxism-Leninism, Into a practical doctrine for the
welfare of the Chinese people of today. As Professor James Chieh Hsiung
points out, "instead of debating whether or not Chinese Communism is
unique, one should examine the extent to which old and new, Chinese and
Marxist, are compatible and complementary, the ways in which they have been
blended, and the evolution of Mao’s thought over time, in response to
12changing circumstances". It is this belief that the author holds to be 
the correct view of the continuity of Chinese culture,
A careful and comprehensive study of both today's Chinese Communism 
and of classical Chinese concepts has further reinforced this belief, dis­
closing that a number of elements of the Chinese cultural legacy in many 
broad areas are similar to the tenets or modern Marxism-Leninism, For 
instance, the traditional and communist Chinese perception of world order
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and foreign policy is one of the major areas of similarity, a blending of 
principles which has substantial impact on the entire current world politi­
cal system. Pursuing his observation, Professor Hsiung further commented:
Throughout Chinese intellectual history, value has always been 
placed on synthesis rather than originality, which is essentially a 
concern of the West. Confucius specifically disclaimed originality 
and cast himself in the role of a great synthesizer. No Chinese 
thinker has departed from that tradition, not even Mao, Chinese 
Communist propaganda praises Mao only for his "gift" of creative 
"development" and "application" of Marxism-Leninism,
It is the author's belief that in order to obtain a comprehensive 
view and complete picture of Chinese culture the scope of study of classi­
cal Chinese concepts must be broadened to include all contending schools 
of thought during the classical periods which actually contributed to the 
basic themes of Chinese civilization. Most of the China scholars have 
narrowed their studies to Confucianism only. On the other hand, the period 
of history studied should commence at least with the classical ages of 
Spring and Autumn and the Warring States and continue down to modern times 
so as to include the full content of Chinese history. Particularly, in t h.e 
field of international relations, most of the modern China scholars have 
regarded the Chinese concept of suzeraignty and the tribute system after 
the Han dynasty as the only authentic theory of Chinese traditional inter­
national relations. Therefore, they are inevitablly faced with difficulty 
in interpreting the spirit of current Chinese foreign policies in light 
of the modern world system and power politics. As a matter of fact, certain 
conceptual elements which have contributed to the formation of current 
China's fo aign policy could be attributable to the various contending 
thoughts of classical schools in the periods of Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States. For example, in their writings and speeches Mao Tse-tung 
and his associate leaders have often cited the ancient Chinese teachings
-9-
and used quotations from leading ancient philosophers or eminent figures
such as Lao "'zu, Confucius, Hsun Tzu, Meng Tzu, Sun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei
Tzu, and others to support their various views on current issues. As an
illustration, in a recent meeting with Dr. Yang Cheng-ning, a Nobel prize
winner in physics, Mao Tse-tung has compared the concept of dialectical
materialism to similar principles of classical Chinese thinkers such as
Hsun Tzu, Kung-sun Lung, and Han Fei Tzu, to illustrate the consistency of
14historical evolution on this subject.
Such considerations as these emphasize the important influence of 
classical Chinese thought on current Chinese politics and foreign policy.
II. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, TECHNIQUE 
OF STUDY AND ORGANIZATION
A) Methodclogy
The methodology employed of this study is the traditional or 
historical approach. In recent years, there have been a number of new 
approaches in studying political phenomena. However, it is probably true 
that the historical approach is still the one most used to study China, 
particularly on such subjects as the traditional Chinese concept of world 
order, classical concepts and philosophers, and conceptual heritage. The 
major value of the historical approach is perhaps its usefulness in pro­
viding a theoretical consistency between the cultural background and 
current circumstances.
The basic methodological feature of this study is its use of 
historical and cultural approaches in a prescriptive analysis. Throughout 
the study certain generalizations and evaluations are drawn on the basis 
of subjective and personal intellectual perceptions supported with histo-
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ricai facts and documents.
B) Scope of Study
The scope of this study contains three major fields of political 
science, that is, international relations, comparative politics and politi­
cal theory, which have been closely associated in the content. Particularly, 
it brings elements of the ancient and the present, the Chinese and the 
Western, into a synthesic whole. However, it gives primary emphasis to 
Chinese perceptions of the world order, past and present, and to Chinese 
responses in current foreign policies. Attention to the West is mainly 
focused on general situations in the modern world politics, various foreign 
policies of major powers and the role of the Third World nations in 
international relations. In addition, as a part of the world system, es­
pecially in the recent years, the functions and roles of the United Nations 
and international law are also treated in the light of Chinese perceptions 
and attitudes. In general, this research involves a broad topic, and a 
wide range of study.
C) Technique of Study
Regarding the technique of study, the dimensional method is employed. 
In other words, both the vertical and horizontal analyses are conducted in 
a chronological (historical) sequence and arrangement and a prescriptive 
(theoretical) treatment. In each chapter, especially in dealing with the 
contending schools of thought during the classical periods, a brief ana­
lysis of historical background and conceptual heritage is provided for more 
elaboration and better generalization. Some quantitative tables, historical 
maps and theoretical diagrams are also provided in order to give a better 
understanding of the study.
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D) Source of Materials
The materials used in this study are basically from primary sources 
either in Chinese text or in English translation. Particularly, the discu­
ssion of the classical contending schools of thought and philosophy depends 
heavily on the Chinese original works. In the contemporary part of the 
study, official documents and statements, including the original works of 
leading personalities have been used and quoted. Secondary sources and 
scholarly works have also been used and quoted in order to compare or 
elaborate the author's views or generalizations in this study.
E) Organization
This dissertation consists of five chapters.
Chapter One provides an introductory analysis of the current con­
troversial views and approaches on studying Chinese Communism, including 
its ideology, domestic reforms and socialist constructions, and foreign 
policies, in the light of China's traditional culture. The author presents 
his belief that certain traditional legacies do survive in current Chinese 
politics and in the political system, particularly their concepts of 
world order and foreign policy. It is this belief which constitutes the 
general theme and spirit of this work.
Chapter Two deals with the classical Chinese concepts of inter­
national politics and their general pattern of development. Vertically, 
a diplomatic and political history of the classical periods of Spring and 
Autumn and Warring States is presented in order to explain the evolution 
of the political thoughts of the various contending schools in the context 
of the external environments. Horizontally, the various contending schools 
of thought and their leading representative thoughts associated with the 
field of international relations are discussed.
-12-
Oliapler 'I'liree basically provides a discussion of cont emporary 
f:!iiii(îse concepts ol world order /nui China's iorelx.n polivv, I'ht- ; tail 11 1 oi'..i 1 
CÜiiiièsc- concepL of suzerai%nty and t lie Irilnile system ol internat ionai 
relations (pre-20th century) is analysed in the liglit of China's current 
position in the world politics so as to explain her perceptions and 
foreign policies towards the two superpowers and the Third World rations.
Til is chapter is divided into two parts as far as China's foreign policy 
is concerned. These two elements are the Chinese concept of International­
ism and Chinese nationalism, which have been actually interrelated, eaci; 
reinforcing the oLÎier. lu this part of the study we find that tiiere are 
parallels between the traditional concept of internationalism and the 
current Ciiinese ideal of world communism, as well as in the implementation 
of these concepts. Ciiinese nationalism is the immediate goal of current 
Ci’.ina's foreign policy. Therefore, China's attitudes towards the two 
superpowers, t';e Tiiird World nations, international organization and 
international law are the major subjects presented for theoretical analy­
sis in this chapter.
Chapter Four concentrates on the various approaches employed by 
current Chinese Communist leaders to implement their long-range «nd 
immediate goals in foreign policy. Taught by their traditional thought 
.und reinforced by their modern revolutionary experiences, the Chinese 
today iiave utilized the concepts of "ideology", "netion-building", the 
"people's war", and "the balance of power" as basic approaches for realiz­
ing their foreign policy in the current international political system.
In analysing these various approaches, their conceptual roots and roles 
in modern times have also been treated in order to provide a more com­
prehensive understanding.
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Chapter Five is a general summary of the basic trend in the evolution 
or development of Chinese concepts of international politics. Furthermore, 
on tilt basis of the overall study of both Chinese concepts of international 
politics and current Chinese foreign policy, some final tentative specula­
tions and theoretical generalizations as to Chinese foreign policy are 
presented for a perspective on the future role of China in the wcrlc sys::m. 
Concluding comments attempt to give a theoretical consistency to Chinese 
foreign policy in the light of China's deep-rooted tradirions and cuitur:
-14-
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traditions by adopting foreign Marxism-Leninism as a national ideology 
rather than traditional Confucianism, They further charge that the currenc 
radical political, economic and social reforms being attempted on Chinese 
mainland are destroying the traditional culture, political system and way 
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For Mao's meeting with Dr. Yang Cheng-ning, see official news state­
ment (July 17, 1973) in Peking Review (July 20, 1973), p.l. Mao's referr­
ing to the classical Chinese thinkers on dialectical materialism was re­
ported by Dr. Yang Cheng-ning in an interview with a group of Chinese students 
at the State University of New York at Stony Brook on August 21, 1973. The 
text of interview was published on Chun Pao (Mass Newspaper), September 3, 
1973, Issue No.52, p.7. Chun Pao is a biweekly newsletter published in New 
York City and circulated among Chinese community in the United States,
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
IN PRE-CH’IN DYNASTIES
I. THE IITTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND POLITICS 
IN THE CHOU DYNASTY
It is generally accepted by Chinese historians that Chinese history
can be traced back to the existence of Huang Ti (the Yellow Emperor) who
has been credited with fighting successfully against the barbarians and with
the establishment of the empire of the Chinese people. But from recent
archeological research on inscribed bones which have been unearthed on the
site where once stood a capital of the Shang Dynasty, or Yin, It appears
Instead that the Shang Dynasty was the oldest Chinese empire of which there
is scientific evidence. This dynasty existed sometime between the seventeenth
i
and the thirteenth century B.C., more exact dates being yet unobtainable.
The Chou Dynasty, which dated from 1122 B.C., followed the Shang
Dynasty. It developed a great civilization and left many historical records.
Wen Wang was the founder of the Chou Dynasty, and after him Wu Wang is
thought to have established his capital near Ch'ang An (present Sian, Shensi
Province). Wu Wang's brother, Chou Kung, was said to have consolidated the
power of the dynasty and to have set up a feudal system in the empire and
an administrative organization of the realm on a pattern which for generations
2
remained the model.
Yu Wang was reported by tradition to have been hopelessly weak, and 
the corruption of his reign contributed to the decline of the Chou Dynasty.
-16-
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At the beginning of the next reign, 771-720 B.C., the weakneHs of the Cliou
was made evident to the world when the central Chou monarchy was defeated
by Insurgent feudal lords and outer barbarians from West Jong, and forced to
move from Hao (near Sian), the Valley of the Wei River, to Loyang, further
east. The dynasty prior to the removal of the capital is known as the Western
Chou and after that event as the Eastern Chou. This change marked the sharp
decline of Chou authority and in the following era, known as the Ch'un Ch'iu
(Spring and Autumn) period, 771-483 B.C., and the Chan Kuo (Warring States)
period, 403-221 B.C., there developed a system of large independent states,
3somewhat like a modern type of international political system. The inter­
national system and politics of these periods are examined below.
A) The Ch'un-Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn) Period, 771-483 B.C.
(1) Boundaries and System of the Western and Eastern Chou.
During the Ch'un-Ch'iu period, Chinese civilization and the Chinese 
political system were extended eastward through the present Shantung Pro­
vince, westward into Szechwan Province, and especially southward into the 
Yangtze Valley. Within these boundaries there seems to have been a closer 
approach to a uniformity of Chinese culture although variations were found, 
especially in the frontier states. Generally speaking, besides some minor 
contacts with the surrounding barbarians, the Chou political system developed 
in isolation from the rest of the world.
Under the feudal system of the Western Chou period, the number of
feudal states ranged from 130 to 1,800, of various sizes, subservient to
4the central Chou Monarchy. The Chou rulers held the title of Wang or king. 
Their individual vassals bore one of five specific titles: those of kung, 
hou, po, tzu, nan, corresponding to the Western titles of duke, marquis, 
earl, viscount, and baron respectively. The structure of the system was
— 18“
hieiurchical and most feudal lords were dependent upon the Chou monarchy for 
lands, subsidies, and protection against each other. However, due to the 
difficulty of transportation and communication among the feudal units and 
the development of internal administrative mechanisms, the nobles enjoyed 
a considerable autonomy within their own states. They maintained their own 
armies, created sub-vassals and fiefs, conducted construction projects, 
operated the tax system, and controlled many other internal affairs.
In theory, the feudal states were not supposed to expand their ter­
ritory at the expense of their neighbors withou royal sanction. But actually 
in some cases they fought wars with each other over territorial spoils. In 
the Spring and Autumn period, due to the weakness of the Chou central mon­
archy, the strength and independence of feudal lords grew rapidly at the ex­
pense of the central Chou authority.^ The Chou monarchs were unable to 
prevent the eventual growth of power among the many vassals who had succeeded 
in building self-sufficient states. This pattern of strong vassals and weak 
central power developed markedly during the period of the Western Chou.
By the beginning of the eighth century B.C., the rulers of the vassal 
states were already able to fight against each other and even against the 
Chou monarchy itself. Some of them started to call themselves kings (wang) 
rather than dukes (kung). Ironically, in 707 B.C. the Chou monarch's army
g
was defeated by one of the vassals. The system was gradually turned into 
one characterized by the central monarchy having to rely for its prestige 
and power on those theoretically subordinate to it. The pattern of dependency 
had become reversed. The central authority of the Chou came to have only a 
certain symbolic and ceremonial importance indicating of the theoretical 
unity of China.
Furthermore, rudimentary forms of nationalism grew up within the 
independent states, replacing the popular patriotism toward the village
• 19-
Map 1
The Period of Spring and Autumn: Political 
Boundaries of China about 560 B.C., 
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Source: Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition: Analysis of 
Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1965), p.4.
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chiels and the central "Son of Heaven" of the earlier period. The differences
in dialects, customs, ways of life and cults among the states began to be
recognized and emphasized by the people while the concept of nationalism was
quite primitive. Many famous and capable men had served as prime ministers
or generals in several different states. The development of nationalism made
it easy for the rulers in the Warring States period to organize peasant
militias and armies to fight their wars for them with the feeling that they
were struggling for the sovereignty, independence, and honor of their own
states, not just as a duty to a feudal lord. (Map 1)
Among the hundreds of states in the period of Spring and Autumn,
there were about twelve states which were important in international politics.
They were Lu (•'f'), Ch'i ( ^ ) , Chin ( ^ ) , Ch'in ( ^ ) , Ch'u , Sung
Wei , Cheng (f p), Ch'en , Ch'ai , Wu (J;), and Yueh
However, only five of these states were classified as great powers and played
the role of leadership in China during this period.
Generally speaking, there were about eleven barbarian groups outside
the "Middle Kingdom", a term which referred to a culture center rather than
to the center of a race.^^ They were called Bird Yi, Lo, Jong, Mountain
12Jong, North Jong, West Jong, Ti, Chin Man, Yueh Tribe, P'o, and Pa. Fre­
quently, these barbarians were great threats to the cultural center. Tradi­
tionally, the Chinese term ''nei-yu-wai-huan" (inside disorder and outside 
calamity) expressed the close relationship between internal strength and 
external order. One could not long survive without the other; that is, "when
the barbarians were not submissive abroad, rebels might more easily arise 
13within". Thus, all rulers through the succession of historical dynasties 
have been forced to deal with foreign affairs inaccordance with this theory 
in order to confirm their reign in China.
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The Frequency of Wars in the Ch 'un-Ch'iu Period
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At the beginning of Spring and Autumn period, the international scene 
was a "one-power-predominance" of Ch'i state, the first hegemonial leader, 
and then an international system of bipolarity between Chin bloc and Ch'u 
bloc. However, this system of bipolarity during the period of peace persisted 
under an atmosphere of cold war for about forty years. Then, the system of 
bipolarity was gradually turned into one of multipolarity when Chin failed 
to deter Ch'u's attack Ch'ai in 506 B.C.^^ Along with the decline of Chin, 
Ch'i grew stronger and Wu in the South emerged as a great power with the 
capability to deter Ch'u.
The end of the Spring and Autumn period was marked by the internal 
confusion of Chin and its splitting into fragments: the three states of Ilan, 
Wei, and Chao, Therefore, the sphere of the Chou system was expanded gre­
atly and the system was characterized by a greater diffusion of power as a 
result of the constant fighting. A system of multi-polarity emerged and the 
power centers increased numerously. In general, there were seven major powers 
in the international system. The struggle for power among those great centers 
began the period of Warring States. (Table 1)
(2) The Foreign Policy of Five Great Powers (Wu Pa )
and the Politics and Diplomacy of the League.
Scholarly attempts to identify the five Leaders of Hegemony, Wu Pa, 
has resulted in controversy. Consensus is that the five Pa were Duke Huan 
of Ch'i, Duke Wen of Chin, Duke Mu of Ch'in, Duke Hsiang of Sung, and King 
Chuang of Ch'u. Strictly speaking, only Duke Huan, Duke Wen, and King Chuang 
were the three most important with power enough to lead all the other states 
in the Chou system.
However, among the five leading powers of hegemony, only Ch'i and 
Chin were regarded as the successful and legitimate leaders in the Chou 
system. Others were treated as barbarians, which included the western
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bari..rian, Ch'in, and the southern barbarian Ch'u. Here a brief look at the 
foreign policies of the great powers is in order.
1) Duke Huan of Ch'i, Duke Wen of Chin and Their Descendants.
a) Long-range Policy Goal: Like all the other states, the national 
goal of Ch'i and Chin was isastery over their contemporary states which in­
cluded enlarging their territories through the annexation of the small states.
b) General Principles of Foreign Policy: Both Ch'i and Chin were 
guided by a general principle which was termed "respecting the central au­
thority of the Chou monarch and protecting Chinese confederation from bar­
barian invasion" (tsun-wang iang-i ^  Z . )• In fact, this principle 
was more a technique for them to attract the other states under their leader­
ship through a legitimate approach.
Through the whole period of Spring and Autumn, the Chinese confe­
deration of Chou was constantly bothered by outside barbarian invasions,
such as Ti and San Jung in the north, Ch'in and Western Jung in the west,
16and Ch'u, Wu, Yueh and other barbarians in the south. So, it was naturally 
an urgent task for the great powers like Ch'i and Chin to unite the other 
small states for a self-defense system as well as for the garrison of the 
Chou Monarchy. Confucius awarded the credit to Duke Huan and his minister 
Kuan Chung for saving China from barbarian invasions, and said:
Kuan Chung acted as prime minister to the Duke Huan, made him leader 
of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to 
the present day, the people enjoy the gifts which he conferred. But for 
Kuan Chung, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets 
of our coats buttoning on the left side.
c) Strategy of Foreign Policy: The word "hegemony" or ^  is based 
on the concept of power instead of virtue, or just pretending virtue as the 
sugarcoat. Ch'i and Chin were no exceptions. They took advantage of their 
leading position to control and dictate the small states who were already
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weak J.11 the name of the Chou Monarchy. The Discourse of Warring States (Char.
Kuo Ts'e) stated:
In the past time, Duke lluan liad led all nobles into leagues toi 
nine times under the title of King Hsiang of Chou authority. By res­
pecting the monarch, he established his leadership. Through the acti­
vities of nine conventions Duke Huan was respected by the other states 
no less than what the Chou monarch received. ®
To form a league and alliance were also useful for increasing their
national prestige for leadership purpose. Both Ch'i and Chin were very active
in pursuing this strategy. Diplomatic contacts among the states during the
period of Spring and Autumn were frequent and resulted in alliances, treaty
organizations, leagues, conventions, and conferences. In the entire period,
19there were 206 times such meetings according to historical records. The
politics of league and alliance diplomacy was conducted variously as part
of a struggle for power and leadership; for self-defense, independence,
survival and security; in connection with warfare and invasion; for mutual
assistance; in connection with peace settlements; and for other social and 
20economic reasons.
The use the military force has always been an instrument of national 
power. This was true also for Ch'i and Chin, However, based on Sun Tzu's 
principle of war, they tried to limit the use of force to the minimum and 
to utilize political power to the maximum. During Duke Huan period, for
example, there were nine peace convenirions but only four military con-
. 21 ferences.
2) The Foreign Policy of Ch'u, Ch'in, Wu and Yueh
The main goal embodied in the foreign policies of these states, 
especially Ch'u, was that of conquering the Chou confederation and esta­
blishing their leadership and hegemony. Since they were regarded as the 
barbarians, they could not take advantage of the policy of "respecting the 
central monarch and repelling the barbarian" to dictate to their fellow
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Kl.at.cs as (Jli'i and (thin did. Wliat tiicy could do was only lo l u a x  1mlz c  I hoi i 
diplomatic manipulation, through whicii their power and prestige could he 
increased in order to compete with the Ch'i or Chin bloc. Throughout this 
period, Ch'u was in effect a great power which, along with its satellites, 
constituted a collective defense system against the legitimate Chin bloc, 
somewhat analogues to bloc politics between the U.S. and Soviet groups during 
the 1950's.
In ancient China as well as in contemporary times, the middle and 
small states, which are important components of a bloc, have been the targets 
of the foreign policies of the big powers. During the Spring and Autumn period, 
the small states sucii as Ch'en, Ch'ai, Hsu, and especially Cheng were geogra­
phically located among the great powers— Ch'i, Chin, and Ch'u-- and were the
22buffer zone of the two blocs. Chin and Ch'u. Through almost entire period
the immediate goal of Ch'u's foreign policy was gaining the allegiance of
these buffer states. For the buffer states, it was naturally the question
of selecting Chin or Ch'u as allies since neutrality was impossible. Generally
speaking, Ch'en, Ch'ai and IIsu were allied with Ch'u and Sung and Lu and Wei
with Chin although they sometimes shifted around, Cheng was between these
two blocs and could tip the balance of power although she herself was not a
big power. As a balancer, Cheng, therefore, became the target of military,
as well as political, struggles among the great powers. In addition, in a
weaker strategic position than Cheng's, Ch'en was an immediate step-stone
23for Ch'u to gain Cheng. For one hundred and twenty eight years, Cheng suf­
fered in the power struggle among the great powers both politically and mili­
tarily, including the most important battles of-Chao-ling, Ch'eng-p'u, and
24Yen-ling during the Spring and Autumn period. Like the present international 
situation, the buffer states or the Third World states have always tried to 
nnnHnf-t- V̂lP nnl i rv of non-alienment but in vain.
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in general, during the Spring and Autumn period, most of the great 
powers which aimed for leadership operated the so called policy of "allying 
the afar and/or big state and attacking the near and/or small state (vuan- 
chiao chin-kung and through the use of diplomatic manipulation.
The politics of conference and alliance (hui-meng cheng-chih /o )
was very popular. This diplomatic intercourse enriched the scene of inter­
national politics among the states and a rudimentary body of international 
law was founded through the interstate customs, principles and rules.
3) Rules and International Law of the System of the Chou Monarchy.
In his study, Professor Shih-Tsai Chen pointed out that during the
Spring and Autumn period there had already been the concept of the equality
of states and national independence, which have been a basic principle of
modern international law. Under the name of "li" (^-^), a great number of
rules were followed by Chinese feudal states in their intercourses within 
25the system. However, these rules of lî  did not apply to the barbarian
states which were outside the Chinese family of st:-tcs, since they had been
considered as culturally inferior and, therefore, could not be treated
equally. Professor Chen suggested several facts as evidence to support this
point in his study.
First, regardless of thier official rank, size, population, wealth,
military strength, or political influence, all the feudal lords were equally
addressed as "chun" (^), or sovereign, in interstate intercourse. Sometimes
27they even addressed each other as brothers.
Second, all the feudal states were of equal soveriegnty one with 
another and "equally independent one from another". "In law, none of the 
feudal lords was subject to the jurisdiction of any other of them." Under 
this principle the concept of diplomatic immunities found its rational basis
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28in ancient China.
Third, no matter whether they were great, middle or small powers,
all the feudal states with similar status in the Chinese Chou syslein were
equal in rights and obligations under the rules of international law. They
were equal in the awards of arbitration protected by the law and equal in
the stipulations of treaties which were equally binding upon them. In the
bilateral and multilateral treaties reciprocity of rights and obligations 
29was very common.
Fourth, "the wills and acts of the feudal states with similar status
30belonging to the Chinese family of states had equal value in law". The
signatures of different states in the treaties contained the equal value
although politically, it might result differently in the enforcement of the
treaties. The rules that treaties could bind only the contracting parties
presented a rational basis in ancient China.
However, in the Spring and Autumn period, the Chou monarchy had a
special position in law and, therefore, was not equal but superior to the
feudal states. The principle of the equality of states applied only to the
states of Chinese feudal system, the so-called "lieh-kuo" (5'jl^). The will
of the Chou monarch could in theory override that of the feudal lords and
there could be no treaty between the former and the latter. Moreover, the
feudal states, theoretically and legally, could not wage war against the
Chou authority, and "The Son of Heaven had no wars but only expeditions"
31which were armed strifes between superiors and inferiors. According to
the same theory, the armed conflicts between the Chinese and the barbarian
states could not be termed as wars, and simply, the notion prevailed that
32the Chinese always defeated the barbarians. However, the idea of "bar­
barian" was determined not by race but by behavior, and the ancient Chinese
—28—
33concept of international law was cultural rather than racial. For example, 
at the end of Spring and Autumn period and during the Warring States period, 
many states of the Chou system became "new" barbarians because of their be­
havior such as Wu and Yueh.^^ And naturally the rules of international law 
did not apply to them thereafter.
In practical international politics there were several rules and 
principles existing in the Chou system which were especially important for 
the great powers searching for leadership. The first was "li" (ritual, cour­
tesy, propriety). In addition to the rules of international law mentioned 
above, in practical politics the feudal states, especially the great powers, 
in the Chou system should follow the principle of "respecting the Chou mon­
archy and deterring the barbarians". The official mythology and customary 
rules of behavior which were presented in the writings of Confucian School 
emphasized feudal unity, order, obedience to the "Son of Heaven", harmonious 
relationships and the necessity of hierarchy. In practice, it was discounted, 
and, in a system of many powerful ambitious, and independent states, these 
rules and principles were anarchronisms or they served superficially as 
advantages for the big states in their power struggles. Therefore, Mencius 
and Hsun Tzu, the Confucian followers, were against the concept of hegemonial 
leadership and criticized the five leaders in the Spring and Autumn period
because their leaderships were based simply upon power and statecraft rather
35than the appropriate li.
More than the concept of the humanistic principle the Confucian 
School suggested an idea of natural law, the Mandate of Heaven, which tried 
to apply the mythological religious octh and conmlttance to the political 
reality. There were numerous examples in the "politics of alliance and league".
The second rule and principle in conducting international relations
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was ' teh" (:(%), the virtue. For the great powers teh was a very important 
factor for them to win their fellow brother states' support for leadership.
It was mentioned that under prime minister Kuan Chung's suggestion, Duke
Huan of Ch'i was very careful in using the forces in order not to reverse
37the virtue. Therefore, the later leaders were regarded as less virtuous 
as Duke Huan due to their gradual ignoring of virtue in favor of their own 
self-interest.
The third set of rules and principles was the "yi" (|^, righteousness
and the "hsin" trustworthiness, good faith, or sincerity, which were
also important principles, and were the required factors for the great powers
to establish their leadership, Hsun Tzu said: "The leadership of hegemony
38was established upon trustworthiness". He regarded it as the "way" to a 
leading position among the states. For instance, after Duke Huan of Ch'i 
formed a league with his fellow states, Cheng was attacked by Ch'u in 666 B.C. 
In order to perform its commitment, Ch'i consulted with Lu and Sung and sent 
forces to save Cheng from invasion. This action was appraised with merit 
through international public opinion and Duke Huan's prestige increased 
greatly,
A superior man (chun-tzu) will say, "If there be not the appendage 
of good faith, covenants are of no use. It is said in the Poems ' The
king is continually insisting on covenants, and the disorder is thereby
increased;'— which was from the want of good faith".
In a league, suspicions among the members are common. Therefore, 
trustworthiness will decide its fate.^l
Duke Huan was also applauded by his fellow nobles for his fighting
a just war to help the Yen state against barbarian Mountain Jung's aggression
in 674 B.C,^^ The idea of righteousness was expressed through this operation
and this concept was prerequired and supplemented by teh, and hsin into
a systematic way (tao) to leadership. That is why early leaders such as
Duke Huan of Ch'i and Duke Wen of Chin have been appraised at a higher position
-30-
than other leaders by Confucianlsts.
In general, these idealistic rules were somewhat psychological and 
intangible forces in character. In the later years of the Spring and Autumn 
period and especially during the period of Warring States, they were ignored 
and overridden by the realistic power political concepts suggested by the 
Legalists.
(3) Conclusion
Several points can be concluded at the end of the Spring and Autumn
period.
Through several hundred years of international intercourses, many 
barbarian races around the frontier of the Chou system were absorbed into 
the Chinese race and, therefore, culturally civilized, such as states like 
Ch’in, Ch’u, Ti barbarian, Wu, Yueh etc. Following the cultural expansion, 
the boundary of the Chinese system of states was enlarged to a great extent: 
west to present Shensi and Kansu; north to Hopei; south to Hunan, and east 
to the sea. This formed the basic Chinese territory thereafter.
In social, economic and literary fields, there were great changes.
The feudal system broke down and the merchant class emerged. Education became 
popular and the pragmatic humanitarianism took over the religious mythology. 
When Confucius set up his school of thought, the golden age of philosophy 
began. Thereafter, "a hundred schools contended and a hundred flowers blos­
somed". Numerous scholars and statemen appeared, and Chinese scholarship 
turned into a new era.
Due to the breakdown of the feudal system, Chinese society was in 
chaos. The international anarchy was characterized with power politics. A 
movement for unity had been felt necessary and urgent during the Warring 
States period. This hope was finally realized by Ch’in in 221 B.C.
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Map
The Period of Warring States :









•  C H ’»




C H  I N
C H ' U
SH  U










China in c. ̂ jo B.C.
Source: Jacques Gernet, Ancient China: from the Beginning to 
the Empire (Berkeley, Calif.: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1968), p.97.
-32-
B) The Chan-Kuo (Warring States) Period, 403-221 B.Cv
(1) International System and Politics.
The intermediate period between Ch * un-Ch ' iu and Chan-Kuo was an inter­
national system of four power centers: Chin, Ch'i, Ch'u, and Yueh. When the 
Chou monarch. King Wei-lieh, endowed the "feudal state" title to the Three 
Chins (Han, Chao and Wei) in 403 B.C., the period of Warring States began.
Due t o  several hundred years of international intercourse and cul­
tural txpansion in the Spring and Autumn period, the Chinese system of inter­
national politics had been greatly enlarged as the Warring States period 
started. The beginning of the period was a scene of struggle for power through 
conquest and territorial annexation among the feudal states. Externally, at 
this time the great powers met each other frequently for alliance and mutual 
assistance purposes. Internally, they began their social, political, and 
economic reforms. For example, in 356 B.C. Wei Yang (Lord of Shang), was 
appointed to make a reform in Ch'in. The same type reforms were also per­
formed in Ch'i and several other states. Gradually, there appeared on the 
scene seven great powers in the international system. They were Yen ( ^ ) ,
Chao ($^, Han (|^), Wei ( ^ , Ch'i (^), Ch'u ( j ^ , Ch'in (:^), the so-
44called "Seven Powers of Chan-Kuo". (Map 2)
In brief, the entire Warring States period was one of constant wars 
among these seven powers under the general strategic policies of balance 
of power: "Ho-Tsung.^.M*L" (Vertical Alliance) and "Lien-Heng " (Hori­
zontal coalition). At that time, the Chou monarch was extremely weak as a 
small power, although he was still regarded as the center of the Chinese 
system, the Son of Heaven. But, starting in 354 B.C. battles among the great 
powers became more severe and many famous military strategists such as Sun 
Pin or Sun Tzu and Wu Ch'i appeared. In 334 B.C., rulers of Wei and Ch'i 
began to entitle themselves as wang or king, which was the same rank as the
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Chou monarch. Rulers of other powers followed without h e s i t a tion.There­
after, Chou authority was completely ignored. In 256 B.C., the Chou monarch 
was attacked and conquered by Ch'in. The annexation of Chou territory by 
Ch'in toppled the superficial "Son of Heaven", and the Chou Dynasty came to 
an end.^^
Shang Yang's reform gave Ch'in a new life and Ch'in immediately 
emerged as a more powerful nation overriding the other powers. In the process 
of power struggles by military forces, Ch'in adopted Chang Yi's foreign policy 
of Lien-Heng to divide the alliance of its rivals by manipulating the contra­
dictions among them. By correct handling of military power and diplomatic 
technique, Ch'in gradually defeated and conquered the other six powers one 
by one. In 221 B.C., under Ch'in's rule a strong unified Chinese empire ap­
peared for the first time.
(2) The Foreign Policies of the Seven Powers
Unlike in the period of Spring and Autumn, the foreign policies of 
great powers in the Warring States international system concentrated on the 
concepts of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. Ch'in, located in the west, was a great 
power and a potential threat to the bordering states, and others too. There­
fore, the only possible solution was a Horizontal Alliance, where any state 
would ally with Ch'in to attack others, or of a Vertical Alliance, where the 
other states would form a united front against Ch'in. The purpose of the 
policy of Ho-Tsung was to deter Ch'in's aggression under a collective defense 
system which Ch'in was obviously worried about. Hoping to break the tie and 
diminish the effectiveness of this collective defense system, Ch'in devoted 
herself to winning any power or states among them by various means including 
the use of military threat, a promise of sharing the profit, and correctly 
handling the contradictions among the opponents. Because of these premises
•0 4 “
of self-interest among the states, the policy of llo-'lsung Imd never seemed 
effective enough to check Ch'in's expansions through the entire period,^^
In genera?the foreign policies of the great powers during the 
Warring States period oscillated between Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng according 
to the appropriate situation and specific individual national interest. In 
the case of Ch'in, Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng had been alternately utilized 
along with national expansion. Moreover, its flexible manipulation of the 
contradictions among the states and the strategy of allying and attacking, 
including the use of a fifth column, determined Ch'in's rule of China,
(3) Rules and Laws of the International System
Unlike during the former period of Spring and Autumn, the previously 
established general rules of the international system no longer existed 
during the Warring States period. The only "rule" left was the struggle for 
power and securing self-interest. Therefore, the realist school and the con­
cept of Legalism reached their golden age while the idealist Taoism and Con­
fucianism declined. Great advocates of Legalism, men such as Wei Yang, Su 
Ch'in, Chang Yi, Sun Pin, and Wei Liao, were very active and popular among 
the leaders of the great powers at that time. Even the Confucian follower,
Hsun Tzu, became a realistic thinker though he still kept Confucian principles 
in mind. But his two students, Li Ssu and Han Fei were determined to be 
famous Legalists,
The period during this new international system differed greatly 
from that of the period of Spring and Autumn, The Chou monarchy was no longer 
respected and was even conquered. The feudal system collapsed completely.
Most states were complete independence and equality from one another. The 
ruels and concepts of 1^, yi, hsin, and teh, which were popular in the 
Spring and Autumn period, no longer existed. In the struggle for power, most
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Table 2
The Frequency of Wars in the Chan-Kuo Period
Years W ar score in each year o f decade* T otal Peaceful
u.c. I 2 3 4 5 G 7 8 9 10 WÛ score yea: s
............... . . .  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 3 5 9 1 71
ir .3 -m  ............... . . .  0 0 0 0 0 15 0 15 15 0 4 5 i  115 7 123
4 11-131 .................. . .  0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 1 0 j
............. . . .  0 1 5 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 4 5 7 l
43 3 ^ 1 4  ............... . .  0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8 10 } 31 8 20
113-101 .................. . .  4 15 0 2 6 3 0 0 0 0 10..- 1
i
5 !
103 301 .................. . .  0 2 5 5 0 15 0 0 15 3 5 3 5 175 4 :
303-3RI ................ . .  0 2 5 15 0 15 2 4 5 0 2 18.5 j GO 3 10
3R3-3T4 ............... . .  0 0 e 15 5 5 15 3 5 15 0 7.5 21 ? i
373-3(11 ............... ..  3A 0 4 4 4 0 3 15 4 0 25 2 1
303-3.31 ............... . .  5 2 0 0 2 3 5 0 15 4 5 5 235 • 575 3 s 11
333-314 ............... . .  2 2 0 0 0 « 0 0 2 0 8 G !
343 331 ............... ..  0 2 r> 4 15 0 0 0 1 18.5
333-324 ............... . .  5 1 5 2 4 2 15 0 4 0 2 20 - GG5 2 !• s
323-311 ............... ..  2 0 0 2 G 7 3 5 o 3.5 2 28 2 (
313-304 ............... ..  8 1 5 15 0 2 2 2 5 0 4 21
303-201 ............... . .  0 10 2 2 G 0 4 5 5 V 3 315 85 2 l 6
203-284 ............... . .  0 2 4 2 2 2 5 5 0 8 2 295 1 i
283-274 ............... ..  2 2 C 4 2 2 3 3 2 4 30 ' 0 1
27.3-201 .................. . .  4 2 4 2 2 0 o 4 o 2 24 /o 1  ̂ 5
203-234 .................. . .  4 2 2 0 ü 4 7 3 0 0 ■‘ i233 241 .................. . .  0 2 0 5 2 10 2 0 2 2 25 31
243-231 .................. . .  2 8 2 0 2 0 2 3 2 2 23 ■ 68 2 r G
233-224 .................. . .  2 2 2 2 2 0 4 2 2 2 20 1 1
223 -222 ...............
242-ycar total ..




• T h e  "war score” is calcu lated  as follows: In any single cam paign, each o f the seven m ajor powers involved is com puted a s ^ n c  
p oin t, w hile each sm all sta te is com puted as one ha lf point. T h e  yearly  score is the total points o f  all cam paigns in that year, i he  
seven major powers arc C h'i, C h’in . Cii’u, Chao. Han, W ei. and Yen.
Source: Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis 
of Social Mobility, 722-222 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1955), Table 6.
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of the individual states resorted to the use of force externally and to na­
tional political, economical, and social reforms internally. Comparatively, 
warfare at this time became crueler, longer and larger involving much more 
manpower, although the number of wars was smaller than that of the Spring 
and Autumn period, (see Table 1 and Table 2) Some new weapons were invented 
at this time, such as ''yun-t'i a scaling ladder to climb the city
wall, and "kou-chu the hooked claws used in naval battles. Most of
the states started to build great walls along their frontiers which later
were formed by the First Emperor of Ch'in (Shih Huang-ti) into the famous 
49"Great Wall". Moreover, the components of national power were now based 
not only upon the number of four-horse military chariots as before, but also 
upon such factors as population, political and social systems, national mo­
rale, manipulation of diplomacy, etc. which have been regarded as requirements 
of a national power in modern times.
Indeed, like its name implies this period was a system of anarchism 
and a constant state of war. (Table 2)
(4) The Unification of China
In 221 B.C. Ch'in brought the warring states system to an end and 
unified China. There were several reasons vby Ch'in was able to achieve this 
change that resulted in unification.
First, a comparatively new state, Ch'in acknowledged a smaller gap 
between the feudal noble class and the proletarian peasant class than that 
of the other states. It was therefore easier to make more extensive political, 
social, and economic reforms. Especially, after the national reform by Wei 
Yang in 356 B.C., Ch'in became a Spartan-like social and political system 
and totalitarian centralist state, while other states such as Ch'i, Ch'u, 
and the "Three Chins" remained under the feudal system and order. Class
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conflicts were more radical, and the political and social system was less 
consolidated. Occasional peasant rebellions corrupted the political and 
social system and weakened national power with the consequence of defeat by 
external invasions. For example, the greatest peasant uprising during the 
Warring States period was led by Chuang Ch'iao in Ch'u in 301 B.C. This 
rebellion corrupted Ch'u and aided Ch'in's success.
Second, effective reforms in political, social, and economic fields 
made Ch'in a stronger power. The Legalist oriented administrative centralism 
increased efficiency in external and internal affairs. In the process of 
imperialistic expansion that led to unification, Ch'in could consolidate the 
occupied areas through the extension of its political, social and economic 
system. The national power of Ch'in was continuously increased along with 
its military advances, and finally all competition was eliminated.
Third, there was a general desire for unification. Due to the constant 
international anarchy and social chaos the people were searching for peace, 
and they were willing to support those states that could provide them the 
political, social, and economic need required for unification. Unlike other 
states, Ch'in was competent to do this.
Fourth, the rulers of Ch'in could appropriately use many able men 
to its advantage. Persons like Wei Yang and other Legalist men had been 
the ministers of Ch'in and contributed considerablly to the national develo­
pment. Moreover, in its struggle for power, Ch'in could effectively imdement 
the appropriate foreign policies and military strategies including the use 
of a fifth column. For instance, flexible use of the policies of Llen-Heng 
and Ho-Tsung had made Ch'in a superpower during the latter part of the 
Warring States period.
After Ch'in unified China in 221 B.C., its ruler entitled himself the First
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Emperor of Ch'in hoping to establish a permanent empire. He reinforced the 
Legalist concept of political centralism which made China a totalitarian 
stale for Llie first time in Chinese history. However, tlie radical Legalist 
concept could be employed only in a transitional stage rather than during a 
more tranquil period. Ch'in's tight control eventually generated the people's 
reaction, and the dictatorial policies finally induced peasant uprisings.
After no more than twenty years' rule, Ch'in was forced to yield its admini­
stration to the long-lasting Han Dynasty, which alternately adopted the pacific 
thoughts of Taoism and Confucianism.
II. SOURCES OF CONCEPTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
52Karl Marx points out that ideas are determined by material conditions. 
This was probably true in the case of Chinese history, especially during the 
Cn’un-Ch'iu and Chan-Kuo periods which have been regarded as China's golden 
age of thought even though under circumstances of chaos and anarchy.
Confucius and Lao Tzu spread their idealistic concepts of world 
order and philosophy during the latter part of Ch'un-Ch'iu period, and at 
that time international relations were still under a hierarchical feudal 
system and the international rule of "11". Therefore, Lao Tzu suggested a 
political philosophy of wu-wei (do-nothing, inaction) and Confucius 
conservatively urged the restoration of former Chou's hierarchical system 
as an ideal order. When the international system entered into the power- 
politics period of Chan-Kuo (Warring States), the idealistic thoughts 
declined and were overrided by the realistic thoughts of Mohist utilitarian­
ism and Legalism. Even Hsun Tzu, the great Confucian follower, due to a 
change of circumstances, also turned into a realist thinker. "His day was
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thougnt differ due to their own efforts, investigations and interpretations. 
Ail the great thinkers have been eager to discover this very Tan with their 
great efforts. For instance, Confucius said: "If a man in the morning hears 
the right way (Tao), he may die in the evening without regret".
(2) Tao; from Idealism to Realism, and the Synthesis
The Chinese schools of thought do not differ from each other on the 
cosmic world-view but on the temporal social world. Because the ages of Ch'un- 
Ch*iu and Chan-Kuo were abnormal with disharmony, different schools at that 
time suggested different theories for the purpose of correction and order.
For Lao Tzu and his followers, the Tao was no more than the following 
of nature and the principle of inaction, wu-wei « For Confucianism, the
Tao was no more than the humanistic relations of "Jen" (Xz:-), "Yi" (^), "Li"
2 nd the principle of hierarchy. For Mohism, the Tao was no more than 
searching for utility and the principle of practical profit. For Legalism, 
the Tao was no more than the realistic functions of law, authority, and
statecraft operating in Che social, economic and political fields. Hsun Tzu
commented on the various schools of thought:
In the past, the traveling scholars were blinded, so they had different 
schools of thought. Mo Tzu was blinded by utility and did not know the
value of culture. Sung Tzu was blinded by desire, but did not know (that
men seek for) gain. Shen Tzu was blinded by law but did not know (the 
value of) talent. Shen Tzu was blinded by authority but did not know 
wisdom. Hui Tzu was blinded by words but did not know facts. Chuang Tzu 
was blinded by what is of nature but did not know what is of man.
However, the idealist schools, Taoism and Confucianism interpreted 
the Tao through an idealistic viewpoint of optimism and suggested an ideal 
world in the future. Lao Tzu saw an ideal state where a sage ruler would 
undo all the causes of trouble in the world and would govern with non-action. 
Similarly, Confucians saw an ideal world state in the society of Ta-T'ung 
which Li Y un or Evolution of Rites one of the chapters in the Li Chi
or Records of Rites (t^*&i), states that "When the great Tao was in practice.
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Figure 1
The Trends of the Concept of International Politics 
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one of slaughter, licence, and sophistry. From this came his very low estimate 
of human nature, cardinal in his philosophy. He saw that while the idealism 
of Confucius might have worked in the ancient *Age of Peace' something sterner 
was needed for his own *Age of T r o u b l e ' , s t a t e d  Professor H. Creel. Tiu- 
transformation of thoughts from idealism to realism exactly revealed the trend 
of the international political and social systems at that time. (Figure 1)
A) Chinese Concept of World-View; Sinism
(1) Tao, Dialectical Materialism, and World Revolution
Chinese minds are primarily social and practical, and their true 
cosmos is anthropocentric rather than theocentric. Therefore, a leading prin­
ciple of Chinese natural philosophy is that the physical world is a world of 
action or phenomena which appear to be always in flux with little to do with 
any eternal verities, as opposed to assumptions of a static world and a world 
of s u b s t a n c e , I n  general, the Chinese believe that all the phenomena in 
the world in the realms of art, literature, philosophy, politics and religion, 
do not exist individually buc are closely associated with one another as a 
continuous whole. This is the spirit of Chinese culture and the concept of 
"Tao" (ĵ ) , —  the Truth, the Harmony, the Order, the Way--by which all things 
come to be. If the idea of Tao could be put into a modern western term, it 
would correspond to the concept of "natural law".
This monistic concept of the cosmos was typical dialectical materialism 
and was first indicated in the ancient writing of Yi Chine, Book of Changes, 
which stated:
Heaven and earth existing, all (material) things then got their 
existence. All (material) things having existence, afterwards there 
came male and female. From the existence of male and female there came 
afterwards husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father 
and son. From father and son there came ruler and minister. From ruler 
and minister there came high (superior) and low (inferior). When the 
distinction of high and low had existence, afterwards came the arrange­
ments of propriety and righteousness.
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Thertfore, the universe Is regarded as a current with no reality but only a
transitional process, the YI (Change). In this change, "there la no thought,
no action. It is in itself still and calm; but, when acted on, It penetrates
forthwith to all phenomena and events in the u n i v e r s e " . L a o  Tzu also wrote:
"From the Tao there comes One; from One comes Two; from Two comes Three; from
Three comes all t h i n g s . C h u a n g  Tzu followed the idea that "The world and
I have a common origin and all creatures and I together are one. Being one,
our Oneness can be expressed.«, or unexpressed. The one, with the expression,
makes two, and the two, with one (what is unexpressed), make three. From there 
58on ... " In the Universe there is a cosmic force which produces in turn 
the "Yin" (f^), the passive element, the response, the matter or earth, and 
the "Yang" (pjjj), the active element, the challenge, the form or heaven, and 
through the interaction of these two elements, challenge and response, springs 
life and all things. With the concept of Yin and Yang there is the idea of 
relativity, negative and positive, life and death, right and wrong etc. More­
over, the Yang represents the constructive force of the universe and the Yin 
represents the destructive force. The Universe, the process of change and the 
struggle between status quo and revolution, all things appear. It is in per­
manent revolutionary and endless change.
Similarly, the Chinese see the human relationship among individuals, 
societies, interstates in the world as a harmonious whole. This great harmony 
has been examplified in natural phenomena. Like nature, it may sometimes be 
abnormal but there is no concept of evil as substance. It will become good 
as soon as proper relationships are restored. The Chinese believe that once
the disharmony occurs there is a way or Tao. "the right way, and the only
59way for the affairs of the cosmos to be carried on". It is the very revo­
lutionary Tao which the historical Chinese sages and philosophers have been 
searching for, and it is the very starting point which the various schools of
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the world was common (or public) to all; ... On the contrary, the realist
schools, Mohism and Legalism interpreted the Tao through the realistic view­
point of pessimism as a practical means or a right way to control the world 
disorder in order to restore the universal harmony. Mohists suggested prag­
matism and utilitarianism, and the Legalists saw the law, the authority, and 
the statecraft as the proper tools for social and political management.
From the past thousands of years of human experience and practice in 
Chinese history, present Chinese Maoism is trying to synthesize the idealism 
and realism, the form and matter, into a better transformation under the con­
cept of Tao. In other words, Chinese Communists see the Tao in the Maoist 
doctrine, the synthesis of reason or theory and practice in the principle 
of dialectical materialism.
B) The Naturalistic School; Lao Tzu and Taoism
Lao Tzu and his followers are the great interpreters on the theory 
of Tao along the cosmic system of nature. Their first principle is that Tao 
is the law of nature and the right way concerning the relations between man 
and nature. Through the experienced phenomena, the universe is great and 
perfect which is well beyond human comprehension, "Look at it but you cannot 
see it! Its name is formless. Listen to it but you cannot hear it! Its name 
is soundless. Grasp it but you cannot get it! Its name is bodiless. These 
three are unfathomable; therefore, they blend into o n e . T o  follow the 
law of nature is the right way or Tao to reach the great harmony. Thus,
"Man follows the ways of the earth; the earth follows the ways of the heaven; 
the heaven follows the ways of the Tao; the Tao follows its own ways (the 
nature),
The Tao for Taoists is neither moral nor theistic but a neutral and 
impartial principle which governs all things in the universe and is devoid
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of human volition and emotion. It is, therefore, under the principle of mate­
rialism. The heaven and earth for Taoists are not under human control. Indeed, 
they dominate man; they treat all creatures alike as "straw dogs". In other 
words, Tao is working on its own way and is all-powerful and perfect.
From the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, Taoists see history and the 
universe as dialectical materialism. They regard the phenomena in the world 
as a relativity. Somewhat like the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Lao Tzu 
stated, for instance, "All things under heaven are born of existence; exis­
tence is born of non-existence."^^ ... "The Tao gives birth to one; one gives 
birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to all myriad 
t h i n g s . ... "When the great Tao is abandoned, there appear charity and 
duty. ... When darkness and disorder reign, there appear loyalists.
Chuang Tzu also regarded the concept of "right" and "wrong" as relative.
"This is why a sage harmonizes the different systems of right and wrong, and
68rests in the revolving of Nature." This "revolving of Nature", for Chuang 
Tzu, was not in the sense of destroying but transcending, and it represented 
the spontaneous revolving change going on in all things. Therefore, the 
Taoist concepts of dialectics and relativity are revolutionary and it is the 
characteristic movement of Tao. "A complete reversing is the movement of the 
Tao. " I f  the quality of a thing has developed to its highest pitch, then 
that quality inevitably changes and becomes its o p p o s i t e . P u t t i n g  this 
revolutionary concept into the temporal society, it provides certain justi­
fication for the movements of revolution in Chinese history. It is the "Man­
date cf Heaven" in traditional Confucian terms and the "World Revolution" 
in current Maoist and Communist language.
Idealistic Taoism was popular in the late period of Spring and Autumn 
and the early part of the Warring States period. But it was overridden by
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Legaiism when the international situation entered into chaos. However, when 
the unified Ch'in Empire fell in 206 B.C. and the Han Empire was established, 
the pacific oriented Taoism gained its popularity in the early prosperous 
era under Emperors Wen and Ching (SC^^-L/a) of the Han Dynasty until 136 B.C.
when Confucianism was made orthodoxy under the reign of Emperor Wu-ti ).
(1) Lao Tzu
1) Wu-Wei and Dialectical Materialism.
Following his cosmic concept of Tao, Lao Tzu suggested the idea of 
Wu-Wei, do-nothing or inaction, as the basic theme of political theory. He 
believed that all authorities and institutions are man-made and artificial, 
and that all moral norms and social standards are contrary to the spirit of 
nature, Tao. Those who are busy in setting up the social system, institutions, 
and even the project of nationalistic universalism are responsible for the 
miseries and disorders of the human being.Let there be no goodness or badness, 
no justice or unjustice, no beauty or ugliness, because they are all man-
created and there are no such things in nature. Let all the concepts of
"must", "should", and "ought" be done away with because they are subjective
and prescriptive. He believed all people who follow the natureal way will be
in happiness. Some people see Taoism as a negative thought. However, what 
Lao Tzu urged was to teach people this basic characteristic of nature and 
consequently to follow the natural way without reluctance. In this sense,
Lao Tzu was realistic. As a matter of fact, he implied that man should do
what the man's reason dictates according to his natural tendency rather than 
reversing the existing facts and human rationality.^^
2) Wu-Wei and Class Struggle
Lao tzu's theory of do-nothing is critical. He believed that current 
society had done too much and this excess had resulted in social disorder
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and human disharmony. Whenever there is exploitation between the ruling and 
the ruled, conflict and struggles result. Lao Tzu explained;
The world is won by refraining. How do I know this is so? By this:
As taboos increase, people grow poorer; when weapons abound, the state 
grows chaotic; where skills multiply, novelties flourish; as statutes 
increase, more criminals start. So the Wise Man will say: As I refrain, 
the people will reform, since I like quiet, they will keep order; when 
I forebear, the people will prosper; when I want nothing, they will be
honest.72
3) Wu-Wei and International Power Politics.
Similarly, putting Lao Tzu's philosophy of wu-wei into an inter­
national political setting, he believes that the international system will 
be stable through inaction and by reducing the desire of interest. World 
disorders are due to the desire of searching for national interest and the 
interferences of great powers. Today, for instance, the so-called nationalistic 
universalism is the root of all the causes of the international state of con­
flict. The developments of science and weapons, the concepts of "national 
interest", "prestige" and the ideologies of "democracy" and others comprise 
the factors of world disorder. For Lao Tzu, all these actions are artifical 
and are away from the Tao. They are doomed to fail.
When one desires to win over the world by action, I find that he will 
never have a moment of rest. The possession of the world is something 
ordained by nature. It cannot be gained‘by action, or held. Those who 
try to gain by action are sure to fail; those who try to hold are sure 
to lose.73
It should also be understood that the whole world will be won by 
inaction rather than by action. "By letting go, it all gets done; the world 
is won by those who let it go. But when you try and try, the world is then 
beyond the winning."7^
4) Anti-aggression and Anti-imperialism.
Furthermore, Lao Tzu also realistically admitted that sometimes the 
use of military force and interstate war are inevitable, but they should be
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eliminated to the maximum because of their evil nature. War among nations
is a human catastrophe and should be avoided as much as possible. The fact
that the gain from war is generally less than that from avoiding war should
be understood by statesmen and policy makers. Therefore, war should not be
glorified and employed enthusiastically.^^
Moreover, Lao Tzu suggests that only by following the Tao or the
virtue of nature, not by che force, can a nation get sufficient support to
be a leader in the world. Conquest through war should not be encouraged.
Imperialism through force should be severely condemned.
Those who use Tao in assisting the ruler do not resort to war for 
the conquest of the world. War is a most calamitous evil. Wherever armies 
are quartered, briars and thorns become rampant. Famines inevitably follow 
in the wake of great wars.
5) Tao and Strategy
However, once war occurrs, stratagem should be planned and trickery
should be a p p l i e d . A c c o r d i n g  to the Tao, everything is the universe is
relative. Wise policy-makers are satisfied when an appropriate attack is
stopped, and they do not venture to pursue conquest for supremacy. The victors
should limit themselves and not be vainglorious, aggressive, arrogant, or
anxious for supremacy through conquest, because it is contrary to the Tao
for the strong to do harm to the weak. Those who act contrary to the Tao are
78doomed to perish early.
Thus, Lao Tzu argued that even the utilization of warfare as a means
of foreign policy should be based on the appropriate nature of Tao. The best
leaders are supported by virtue and Tao; they do not shun them; and therefore,
none in the world can compete with such leaders.
The best warriors are not warlike. The best strategists are not im­
pulsive. The best winners are not quarrelsome. The best leaders are not 
arrogant. All these indicate the virtue of noncontention, the ability 
to employ men, compliance with Heaven's sublime way.-
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According to the Tao Lao Tzu suggests a strategy of defensive war. He points
out; "One of the ancient strategists said: 'I do not venture to fight an
offensive war; I prefer to be on the defensive.,..’" As to the political-
military strategic policy, the power of supposed enemies should be carefully
calculated and not be underestimated. This is the key factor in not being 
81defeated.
6) lao and Foreign Relations
Regarding international diplomatic relations, Lao Tzu suggested that
states should practice humility, especially the great powers. The small
nations, like the female, the Yin, are willing to occupy a passive, responsive,
and subordinate position to serve or to cooperate with their big brothers.
Therefore, if the great powers are humble with virtue according to the Tao,
the minor powers will be willing to remain under the protection of their big
brothers. Thus, there are mutual benefits. The great powers have expended
82nothing more than humility and the world is governed by harmony. True, 
today if the great powers can be humble with virtue instead of arrogant with 
power, cooperative regionalism could probably be achieved harmoniously,
7) Wu-Wei and Utopian Society
Extending the idea of inaction, Lao Tzu's concept of the foreign 
policy of states is isolationism with international intercourse and communi­
cation being minimized as much as possible. He suggested as an ideal society 
a small state with simplicity and self-reliance, a utopian community.
The ideal land is small and its inhabitants are few, where tools 
abound ten times or yet a hundred-fold beyond their use; where people 
die and die again but never emigrate; have boats and carts which no 
one rides. Weapons have they and armor too, but none displayed. The 
folk returns to use again the knotted cords. Their meat is sweet;
their clothes adorned, their homes at peace, their customs charm. And
neighbor lands are juxtaposed so each may hear the barking dogs, the
crowing cocks across the way; where folks grow old and folks will die
and never once exchange a call.®^
-49-
La o Tzu’s utopia is a state of freedom, self-sufficiency, anarchism, and 
social harmony.
(2) Chuang Tzu
Chuang Tzu was a naturalist, not a worldly man. He withdrew from 
society and stepped into the realm of nature where he longed to be a free 
being like a butterfly in the great universe (idea of the famous chapter of 
his writings "The Dream of a Butterfly"). He sought freedom from all temporal, 
spatial, and physical limitations. Unlike Yang Tzu, another Taoist, who es­
caped from the world into his own ego, Chuang Tzu put his ego into a state
84of mystic union with the entire universe.
1)Nature, Artificial Difference, and Class Struggle
Chuang Tzu's basic theme is to follow nature. This concept has been 
indirectly and symbolically expressed by his writings. Opposed to the Confucian 
humanistic system, Chuang Tzu and the Taoists deny the value of the rectifi­
cation of names which define the terms of all things so as to set up a standard 
of moral values and the relationship between ruling and ruled classes in the 
political and social system. In fact, the difference between what is of nature 
and what is of man is the key to human happiness and pain, order and disorder. 
Chuang Tzu pointed out: "What is of nature is internal. What is of man is 
external. That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of nature.
That a halter should be put on a horse's head, or a string through an ox's 
nose, is what is of man."®^
The duck's legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck 
will feel pain. The crane's legs are long, but if we try to shorten them, 
the crane will feel grief.
2) Nature, Anti-Imperialism, and National Self-Determination 
Therefore, following what is of nature or following what is of man
is the source of all happiness, order, peace, and goodness, or the source of
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all pain, disorder, war, and evil in the world. However, the purpose of all 
laws, morals, institutions, and governments, even the world system and or­
ganizations, is to establish uniformity and eliminate difference. That is why 
Chuang Tzu strongly opposes the idea of governing through tlie formal machinery 
of government or enforcement but suggests that the best way of governing, even 
expansion, is through non-government--a natural, cultural, and social deve­
lopment. It is the idea of culturalism.
Similarly, in the field of international politics, for Chuang Tzu, 
what is of nature is a country’s specific environment, character of people, 
its own cultural traditions, its ways of life, and its particular social 
and political system. The internal feature of a nation is its nature. However, 
certain ambitious nations, especially those great powers, formulate their 
foreign policies motivated by national self-interests and unilateral ideo­
logies to have externally initiated a series of what is of man--international 
rules, institutions, legal systems-- to impose upon others through the way 
of nationalistic universalism and finally power struggle and war. It is, 
therefore, contrary to what is of nature, though the idea of uniformity might 
probably be motivated subjectively by human compassions. For Chuang Tzu, 
however, it only makes the international situation more tragic and severe.
In his terms, today's policies of imperialism and colonialism and other 
ideologies motivated by national self-interests in modern world politics 
are what is of man. To let counties decide their own self-development or 
national self-determination is what is of nature and is necessary in the 
promotion of their progress and human happiness. Like Lao Tzu and Yang Tzu, 
Chuang Tzu favored a policy of non-interference which may give a nation a 
chance for its internal nature to be freely developed. This is what Tao tells. 
The Tao does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. TTius, the
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self, the world, and the universe are mixed into a great harmony. In general, 
Chuang Tzu devoted liimself to hlending man and nature together into a union.
C)  T h e  I d e a l i s t i c  .11 id l lunimi  1 1 a r  I a n  h d i o o l ;  C o n i u c l i i B  a n d  Cini  I u c  1 .-lu I sni
Unlike Taoism, Confucius and his followers found the idea of Tao in 
practical human relations. They realized that man is compelled by his nature 
to live in the company of other men, in other words, in society. Oriented 
by this concept of humanity, man has been searching for the appropriate ways 
to handle human conflict and to promote human harmony. The idealistic Confucians 
start with the basic assumption that man's nature is good and with sympathy, 
jen, which can be extended to others. They believe that chaotic internal and 
external situations result not because of the nature and constitution of 
society and civilization but because of the wrong direction that society and 
civilization had taken. So, they suggest preserving order in social and cul­
tural institutions by stressing proper relations among men under the doctrine 
of jen. The starting point is with the individual, from which cultivated 
virtue and human sympathy are extended by the appropriate *'li" (4'^, courtesy 
or rites, to the closest persons in a family, then from family to the society, 
then to the state, and then finally to the whole world. Like Plato and many 
other philosophers, the Confucians synthesize politics and moral ethics.
Confucians regard the family as a model of human moral relationships, 
while society, the nation, and the world are the extensions of this basic 
unity. This monitic idea regards the nations as a big family and the world 
as a family of nations. The head of a nation and its officials are the parents 
of the people. Therefore, the appropriate relationships of superior-inferior 
in the family should also be applied in the state and in the world. The Con­
fucians believe in the sage-rule with virtue as the key for human harmony.
Confucius in the late part of Spring and Autumn period initiated
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Confucianism. It was not popular at that time and Mohism and Taoism superseded 
Confucianism in the Mencius' era. During Hsun Tzu's time, the idealistic Con­
fucianism declined and the realistic Legalism became popular. This decline 
was not abated until Tung Chung-shu succeeded in establishing Confucianism 
as the orthodox or national belief in the early Han Dynasty. Thereafter, the 
Confucian concept of the international system and politics triumphed until 
the early twentieth century in China.
(1) Confucius— K'ung Tzu
1) Jen and Human Relationship
The principal concept of Confucius was the idea of Jen (4-̂ ), benevo­
lence, human-heartedness, man-to-manness, perfect virtue, or sympathy, Con­
fucius believed that man was born with jen but that it had to be cultivated 
and developed, and this is the point of division between the superior man,
chun-tzu and the small man, hsiao-jen (/J'A-). The meaning of jen for
87Confucius was very broad, for instance, "It is to love all men." "Now the
man of jen, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others;
goishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others." "It is.w
... not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no
89murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family". Moreover,
90Confucius said, "The man of jen is cautious and slow in his speech." There­
fore, for Confucius, jen can be anything which is of propriety in human re­
lations according to the Tao.
2) The Family, Nation, World
The development of jen, for Confucius, was hierarchical in a system
of order which started with the cultivation of the individual person. In the
"Great Learning", Ta Hsueh ( j d ^ ) , Confucius teaches the process.
The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout 
the world, first ordered well their own nations. Wishing to order well
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Llieir nations, tliey first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate 
their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate 
their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify 
their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts.
From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must con­
sider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.
After all of these processes are done, the whole world will be made 
tranquil, happy, and harmonious. In order to set up the hierarchical system 
of order, Confucius stressed the improtance of the rectification of names 
under the principle of courtesy or rites. He suggests a status strati­
fication in the social and political systems, so that the appropriate human
92relationship can be realized. Thus, "The king or the superior should be
benevolent, his officials or inferior respectful, the son filial, and the
93father loving. In their relations they should be faithful." Furthermore, 
from the rectification of names and status, the five relationships can be 
harmonized between sovereign or superior and subjects or inferior by loyalty 
or respect; between father and son by filial piety; between husband and wife 
by love; between elder brother and younger brother by kindness; and between 
self and friends by ^  or righteousness.
Confucius' world was a system of patriarciiism based upon the assumption 
that good people are the foundation of a good political system thus resulting 
in a peaceful and harmonious world. The nations in the world are just like 
the individual members in the family. The good member states will make a 
harmonious world family. Thus, a nation, interanlly, must cultivate herself 
by sage-rule with virtue and guide the component members into appropriate 
relationships under the principles of jen and 1^. Externally, it is necessary 
for a nation to see its fellow states as leder or younger brothers in the 
world family. That is, like family relationships, small nations should look 
upon big nations as elder brothers with respect and admiration, while the 
great powers ought to treat their younger fellows with kindness and friendliness.
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3) Virtue and International Relations
Concerning international intercourse, Confucius believed that nations 
should conduct their diplomatic relations not only with jen but also under 
the principles of yi, righteousness, and hsin, trustworthiness. He said: "I 
do not know how a man (a nation) without trustworthiness is to get on,
The superior man in everything considers righteousness to be essential. 
He performs it according to the rules of He brings it forth in hu­
mility. He completes i t  with s i n c e r i t y . ^5
Moreover, Confucius opposed the concept of profit or national interest 
and argued: "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; 
the mind of the small man is conversant with gain."^^ Confucius seems to 
indicate that lower grade nations are interested in profit and will be more 
aggressive in nature, while higher grade nations are cognizant of the spirit 
of righteousness and will be peaceful in nature.
As to the general theme of rule in the world community, Confucius 
suggested the principle of 1^ instead of international law or sanction. He 
argued: "If the fellows (nations) are restricted by (international) law and 
influenced by the fear of punishment (war), they will try to avoid the puni­
shments, but will have no sense of shame or national dignity. But if they 
are restricted by virtue and influenced by regard for jâ or ethics, they will
not only have the sense of shame or national dignity, but will also be re-
97moved from evil intention."
Moreover, Confucius emphasizes the importance of sincerity and trust­
worthiness in international intercourse and diplomatic mission.
Of the three essential, the greatest is good faith. Without a revenue 
and without an army, a state may still exist; but it cannot exist without 
good faith.98
4) Virtue, Leadership, and World Politics
Confucius favored the idea of leadership in the world community to
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promote world order and happiness. As to leadership, he suggested that world
leaders act in accordance with virtue according to the appropriate moral
principles. He argued that if the superior or great powers behave correctly
according to moral virtues, their fellow states will automatically follow
the pattern without reluctance.
When a leader's conduct is correct, his policies will be respected 
and without the enforcement. If his cond^^t is not correct, he may issue 
forces and orders, but none will follow.
The relations between superiors and inferiors is like that between 
the^^ind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across
Therefore, "If you lead your fellows with correctness, who will dare not to
be correct?"^^^ Confucius advised the world leaders not only to strengthen
their power, in a quantitative sense, which is the required factor to be a
leader, but also to enrich themselves with virtue. Once the latter was achieved,
102a sphere of influence would automatically be formed and set.
5) Virtue, Culturalism, and Sphere of Influence
To Confucius, it was virtue which made the world orderly and in har­
mony, not the exercise of force. He said; "A horse is called a chi (a kind
of leading horse) not because of its strength, but because of its other good 
103qualities." Confucius taught that leadership, with culture as a weapon 
based upon moral concepts and virtue, will be more effective and stable in 
achieving expansion. Cultural influence can deeply penetrate the ways of life 
of the people and alter their thoughts and finally assimilate them. Leadership 
with moral virtues instead of physical force will be victorious and ever­
lasting in creating spheres of influence without difficulty. Confucius said;
"Let his (a leader's) words be sincere and faithful, and his actions honorable 
and careful; such conduct may be practiced extensively among the rude barbarians 
of the South or the Nroth. Otherwise, will he be appreciated even in his nei- 
ghborhood?"^^^
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6) Utopian Ta-T*ung Society and World Communism
In general, the system of human relationships for Confucius was moni­
stic. What could be exercised in the family, in the national society, would 
also be applicable in the international community, especially those basic 
moral principles. He saw the great Tao in human relationships rather than 
in nature. His was a time when the stable feudal system had been crushed and 
replaced by one consisting of many independent states, and a social system 
that was in disorder. Therefore, Confucius contributed his concepts for social 
and political reform hoping to restore the system of the early Chou monarchy. 
Ho Hsiu (129-182 A,D.) who wrote a commentary on the Kung Yang Com­
mentary interpreted the "Ch * un-Ch'iu" as "a record of the process
through which Confucius ideally transformed the age of decay and disorder 
into that of 'approaching peace', and finally into that of 'universal peace'
Li Yun, or the theory of "Evolution of Rites", also presents the three stages 
of social progress: despotism, constitutionalism, and anarchism.
The first stage is a world of disorder, chu-luan-shi of
which Confucius learned through transmitted records. This was the age after 
Chou Kung until Confucius. The second stage is that of "small tranquility", 
hsiao-k'ang (/3'J^, in which Confucius, having given good governement to his 
own state through social and political reforms, next brought peace and order 
to all the other states lying within the Middle Kingdom,
Now, the great Tao has fallen into obscurity, the world has become 
like families in which each loves but his own parents and treats as 
children only his own children. .., The states build up their own defense 
system for self-security and the international relations are based upon 
the principles of ^  and ••• This is called the age of hsiao-k'ang.
The thrid age was an ideal utopia for Confucius, the Ta-T'ung Society,
in which all the people in the world are civilized and harmonized in order
and peace. He compared this age to the period of the ideal society of wu-wei
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whiclî is ccmpatible with Lao Tzu's idea of wu-wei and utopian communism during 
the legend sage-rulers, Yao and Shun emperors. Confucius pictured this utopia 
as follows:
When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all; men 
of talents, virtue and ability were selected, sincerity was emphasized 
and friendship was cultivated. Therefore, men did not love only their 
own parents, nor did they treat as children only their own sons, A 
competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment 
was given to the able-bodied, and a means was provided for the upbringing 
of the young. Kindness and compassion were shown to widows, orphans, 
childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they all 
had their homes. They hated to see the wealth of natural resources un­
developed, (so they developed it), but this development was not for their 
own use. Thev hated not to exert themselves, (so they worked, but their 
work) was not for their own benefit. Thus (selfish) schemings were re­
pressed and found no development. Robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors 
did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors were left open. This 
is the period of Great Harmony, Ta T'ung (^l®]).^
To this scene, Confucius' ideal Ta-T'ung society is undoubtedly akin 
to the picture of utopian world communism, which the current Chinese Communists 
portray as their goal.
(2) Mencius--Meng Tzu (_^^)
1) Yi, Justice, and People
Mencius followed Confucius' idea of jen, yi, li, and other virtues
but he emphasized the importance of ^  or righteousness as a principle of
human conduct. Like Confucius, he agreed with the concept of a politics of
virtue, and condemned the evils of war which he regarded as the great human
tragedy. So, he argued that "if the ruler of a state loves benevolence, he
108will have no opponent in all the world." Mencius believed that if a state 
wants to be a world leader or to win the whole world or to influence other 
nations, the key principle is to win the people over rather than by exerting 
force which people dislike.
There is a way to get the world: get the people, and the empire is 
got. There is a way to get the people: get their hearts, and the people 
are got. There is a way to get their hearts: it is simply to collect
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109for Lliem what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike.
2) Concepts of "Wany," and "£a" and Superpower
War among tlie nations is a great crime to the people. Mcnclus condem­
ning it stated: "Death is not enough for such a c r i m e " . T h e r e f o r e ,  Mencius 
opposed the concept of Pa (^), or Hegemony in world politics because it was 
based upon the threat of force. The concept of Wang (%.), or Kingship, which 
is based upon virtue and righteousness, is important in the international 
system of conducting world affairs and harmonizing interstate relations. A 
great power with the concept of Pa may not be supported by his fellow states,
but a small power with the concept of Wang could be able to win the whole
world. Mencius said;
He who, using force, makes a pretense to benevolence, is the _Pa which
requires to be a great power. He who, using virtue, practices benevolence
— is the Wang which need not wait for being a great power. ... When one 
by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. They submit, 
because their strength is not adquate to resist. When one subdues men 
by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit,
3) Justice, National Interest, and Anti-Imperialism
Keeping the principle of yâ in mind, Mencius strongly opposed the 
concept of profit or interest, 1^ , especially the imperialistic acqui­
sition through conquest. He observed that men were constantly struggling over 
gains, profits, and national interests, unsatisfied till they have usurped 
all. Therefore, he strongly condemned wars of imperialism for interests and 
profits, and he denied the right of one state to intervene in the internal 
affairs of ocher states because it often resulted in war, Mencius was an 
exponent of self-determination for peoples. The states should be independent 
on their own feet and the government established for the welfare of the people. 
With some democratic ideas in mind, Mencius asserted that in a nation the
people were the most noble and improtant element of the state, the ministers
112and material resources next, and the ruler the least essential. So, the
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government is supposed to serve the public Interest of the people rather than 
Lyranize the people. Externally, the state should maintain peaceful coexistence 
with its fellow states and should not he imperialistic or develope seli-in- 
terests for its own people at the expense of other peoples.
4) Defensive Concept and People’s War
In order to deter imperialistic aggression Mencius approved the war 
of justice, 2Î.) for self-defense. He did not feel the state needed to par­
ticipate in international alliances or organizations for collective defense 
because these are often distorted by certain individual states and are often 
filled with suspicions. Once Mencius was counseled about the question of self- 
defense and alliance, he said: "There is one thing I can suggest. Dig deeper 
your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your people. In
case of attack, be prepared to die in your defense, and have the people so
113that they will not leave you: this is the proper course.”
Mencius emphasized that the real strength of a nation lies in its 
people and their morale rather than in material power. The strongest forces 
and weapons may very well collapse through the corruption of morale in either 
the defenders or aggressors. Proper military preparations and material re­
sources and facilities are necessary, but they constitute no guarantee of 
winning. But "most important of all is a happy, contented, loyal, united, 
benevolently governed p e o p l e . T h i s  point is exactly what today's Chinese 
Communists emphasize in the concept of people's war.
5) Self-Cultivation, Self-Reliance, Permanent Revolution, and 
Arduous Struggle
Mencius further suggests that the way to a strong individual or nation 
is achieved through self-cultivation, self-discipline, and self-reliance. Too 
much ease and pleasure in prosperity will spoil man's nature and may corrupt 
the nation. Therefore, a nation needs external hostile stimuli or outside
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tlireats to sustain emotional tension for constant self-restrengthening. In­
ternally, people of a nation need a continuous revolutionary mood for human 
cultivation, self-training, social discipline and system reform, Mencius 
emphasied that the survival and strength of a nation could come through a 
condition of suffering and calamity, while ease and comfort pave the way to 
weakness and collopse.
Thus, when Heaven is about to confer a great mission on any man, it 
first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews and bones with 
toil. ... By all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, 
and supplies his incompetencies. Men for the most part err, and are after­
wards able to reform. They are distressed in mind and perplexed in their 
thoughts, and then they arise to vigorous reformation. ... If a nation 
has no brilliant elites and statesmen internally, and if abroad there 
are no hostile states in threat or other external calamities, the nation 
will generally come to ruin. From these things we see how life springs 
from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure.
This advice is quite similar to the preaching of the "Yenan Spirit" 
of current Chinese Communists--a call for national self-strengthening, self-
(3) Hsun Tzu--Hsun Ch'ing -J-)
1) Virtue, Concept of Wang and Pa, and World Politics 
Hsun Tzu, like all other Confucians, emphasized virtues in human 
relations and politics, especially among the great powers in world politics. 
He, like Mencius and others, distinguished carefully the concept of "Wang", 
the rules of kingship which qualify one for a leadership position by virtue 
and public sanction on the basis of correct ritual principles, and the con­
cept of Pâ , the rules of hegemony, which lead to militarism by strengthening 
their military and economic power and overawing fellow states in the world.
Not resenting the rules of hegemony as Mencius had, Hsun Tzu admired the 
rule of hegemony such as Ch’in state enjoyed during his time; but he preferred 
the better quality of kingship rule which was a higher grade of politics. He
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believed that the practice of Wang would be more successful for a leader in 
world politics.
His benevolence is the loftiest in the world, his righteousness is 
the loftiest in the world, and his authority is the loftiest in the 
world, ,,, With an authority that cannot be opposed, abetted by ways 
which win men's allegiance, he gàins victory without battle and acquires 
territory without attack. He need not wear ouL his men and arms, and yet 
the whole world is won over to him. This is the way of one who understands 
how to be a king (Wang
For Hsun Tzu, the kingship (Wang) works to acquire the willing support
of people. "He who promotes ritual will become a true king; he who governs
well will be strong; he who wins over the people will find s a f e t y " . J u s t
as Mencius argued, the concept of Pa, the hegemony, is based upon the exercise
of force and militarism, according to Hsun Tzu. To abuse force is not following
the correct principle of Tao. So, the state which relies upon strength will
1IRbe gradually reduced to weakness. Furthermore, the other states "never cease
to eye him with hatred and to dream of revenge; never do they forget their
enmity. They spy out his weak points and take advantage of his defects, so
119that he lives in constant peril".
Therefore, Hsun Tzu advocated that one who truly realizes how to use
force does not rely upon force but instead carefully follows the principles
of "Wang Tao". the way of kingship. Thus a potential world leader must have
a combination of force and virtue and be one who "builds up his might and
creates a fund of good will. With his might well established, he cannot be
weakened by the other feudal lords (other states); with a fund of good will
to rely upon, he cannot be reduced to insignificance by the other feudal
120lords (other states)." Thus, the state which follows the Wang Tao will
always be victorious and consequently the leader of the world, and it is
121he who truly understands how to use force.
2) People, People's War, and Military Stratagem
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People, the most Important factor of a nation, Hsun Tzu does not
ignore. Like Mencius, he regarded people as the most fundamental of all a
nation's resources, Hsun Tzu pointed out that when people are uprising the
nation will be in danger, and when people are in order the nation will be 
122in safety. Moreover, similar to the concept of the Mandate of Heaven,
he compared people with the characteristics of water: "The ruler (government)
is the boat and the common people are the water. It is the water that bears
123the boat up, and the water that capsizes it". If the nation wants to be 
safe, the best thing for the government to do is to govern fairly and to love 
people.
Following Mencius* concepts of just war and anti-imperialism, Hsun 
Tzu argued that the practical and realistic way to stop imperialistic agg­
ression and eliminate the chaos resulting from a state of war is to "use war 
to eliminate war", similar to Mao Tse-tung's concept of "war and peace"—  
abolishing war through war.'^' Hsun Tzu was convinced of fighting a just 
war for the sake of peace and justice.
However, Hsun Tzu also realized that the ability to fully generate 
adequate national power to fight a war fundamentally rests upon the willingness 
and the support of the people. He prescribed a basic principle that the essence
of using forces to wage a war is to win the support of the people and to fight
, , 125a people 3 war,
Hsun Tzu regarded war as an inevitable approach to obtain peace some­
times, and it is not for imperialistic gain but stop ambitious aggression. 
However, according to the principle of Wang Tao the best way to operate war 
is to win all the people*s support with virtue, so that people are cultivated 
by moral principles of jen and %i and regulated by the principle of towards 
the full mobilization of national morale. With the total mobilization 
of people armed with the proper ideology combined with other national sources
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of power, the people's war will be almighty because the entire people can
127fight hand by hand with one heart. To this point, Hsun Tzu proposed that
128"man Is the decisive factor in war, not materials". In other words, win­
ning people is superior to obtaining materials, because the imperialistic 
evil aggressor and war-loving states cannot employ their own people to carry 
out war even with better materials if not supported by their people. Therefore, 
the state which follows Wang Tao grows day by day more illustrious. And those 
among the other states associated with it will find safety, those which turn
129away from it will be in danger, and those which turn against it will perish.'
From a people's war follows the principle of Wang Tao. according to
Hsun Tzu, and the state becomes almighty. The nation that devotes herself
to this Tao will eventually bring her leadership in the w o r l d . ^^0
The nation which gains its people's efforts will be rich; the nation 
which acquires its people's willingness to fight will be strong; and the 
nation which obtains its people's respects will be reputable....
In general, Hsun Tzu emphasized the relationship between people and 
government and between people and war which formed his whole concept of po­
litics. As to the concept of Wang Tao in world politics, he synthesized 
Confucian idealism and Legalist realism. In this respect, Hsun Tzu’s views, 
to some extent, are akin to that of present Maoism.
D) Pragmatic Utilitarian School--Mo Tzu and Mohism
In the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period, there appeared 
a third great school of thought, Mohism, which represented the proletarian 
and the lower middle classes, such as independent artisans, workers, and 
free farmers, who were emancipated from the traditional feudal bonds between 
the noble and the serf and slave classes. Neither wealthy nor powerful, they 
were a common lot of plain, hard-working, self-supporting and practical people 
interested only in what was useful. They were equally opposed to the aristo-




and security and to implement international rules and justice through enfor­
cement whenever it is violated.
Mohist doctrine enjoyed its popularity during Mencius* time. Thus, 
Mencius pointed out; "The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world. If
you listen to people's discourses throughout it , you will find that they
138have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo." Meanwhile, the activities
of Mohist groups also worked to a certain extent to eliminate the possible
outbreak of war. However, after the death of Mo Tzu, the Mohist school declined
and was neglected for over two thousand years until the present time when it
was rediscovered by Chinese scholars. Current Chinese Communist scholars
have noted the "class struggle" aspects of Mohism and have stated that Mohism
139was the only school of thought which represented the proletarian majority.
(1) Mo Tzu— Mo Ti
1) Universal Love (c h i e n - a i ), Mutual Aid (chiao-hsiang-li 
), and Internationalism
Unlike the Confucian concept of jen which is based upon the "graded 
love" expanding from self to family to state and to the world. Mo Izu preaches 
his doctrine of "universal love" and mutual aid which tries to treat others 
the same as oneself. These doctrines are fundamentally pragmatic utilitari­
anism because he argues that the evaluation of an idea or act as good or 
evil is finally to be determined by whether it is beneficial or harmful to 
the majority of the people. It differs from the pragmatism of the modern 
Benthamites in that the ideal Mohist, though conscious of self-interest, is 
a self-denying and self-sacrificing personality. The Mohists would forsake 
pleasure and incur pain if this would benefit others. Other differences 
include that Benthamite utilitarianism arises from the bourgeois class 
while Mohism originates from the proletarian classes.
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Mo Tzu analysed the causes of world disorder in his age and concluded 
that they lay in a pervading selfishness and partiality. Thus he condemned 
the Confucian concept of graded love, a system of partiality, which he re­
garded as the source of human calamities.
Similarly, in world politics it is partiality which makes nations 
be concerned only with their own interests in struggling for power at the 
expense of other nations. Due to this selfishness the whole world falls 
into disorder and the catastrophe of war:
Now at the present time, what brings the greatest harm to the world? 
Great states attacking small ones, great families overthrowing (explo­
iting) small ones, the strong oppressing the weak, the many harrying 
the few, the cunning deceiving the stupid, the eminent lording it over 
the humble— these are harmful to the w o r l d . ^^2
The doctrine of universal love for Mo Tzu really implies the refu­
tation of the concept of hierarchy which Confucianists suggest. Disregarding 
the differences between big states and small states, near and far, superior 
and inferior etc., it is a proposal to replace the concept of nationalism 
with a doctrine of internationalism, in which people would give their loyalties 
and loves to the whole human race. In this respect, it sounds quite similar 
to both the modern Wilsonian internationalism and the Communist international­
ism. Thus, most people would grant the validity of the principle of universal 
love, although they would doubt that it could be realized. Mo Tzu takes uni­
versal love as neither an abstract principle nor an arbitrary injunction and 
argues; "Whoever loves others is loved by others; whoever aids others is 
aided by others; whoever hates others is hated by others; whoever injures 
others is injured by others. Then, what difficulty is there with universal 
love? Only, the government fails to employ it in his state and the common 
man in his conduct".
2) Anti-Offensive-Attack (fei-kung Just War, and
Anti-Imperialism
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Through human experience Mo Tzu realizes that war is the great obs­
tacle to the practice of universal love and the great cause of human dis­
turbance. Thus, "Condemnation of Offensive War" becomes a corollary principle. 
Some argued that many powerful and rich states came into being through con­
quest. Taking his utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest 
number. Mo Tzu replied to this point that, while four or five successful 
states might benefit thereby, we must consider the suffering of the majority 
of states before we can justify offensive war. Therefore, he severely condemns 
the few great powers which attack the majority of innocent states for purposes 
of self-interest and expansion.
Mo Tzu said: When the people of the world praise something as good, 
what is their reason? ... Even the stupidest man will reply that it is 
praised because it brings benefit to Heaven on high, to the spirits in 
the middle realm, and to mankind below —
But the rulers and states of today are not like this....they set 
off to attack some innocent state...such warfare we find that they have 
crippled the basis of the nation's livelihood and exhausted the resources 
of the people to an incalculable degree. This brings no benefit to man­
kind b e l o w . 144
Since in reality offensive wars sometimes occur, Mo Tzu puts a moral 
justification upon the defensive war in contrast to the immoral offensive, 
war. He further urges the small states to strengthen their defensive ability 
so as to discourage the ambitious great powers from attacking. Thus an eff­
ective defensive system by the small states may prevent the occurrence of
145international warfare and pave the way for world peace and order. In
order to secure a defensive ability and to frustrate the ambitions of the 
great powers, the Mohist disciples even were trained with the art of defence 
and tactics of fortification as a warrior group ready to help the victim 
states to deter the aggressors should the master's mission of peace persuasion 
fail."'
Mo Tzu regards the doctrines of universal love and condemnation of
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aggression as the "Will of Heaven" for the welfare of mankind. To implement 
the righteous will of heaven he would further justify a war of punishment 
as contributing to world peace.
Based on moral considerations, No Tzu also argued that wicked rulers 
and governments do not love their people and should be removed, peacefully 
if possible but by force if necessary. This would be a relatively small price 
to pay to be rid of an evil and to promote the principal of love in the end. 
However, while such removal is probably true and justified for the internal 
affairs of a country, it is very difficult to make a clear-cut distinction 
between a "war of aggression" and a "war of punishment" in international 
relations. That is, who or what institution can judge fairly? Can a war of 
aggression be defined as a "first attack" and a war of punishment as a 
"second attack" or "counter-attack" from either the attacked nations or a 
third party? Mo Tzu did not give us a clear answer. This issue remains a 
great source of confusion even today in determining the definition of 
"aggressor" or "defender" in world politics.
Finally, Mo Tzu suggests that if a great power wishes to be a  leader 
in the world it should not rely on force because its strength will be used 
up in maintaining superiority. Instead, a great power should not only abolish 
the idea of conquest but also try to practice the virtue of benevolence and 
righteousness to win the respect of other states. Therefore the nation will 
he stable and stronger day by day and no other state can dare to attack.
Such moral supremacy of position will eventually ensure her leadership in 
the w o r l d . M o  Tzu's moral concepts of virtue in international politics 
is (like Confucianism) somewhat idealistic, reflecting Chinese humanitarian 
traditions, while his theory of utilitarian arguments, representing prole­
tarian pragmatism, is along the line of realist schools in general. Mo Tzu
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and his followers found the Tao in human mutual benefit which was the Will 
of Heaven.
(2) Mohist Group and Its Political Movement
During the whole Warring States period Mohist thought was very popular 
and Mohist followers were active in their political activity among the states 
of China. The nucleus of Mohist followers was a highly disciplined and mili­
tant group which was similar to modern militant political parties in the 
implementation of their ideal thought and political reforms. Armed with spirit 
of universal love and sincerity, the members of Mohist group acted like re­
ligious preachers. They had great self-confidence and a spirit of self-sacri­
fice in becoming revolutionaries for their principles. This kind of belief 
and conduct was perhaps derived from the social climate of the times which 
was marked by a disintegrating feudal system.
1) Hsiah and Mohist Group
With the disintegration of feudalism during the latter part of Chou 
Dynasty, the warrior specialists, who were the backbone of the armies of 
feudal lords at that time, lost their positions and titles and scattered 
around the country. These people were known as the Hsiah or Yu Hsiah
the knights-errant. The personality of such knights-errant is des­
cribed by the Shih Chi; "Their words were always sincere and trustworthy, 
and their actions always quick and decisive. They were always true to what 
they promised, and without regard to their own persons, they would rush into 
dangers threatening o t h e r s . T h i s  concept of professional ethics was 
largely adopted by Mo Tzu in his teaching.
Unlike the jji (literati), who were specialists attached to the houses 
of the aristocrats throughout Chinese history, the Hsiah were more frequently 
recruited from the lower classes. There is much evidence that Mo Tzu and his
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followers came from the proletarian class, Hsiah. They opposed the monopoly 
of the social amenities, such as the luxuries of rituals and music, by the 
aristocrats. They criticised the Confucian teachings for serving only the 
priviliged aristocratic minority, not the proletarian majority. They further 
denounced the traditional feudal institutions which the Confucianists supported 
in their hierarchical concept of human relations. This criticism, combined 
with the rationalization of the professional ethics of their own social class, 
formed the theme of Mohist thought.
The spirit of Hsiah has existed in the lower classes of Chinese society 
throughout history. The numerous peasant rebellions in the past were largely 
influenced by the spirit of Hsiah and carried out by this group of people 
for the welfare of the peasant majority. (The rise of Mao and Chinese Commu­
nists was also influenced by this tradition.) Later, the development of 
secret societies in Ming and Ch'ing dynasties was partially derived from the 
traditions of Hsiah. Similarly, Chinese literature, as in the famous novel,
Shui Hu Chuan (All Men Are Brothers), which Mao Tse-tung favored most, also 
reflects the philosophy of Hsiah.
Today, the Chinese Communists regard the spirit of Hsiah and Mohist 
doctrine as one of most valuable Chinese traditions, compatible with the 
revolutionary "Spirit of Yenan". They urged that this golden part of Chinese
treasure be enlarged and critically adopted in contributing to the development 
149of modern China.
2) Righteousness, Mohist Warriors, and International Force 
The importance of the Mohist group in the field of international 
politics is their practice of Mohist thought of righteousness through a status 
of international enforcement. From various sources we realize that the Mohists 
constituted a strictly disciplined organization of warriors armed with Mohist
moral ideology. In the works of Huai Nan Tzu}^^ Mo Tzu,^^^and other classics
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ali provided this fact.
Oriented by Moliist principles of universal love and anti-offensive
warfare, the Mohist group of warriors was formed to implement these principles
in the international field. To perform righteousness in opposing offensive
war they were eager help attacked nations, especially weak nations, to fight
a defensive war. From many sources and stories, it is known that their acts
of justice in the international arena were quite effective and did prevent
many wars from occurring. For instance, the famous story in the work "Mo Tzu"
152tells how Mo Tzu made his great effort to stop Ch'u's attack upon Sung.
In the Chapter of Lu Wen of the same work, it tells that through Mo Tzu's
persuasions Ch'i state stopped attacking Lu state, and Lu state cancelled
153its invasion upon Cheng state. Similarly, in the Chapter of Anti-Offensive
Warfare of the same work, it tells that Sung Tzu, a Mohist disciple, presented
a possible confrontation between Ch'in state and Ch'u state by means of per-
154suasion through the Mohist utilitarian principle. From many other con­
temporary works of the "Mo Tzu", there were a large number of cases illu­
strating the righteous conduct of the Mohist group as an international force 
in the world politics of China at that time.
Inspired by Mohist performance in the international field, it is 
possible that ancient Chinese interstate politics included a concept of 
international enforcement to preserve world peace and security which is 
similar to the function of modern international organizations, such as the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. The Mohist group might have been 
primitive in the sense of preventing the occurrence of war and of the syste­
matic promotion of human welfare, but it did provide the valuable idea of 
an international and impartial party to mediate confrontations or to put 
sanceions into practice on behalf of moral justice if necessary. Moreover,
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a considerable merit of the Mohist group is its neutral and impartial stand, 
which is especially important In helping the majority of weak nations in 
cases of threatened invasion, and not serving as a tool for the great powers 
as the modern international organizations have done. On the contrary, the 
Mohist group not only was set up to fighc a defensive war for the attacked 
nations but also was a "professional standing force" in the implementation 
of international principles, which modern international roganizations lack. 
Since the stand of the current United Nations is not clear enough to be
neutral in serving all the nations in the world, the United Nations has
therefore been frequently accused by China and Third World nations of serving 
only a few western great powers, especially the two superpowers, at the expense
of the majority of small nations.
If we can see any influence of Mohist thought upon contemporary 
Chinese foreign policy, it is the Mohist principles of internationalism, 
universal love, and anti-imperialistic attack which inspired their attitude 
towards the role of international organizations today.
E) The Realist School— Han Fei Tzu and Legalism
When the international situation worsened in the latter part of the 
Warring States period, the philosophy of politics was being drastically re­
directed into realistic Legalism, The realist Confucian follower, Hsun Tzu, 
suggested an eclectic approach which later served as a transition toward 
the blossoming of Legalism when political circumstances involved into a 
desperate struggle for national survival.
Due to the change of conditions at all social levels, what the rulers 
were concerned with was not idealistic programs to benefit their people as 
the idealist schools of thought suggested, but with realistic methods for 
dealing with the critical situations which their governments now faced.
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Because the times called for a realistic approach, the I^egalist 
School (Fa Chia^ à ^ J  enjoyed considerable popularity during the latter part 
of Warring States period. There were certain Legalists who devoted their 
efforts to military strategy and art of war, thus forming the Strategic 
School or School of Military Science, Ping Chia • Some prominent con­
tributors to this school were Sun Pin Wu Ch'i , Jang Chu
and Wei Liao - They all wrote Important works on military affairs.
Among those works the work "Sun Tzu Ping Fa" (The Art of War) is today the 
most famous.
Another group of Legalists were concerned with diplomatic manipulations 
among states and founded the "Vertical and Horizontal Alliances" School, 
Tsung-Heng Chia Th^ most prominent members of this school of inter­
national politics were Su Ch'in ( ^ ^ )  and Chang Yi • I" terms of their
methods, both the Strategic School and the Tsung-Heng School are usually 
classified within the School of Legalism.
(1) Philosophical Views of Legalism
1) Human Nature and Historical Materialism
Like all other realist philosophers, most of the Chinese Legalists 
believe that human nature is evil. Since all men act from motives of selfi­
shness and self-profit, it is sensible for the government to set up a system 
of rewards and punishments.
For Legalists, the philosophy of history is of historical materialism 
as a dynamic force in social evolution. This completely contradicts the 
Confucian illusions of Yao, Shun, and early Chou, and the Mohist illusions 
of Yu, the remote golden age of sage-politics. They believe that history is 
a continuous flow, with men, events, and ideas blended through material 
circumstances. The past is nothing to be repeated or regretted; only the
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present and the future remain to be challenged through human intellecL and 
p o w e r . T h e  Legalists fully understood the changing needs of material 
conditions and faced it realistically. Han Fei Tzu suggests that new problems 
can only be solved by new measures, and "Therefore affairs go according to 
their time, and preparations are made in accordance with a f f a i r s . H e  
and most of the Legalists, although admitting that the people of ancient times 
were more innocent or more virtuous, argued that it was due to material cir­
cumstances rather than to any inherently superior good nature. Therefore, 
they maintained that the body politics or politics of virtue could only be 
employed in ancient times but not under the conditions of their day. Han 
Fei Tzu gave this example;
In ancient times King Wen... practiced benevolence and righteousness, 
... King Yen of Hsu ...practiced benecolence and righteousness, ...until 
King Wen of Ching, fearing for his own safety, called out his troops, 
attacked Hsu, and wiped it out. Thus King Wen practiced benevolence and 
righteousness and became ruler of the world, but King Yen practiced 
benevolence and righteousness and destroyed nis state. This is because 
benevolence and righteousness served for ancient times, but n^^onger 
serve today. So I say that circumstances differ with the age.
Another great Legalist, Shang Yang, had already made a similar point 
before Han Fei Tzu and stated that as conditions in the world change, different 
principles were practiced. To this point, the Legalist theory of historical 
materialism is quite akin to modern Karl Marx's analysis of dynamic social 
and economic relations and the famous theory of dialectical materialism which 
stares that ideas are only products of the material environment in which 
men live.
Furthermore, in a striking parallel to Marx's view of historical 
materialism on the basis of economics, Han Fei Tzu holds that in ancient 
times "there were few people but plenty of supplies, and therefore the people 
did not quarrel. But nowadays ... there are many people but few supplies, 
and that one has to work hard for a meager return. So the people fall to
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quarreiing, and though rewards are doubled and punishments are piled on,
159they cannot be prevented from growing disorderly." Similar to Marx's 
analysis of the evolution of history on the basis of means of production 
and economic conditions, Han Fei Tzu divides history into three periods: 
remote antiquity, middle antiquity, and recent antiquity.
2) The Three Groups and Han Fei Tzu as Synthesizer 
By and large there were three groups in the Legalist School. The 
first group was headed by Shen Tao a Taoist as well as a Legalist,
who laid stress on shih ( ^ ) , which could be termed "power" or "authority". 
This group of thinkers attempted to discover the source of control in human 
relations. What they discovered was that it is position or role in social 
relations which creates power and influence. It is the prestige, reputation, 
and position of a man or a nation which produces power-relations that govern 
all of human society.
Similarly, a nation's power and influence in the international 
community is due to its prestige and role in world politics. A skillful 
demonstration of national power may increase a nation's prominence so that 
it can play an appropriate role with a larger sphere of influence. Therefore, 
a nation's shih is not only derived from internal sources of national power 
but also from its skill in managing relations among fellow states in the 
world community.
Ihe second group of Legalists emphasized the importance of shu (4'ij), 
which could be termed "statecraft" or methods of government somewhat like 
the modern technique of public administration. The leader of this group was 
Shen Pu-hai 5 ' ^  ) who was appointed minister in Han state in 351 B.C..^^^ 
The third group of Legalists stressed the function of law, ^  (^^). 
Shang Yang ) led this line of thought which was regarded as inevitable
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due to the drastic change of circumstances during tlie Warring States period,
Ilaii Fei Tzu regards law and shu,or statecraft, as two indispensable tools
for government, because statecraft can serve the ruler in power and laws are
16 ̂what are to be obeyed by the people.
Therefore, each of these three groups made a contribution to Legalist 
Tao. But Han Fei Tzu considered all these three views of Legalist Tao as 
equally important and thus synthesized them further with the Taoist concept 
of wu-wei into a systematic theory of Legalism.
(2) Kuan Tzu, Shang Yang and Nation-Building
The Legalists fully realized that the effectiveness of a nation's 
foreign policy and a role of leaderhsip in world politics relied heavily upon 
its internal strength, especially upon such tangible and intangivle elements 
of national power as social and political structure, military preparedness, 
and national morale. Within an era of power-politics like the Warring States 
period, it was very true that the internally weak nation was weak externally. 
Thus, both Kuan Tzu and Shang Yang were well known for their successful 
political and social reforms.
1) Kuan Tzu and Legalist Reform
Kuan Tzu not only emphasized the function of law but also paid much 
attention to the proper type of education for the people. A highly disciplined 
and educated people would be a tremendous source of manpower for a nation's 
mobilization. On the local level, Kuan Tzu tightened social relations among 
families through a group system of mutual responsibility. He set up a cen­
tralized control of people through semi-social and political units throughout 
the country.
On the economic side, Kuan Tzu put stress on the people's living 
standard, that is, the economic security of people which is one of the most
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important areas in politics. He pointed out; "When their foodstocks are full, 
the people understand what is courtesy or politeness. When there are enough 
civil supplies, the people realize what is honor or humiliation".
"Therefore, a rich nation is always in order, while a poor nation is always 
in chaos. Thus, those who really know how to deal with politics must make 
people rich first, and then rule the people.
Furthermore, Kuan Tzu also understood the importance of the problem 
of economic distribution. In his time, the interanl and external commerce 
of a state was under private control and a capitalistic economic system had 
been highly developed. In order to prevent the monopoly of capital and eco­
nomic exploitation by certain big capitalists, Kuan Tzu implemented a policy 
of socialism through nationalization of all big enterprises which might effect 
national or civil development. His socialist reform corrected the earlier 
capitalist policy of laissez-faire which had created some economic problems.
On the agricultural aspect, Kuan Tzu operated an agrarian reform to 
equalize ownership of cultivated land among the people, somewhat like the 
traditional "Well-Field" (-j| ) system. The government also set up certain
policies to help or to protect the interests of peasants.
Due to Kuan Tzu's drastic political, social, and economic reforms, 
which set up the foundation of national power, the Ch'i state under Duke 
Huan eventually became the first hegemonic leader among its fellow states 
during early Spring and Autumn period.
2) Shang Yang and Totalitarianism
One of the most important events during the middle Warring States 
period was Shang Yang's political and social reforms in Ch'in, which led 
Ch'in to become the most powerful state among its fellow states. Following 
the Legalist line Shang Yang emphasized the function and importance of law
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but his main contribution to the political field was the policy of totalitarian 
nationalism— a harsh struggle for nation-building. A profound legal system, 
for him, was a wise basis for governmental rule. However, what was more im­
portant was how to increase national power, because almost all the Legalists 
realized that power was a prerequisite for determined leadership in the world. 
"The reason for a nation that is respected and for a ruler who is honored 
is because of power,
The most tangible sources of national power at that time were agri­
cultural and military strength. Therefore, Shang Yang's reform was first 
concentrated on the increase of agricultural products by encouraging a 
universal participation in land cultivation. He urged all people of his 
nation to join in laboring for economic production, even soldiers and intel­
lectuals. Thus the nation would benefit from the economic increase.
Besides his emphasis on agricultural development, Shang Yang also 
stressed a highly disciplined militia type of military system. All people 
in the state participated in military exercises and training so that, in 
addition to the formal standing army, a peasant-soldier type of militia was 
organized. Under this policy "strong men are organized as an army; strong 
women are organized as an army; the weak men and women are organized as an 
army; and these are the three armies". All three armies help military ope­
rations specifically by taking their appropriate roles to fight, to supply, 
and to take care of civil affairs.
In general, Shang Yang's country was a centralized and highly con­
trolled totalitarian society with militaristic and nationalistic ideologies 
under strict laws. His political, social and economic reforms of totalitari­
anism limited individual development and freedom, but promoted Ch'in's national 
power. History tells that Shang Yang's totalitarian reforms won honor and 
status in the Legalist School of thought, although the dynasty of the tota-
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litarian Ch'in was the shortest in Chinese history.
C i )  lian Fei 'I'zu ^)--Representative of Legalist Thought
I) Power, State, and Power Politics
Han Fei Tzu was a scholar of keen observation and a writer of the 
"power concept" in political affairs. He studied men and institutions from 
the Taoist standpoint and he never indulged in utopian dreams and wishful 
fantasies as the idealist Confucians and Mohists did. He realistically is 
concerned only with what is at the present and what will be in the near 
future.
According to his theory of the evolution of the state, a theory of
historical materialism, Han Fei Tzu claims that the ancient ideal ruler is
a moralist, the medieval a philosopher, and the modern a man of power. "Men
of high antiquity strove for moral virtue; men of middle times sought out
wise schemes; men of today vie to be known for strength and spirit".
Like Bodin, Han Fei Tzu points out that the essential characteristic of the
state is power, force, or sovereign authority. Without the sovereign power,
even the sages like Yao and Shun would just be mere individuals and could
not maintain peace and order throughout the world. And it is national power
which regulates a nation's internal and external affairs.
Thus he who has great power at his disposal may force others to pay 
him court, but he whose power is weak must pay court to others. For 
this reason the enlightened ruler works to build up power.
Like most of the Legalists, Han Fei Tzu warns of the political reality and
coldness of power politics in international relations. He criticizes the
idealist doctrine of practicing benevolence and righteousness in the world
173politics. Instead he urges a proper awareness of these external power 
struggles and the building of strength through nationalism internally. Only 
realistic means and effective methods could deal with the cruel realities
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of power politics.
2) Nation-Building and Foreign Affairs
Han Fei Tzu therefore suggest that the highest aim of a state is 
the power and wealth which are extremely important to its conduct of foreign 
affairs. A strong policy within is a prerequisite to effective foreign policy 
without. He considers a nation's power and wealth to be mainly generated from 
internal strength and development rather than the wisdom of its foreign policy.
Neither power nor order, however, can be sought abroad— they are 
wholly a matter of internal government. Now if the ruler does not apply 
the proper laws and procedures within his state, but stakes all on the 
wisdom of his foreign policy, his state will never become powerful and
well ordered.
Therefore, in this aspect of political development Han Fei Tzu, like 
Shang Yang urged totalitarian political and social reforms to strengthen 
the nation. The nation must so regiment and educate the people that they 
all work as soldiers and farmers combined for increasing the power and wealth 
of the nation. All the people in the state serve as public citizens not private 
individuals. For Han Fei Tzu, a high mode of nationalism and patriotism must 
be adopted in order to foster national self-reliance and strength. Somewhat 
like the modern German statism, Han Fei Tzu's philosophy of state seems to 
be that the state exists for its own sake and the individual must live and 
die for the sake of the state. Hence, Han Fei Tzu's cold-blooded concept 
of statism was criticized by an eminent modern writer who said that "Han 
Fei Tzu sees only the state, but does not see man; he sees only the group,
1 inbut does not see the individual."^''
3) Independent Diplomacy and the Balance of Power
As for his attitude towards the popular policy of Horizontal Alliance 
(Ho-Tsung) or Vertical Alliance (Lien-Heng), the balance of power, Han Fei 
Tzu seems to be quite cautious about a nation's participating in either of
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these alliances because of the international uncertainty. The lack of mutual
trust and the sometimes secret diplomacy are the main obstacles to an effective
alliance in international relations. To stake one's national survival upon
178an uncertain alliance is a dangerous gamble for a nation. International 
politics during the Warring States period clearly present the fact that 
nine-tenths of the Vertical Alliances, Ho-Tsung, failed due to mutual dis­
trust among the allied states. Therefore, Han Fei Tzu seems to suggest to 
the middle and the smaller states that they keep a policy of non-alignment
and stay away from the alliances and struggles for power, which are the
affairs of the great powers. He especially gives advice to those samller 
states not to participate in alliances unless one's internal power has been 
built strong enough for an independent diplomacy which can participate in 
the game of the balance of power.
...Chou was ruined by the Vertical Alliance and Wey was destroyed 
by the Horizontal Alliance. Instead of being so hasty in their plans 
to join an alliance, they should have worked to strengthen the order 
within their domains, to make their laws clear and their rewards and 
punishments certain, to utilize the full resources of the land in 
building up stores of provisions, and to train their people to defend
the cities to the point of death, thus ensuring that any other ruler
would gain little profit by trying to seize their lands, but on the 
contrary would suffer great injury if he attempted to attack their 
states.... Once the wisdom of its foreign policy is exhausted and its 
internal government has fallen into disorder, no state can saved from 
ruin.179
In general, Han Fei Tzu does not encourage states to join the system 
of the balance of power except those great powers that are capable of standing 
as power centers each with independent diplomacies.
4) One Power Predominance and World Unification
Most of the schools of thought during the Warring States period were 
urging an end to the contending international situation. Each presented its 
means and philosophy for world peace and unification just as in today's 
world condition. Eventually, however, it was the realist Legalism which took
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the role of world dominance. Tlie Legalist policies of science, encouraging 
economy and warfare, disciplining the people under rule of laws, and con­
ducting the foreign policies with realist power-politics approach eventually 
made Ch'in powerful enough to complete its conquest over the other states 
in China in 221 B.C. Han Fei Tzu's thought visualized Chinese unification 
and thereafter has been profitably drawn upon again and again by later rulers 
and political theorists. Its penetrating analysés and astute advice remain 
of vital interest and influence today in contemporary Chinese politics.
A great thinker and Taoist follower of Han Dynasty, Wang Yun ( X  
criticized Han Fei Tzu: "The way (Tao) to govern a nation contains two faces. 
First is to cultivate virtue and the second is to generate power. ... Things 
can be done through virtue and can also be completed by power. A nation may 
be furnished with virtues in conducting foreign affairs externally but should 
be strengthened with power internally. So that the states of virtue-admirer 
can be won by conducting virtues without war and the states violating virtues 
can be carried by force. ... Therefore, neither virtue could solely be relied
upon to satisfy the art of politics nor power could solely be used to deal 
180with the enemy". Following the Taoist philosophy of relativity, he tried 
to synthesize the two faces of Tao which the idealists and the realists 
suggest.
Current Chinese politics seem to be following this tradition of the 
middle way to deal with its internal and external affairs. The Chinese are 
nowadays searching for the way to synthesize the various strains of idealism 
and realism from their past treasure of thought and experiences.
F) The School of Tsung-Heng: The Balance of Power
"The Horizontal Alliance (Lien-Heng was an east-west alignment
of states under the leadership of the powerful state of Ch'in in the west.
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rlic Vertical Alliance (Ho-Tsung ̂ .01) , a nonli-sotilI t  alIgnment, was designed
to preserve tlie independence of the weaker states and block Ch'in's expansion," 
181 according to Professor Bruton Watson. Han Fei Tzu also defined the meaning 
of Tsung-Heng as "the Vertical Alliance (Tsung), in which one joins with a 
number of weak states in hopes of attacking a strong one," and "the Horizontal 
Alliance (Heng), in which one serves a strong state for the purpose of at­
tacking a number of weak o n e s . I n  other words, if we translate the basic 
theme of Tsung-Heng theory into a modern idea, it is the concept of the ba­
lance of power as an approach to international politics. In general, the 
approach of Ho-Tsung could be regarded as "alliances for balance" and the 
Lien-Heng as "divide and rule."
The School of Tsung-Heng was emerging when the realist thought of 
Legalism dominated the philosophical schools in the latter part of Warring 
States period. As the degree of chaos increased due to a vicious struggle 
for power among the contending states at that time, a realistic method was 
needed to solve the problems. Thus, a group of Legalists who devoted their 
efforts specifically to the field of international relations and foreign 
policies founded the School of Tsung-Heng (Tsung-Heng Chia ̂ ^  .
The most eminent men in the School of Tsung-Heng were Su Ch'in (j^^) 
and Chang Yi (fK1^) » who both were disciples of Kuei Ku Tzu 
The former was leader of the Ho-Tsung group and the latter was leader of the 
Lien-Heng group. However, there were many less famous but still notable 
persons within these two groups from time to time during the Warring States 
period and throughout Chinese history.
(1) General Introduction of Tsung-Heng School
1) Hsing-Jen and Tsung-Heng School
Pan Ku (%)^), a great historian of the Han Dynasty, in his work
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Literature of Han pointed out in the preface the various Schools
of thought: "The founder of Tsung-Heng School derived from the position of 
hsing-jen." The so-called hsing-jen, in modern terms, is the diplomat.
When international conditions were getting chaotic and the struggle 
for power among the contending states intensified, the hsing-jen in a state 
played a more important role as an advisor of national security and foreign 
policy. Due to the national needs and coinciding with the international 
situation, a concept of balance of power was gradually formed through various 
experiences of the hsing-jen. In an international situation of contending 
states, the Vertical Alliance and the Horizontal Alliance became the most 
popular proposals for a national foreign policy among the states. The study 
of these alliances as a national foreign policy formulated the School of 
Tsung-Heng.
2) Tsung-Heng School and Otiier Schools of Hi ought
Tlie Confucian idealistic concept of virtue cannot be reconciled with 
the realistic concept of balance of power suggested by the Tsung-Heng School. 
Therefore, although they were well known, the words of Confucius and Mencius 
did not impress the rulers.
The Taoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang provides the important theory 
of dialectical materialism. In the dialectical change of Yin-Yang, the ^  
(|;), supplies the variables for strategic manipulation. The negative, in­
direct, and responsive approaches of Yin supplement the defects of the po­
sitive, direct and challenging approaches of Yang. Taoist doctrine had a 
great influence on the flexible operation of the balance of power for the 
Tsung-Heng School. Such an idea of flexibility in manipulating matters has 
been stated by Lao Tzu: "What is to be shrunken is first stretched out; what 
is to be weakened is first made strong; what will be thrown over is first
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raised up; vhat will be withdrawn is first bestowed. This indeed is subtle 
light; the gentle way will overcome the hard and s t r o n g . T h i s  dialectical 
concept was adopted by Tsung-Heng School in its application of international 
affairs.
The Mohist spirit of pragmatism also provides a realistic and scien­
tific basis for the Tsung-Heng School in its diplomatic manipulation. Upon 
Legalist realism and the Machiavellian type of approaches, national totali­
tarianism and international power-politics, the Tsung-Heng School based its
185approach to international manipulation.
The use of trickery and deception in war and strategy suggested by
the Stratagem School coincides with the game playing and secret diplomacy
in the balance of power. Kuei Ku Tzu was not only the teacher of the Tsung-
Heng School but also the master of the Stratagem School. He adopted the Taoist
concept of dialectical materialism and applied the principle of Tao and Yin-
186Yang as a political realist approach in warfare and international politics.
3) General Principles of Ho-Tsung
Although the main theme of Ho-Tsung is an alliance among states for 
collective defense to deter the menace of a greater power's domination, there 
are several other principles of this policy may be generalized for study.
(a) A Stress on the Advantages of Collective Defense System.
When a group of minor powers' security is threatened by a world power, 
the advantage of a system of collective defense seems to be quite obvious 
for them. Because the common interest among the states is urgent and neces­
sary, a temporary united front can be established regardless of certain dis­
advantages to that alliance.
At this point, therefore, Su Ch'in started his system of Ho-Tsung, 
persuading the concerned states by stressing the advantages of collective
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defense system. He was successful in doing so, first with the weaker and
more concerned states like Yen, Han, and Chao and then with the stronger
187and less concerned states like Wei, Ch'i and Ch'u. Therefore, the out­
come of the system of Ho-Tsung was due to the advantage of mutual benefit 
in a collective defense system.
(b) Competition and Alliances against World Domination
In order to form an effective collective defense system, as many
as possible states are urged to participate in this system, especially those
great leading powers which may play a decisive role. Thus, a pattern of
competition for alliances among the states, especially for the great powers,
is formed. In the process of competition for balance of power, both the most
concerned minor and major powers are liable to be persuaded and the rest of
the other powers might shift their policies after a system is nearly built up.
Su Ch'in formed his system of Ho-Tsung not only by first persuading the weak
and most concerned state of Yen but also by attempting to get one of the
major powers, Chao, to lead the system of Ho-Tsung alliances to deter the
188world dominant Ch'in state. After he succeeded and formed a relatively 
stable alliance, it did not take too much effort to attract other major 
states to participate in the alliance, such states as Wei, Ch'i, and Ch'u, 
Thus, a system of Ho-Tsung was finally established,
(c) Rejection of Appeasement
Since contradictions always exist within all matters, especially in 
a situation of struggle for national interest among nations, a great weakness 
of the system of collective defense is probably the mood of mutual distrust 
among the member states which may finally lead to a total collapse through 
appeasements by certain member states. Therefore, continuous consultations 
and commitments to reinforce collectivity, mutual trusts, and cooperation
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are urged to prevent the possible occurrence of appeasement. A modern example
of this situation can be illustrated by a serious controversy between the
United States, the leading member, and its European allies, especially France,
in the NATO system during I960's.
Similarly, in order to consolidate his system of Ho-Tsung, Su Ch'in
not only tried to embrace all the concerned states in a system of collective
defense but also attempted to eliminate the contradictions among them and
to reconcile their relationship, A great contribution to the system of Ho-
Tsung was his success in persuading the great power of Ch'i not to accept
the title of "Eastern Emperor" in 234 B.C. The powerful state of Ch'in had
offered this in an attempt to bribe Ch'i into sharing the hegemonic superi-
189ority over fellow states in order to eliminate the system of Ho-Tsung.
Su Ch'in was successful in preventing this possible appeasement from occuring
and thus completed his system of Ho-Tsung which maintained world peace and
190checked Ch'in's aggression for a period of twenty-nine years.
4) General Principles of Lien-Heng
Since it is opposite to the system of Ho-Tsung, the principles of 
Lien-Heng are concentrated on diplomatic techniques and the manipulation of 
contradictions among states in order to break down the alliance and the 
system of collective defense. It is mainly a policy of "divide and rule" in 
the balance of power.
(a) Stress on the Disadvantages of Collective Defense System.
Unlike the system of Ho-Tsung which is constructed on the basis of 
the advantages of collective defense, the policy of Lien-Heng is aimed at 
breaking down the system of Ho-Tsung through stressing its disadvantages, 
defects and weaknesses. To this purpose, such defects of alliance as mutual 
distrust and suspicion, secret diplomacy for self-national interest, the
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uncertainty of the power balance, and the unreliability of security commit­
ments, are greatly exaggerated in order to dirainisii the feasibility of co­
llective defense. It is the negative side and the psychological weapon of 
Lien-Heng.
Following this principle, Chang Yi and other Lien-Heng followers 
devoted their efforts to persuade rulers of various states, especially the 
small and middle powers, not to participate in or to withdraw from the system 
of collective defense, emphasizing the disadvantages of such an alliance.
They further tried to incite the great powers to ally themselves with Ch'in, 
the superpower, to share world conquest.
(b) Competition, Divide and Rule, and 
Manipulation of Contradictions
Due to the reshaping of the balance of power by the alliances, the 
system of Lien-Heng was forced to compete for allies in order to diminish 
the power of its opponent. This competition for associates was mainly aimed 
at great powers who, being secure, are easily tempted by the offering in­
terest and bribes. Thus, the strategy of Lien-Heng concentrated on the prin­
ciple of divide and rule. To achieve this goal, not only the tactics of 
bribery with various interests, compensation of certain territory and con­
cessions of minor conflicting policies are used to attract concerned parties 
to keep neutral or to become associates, but also the techniques of mani­
pulating contradictions among the member states of opponent alliances so 
as to break up unity and to reduce the potential power of the system of 
collective defense. When an alliance begins to weaken from the rising self- 
interest of the member states, that will be the correct time for the world 
dominant power to proceed in attacking the individual states one by one.
(c) ’’Yuan-Chiao Chin-Kung" and United Front and Struggle.
The process of divide and rule for the purpose of conquest is for­
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mulated through the strategy of "yuan-chiao chin-kung", associating with
191far-off and/or big states and attacking near and/or small states. This
formula is featured by the principle of united front and struggle. The state
conducting the strategy of Lien-Heng devoted its efforts first to associating
temporarily with the less concerned and distant great powers to form a united
front or at least to make those states keep neutral. Then its aim turns to
the seriously concerned and geographically near and small states for attack.
After the liquidation of the small, less powerful and near states, which
contributes to her national power, the state which follows Lien-Heng then
gradually turns to the isolated allies of united front for struggle. At this
moment, the hopelessly isolated far-off states will face a predominant
challenge and can not keep neutral nor have associates, and they will either
be defeated or have to surrender. The dialectical process of swinging between
a united front and a struggle becomes the Tsung-Heng system's basic approach
to the reshaping of the balance of power.
Cliang Yi's concrete proposal of "yuan-chiao chin-kung" finally made
Ch'in an unconquerable power among its fellow states through reshaping the
balance of power. In her process of making a united front with the far-off
and less concerned great powers such as Ch'u and Ch'i,^^^ Ch'in in the
meantime began to launch attacks on the near and small states such as Wei
193and Han about 317 B.C. At this time, Chang Yi started his mission of
persuading Chao and Yen to submit to Ch'in in the system of Lien-Heng.
After completing this task, Ch'in turned attacks first on Ch'u and then on
Ch'i, her allies of the united front. When Ch'i was hopelessly defeated and
annexed, Ch'in finished its conquest of all states and unified China in
221 B.C. - .
5) The Role of the Tsung-Heng School in the Process of Ch'in's 
Conquest and the Unification of China
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The realist school of international politics regards balance of 
power as the main approach to preserving world peace and national security. 
However, its opponents criticized balance of power as the main cause of 
international conflict and disorder because of its relatively unbalanced, 
vague power concept and power uncertainty. This contemporary controversy 
actually reveals the major theme of the philosophy of Tao and its two faces, 
Yin and Yang. Since nothing is absolute in the universe, the interactions 
of Yin and Yang, a dialectical process of balance and imbalance, led to 
historical, social and economical evolutions through war and peace.
The main theme of the Tsung-Heng School is the concept of balance 
of power. It presents the dialectical theory of Tao— the unity of opposites. 
The existence of the concept of Tsung-Heng is because of its contradictive 
two phases, Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. To this point, members in the Ho-Tsung 
system are "response states" in the phase of Yin which attempts to maintain 
the balance of power, and the states in the Lien-Heng system are "challenge 
states" in the phase of Yang which attempt to break or to reshape the balance 
of power. The interaction of response and challenge, the Yin and Yang, and 
the transformation of balance and imbalance led to the final unification 
of China. In the interaction of the Tsung-Heng system, Ch'in could correctly 
handle the dialectical transformation of contradiction. In the latter part 
of Warring States period, Ch'in did from time to time swing its policy 
between the system of Ho-Tsung and the system of Lien-Heng according to 
various circumstances. With correct manipulation of the Tsung-Heng theory, 
Ch'in drastically increased her power along with each transformation of 
Tsung-Heng, the reshaping of the balance of power. The amount of power which 
Ch'in gained from the manipulation of the balance of power was much more 
than that which she gained through the physical conquest over her fellow
194
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states. In his work "Liu-kuo Lun” (The Six States), Su Hsun ( ^ 0 ^  1009-1066 
AD,), one of the Sung Dynasty's "Eight Great Prose Masters", described 
this situation and pointed out the role of the Tsung-Heng system in the 
process of unification.
The Six States were not destroyed because their weapons were dull 
or their warfare inept. Their real weakness lay in appeasing Ch'in: 
to bribe Ch'in and so diminish their own strength was the path to 
certain destruction.
... Those states which did not bribe Ch'in were destroyed by the 
ones that did because the former were robbed of effective aid by the 
latter and very soon could not stand by themselves— this is why I 
say the real weakness of the Six States lay in appeasing Ch'in. The 
territory Ch'in acquired without having to do battle for it--... 
actually amounted to a hundred times more than she even got by warfare.
The role of the Tsung-Heng School in the process of China's uni­
fication was impressive, especially the system of Lien-Heng which paved 
the way for the finality. Liu Hsiang of Han Dynasty concludes his preface 
in the Chan-kuo Ts'e by giving the credit of China's eventual unification 
under Ch'in to Chang Yi's accomplishment.
When Su Ch'in died Chang Yi formed the Coalition (system of Lien- 
Heng). All the Lords obeyed him and faced the west to do homage to 
Ch'in. It was for this reason that Ch'in Shih-huang ... ate away the 
Six States as the silk-warm gnaws away the leaf. He brought all the 
Lords under his control and unified the empire.
(2) Kuei Ku Tzu )— Founding Father of Tsung-Heng School
Nothing is certain about Kuei Ku Tzu and his life. The Shih Chi
tells us that a hermit lived in the place of Kuei Ku ( ^ ^ )  in the city
of Yang (^^A^) during the Warring States period and that he called himself
Mr. Kuei Ku. The content of the book Tao Chang (2^j^) tells that Kuei
Ku Tzu's name was Wang Hsu ( ^ ^ ^  ) and lived in the period of Duke P'ing 
197Chin, Certain people regarded Kuei Ku Tzu and Su Ch'in as the same person,
198since Su Ch'in pretended to be somewhat mysterious for his own advantages.
199Kuei Ku Tzu wrote the book Kuei Ku Tzu in a total of three volumes.
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1) Tao, Yin-Yang, Pai-Ho and Dialectical Materialism
Kuei Ku Tzu's theoretical foundation of the TmunK-lleng concept rests 
on the Taoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang., which co-exist in a manner of 
unity and contradiction. In this sense, Tao represents the phenomena of 
regularity and ordinariness and the Yin-Yang dialectic represents the pheno­
mena of irregularity and exception in the universe. However, in the objective 
process of transferring from the unity to the contradiction or from the 
contradiction to the unity there exists a transitional point or stage which 
is the key for a subjective motivation and manipulation. It is this subjective
motivation and manipulation which Kuei Ku Tzu regards as a great wisdom in
controlling complicated human relations and social affairs.
In the process of unity and dissociation, or beginning and ending, 
of the universe, there exists a conversional gap or stage which we
should investigate. For those who can understand it through dialectical
flexibility (Pai-Ho^  nD ) and manipulate it will be the gr^at wise men. 
The great wise men are the missionaries of the universe.
The idea of Pai-Ho (Open and Closed) which is highly dialectical in 
sense may correspond with that of Yin-Yang, The flexible interaction of Pai 
and Ho, Yin and Yang, according to the appropriate objective conditions will 
create a situation which may lead to a subjective human control. In inter­
national relations an appropriate management of the interaction of Pai-Ho 
) and Tsung-Heng (collective defense alliance and "divide and rule") 
may provide a condition from which the subjective operator can take advan­
tages, As with modern natural science which follows the objective laws of 
nature operating in the universe, man investigates its rules and may sub­
jectively lead it to the area of human benefit, Kuei Ku Tzu pointed out:
We investigate the nature of Yin-Yang and its relations with 
K'ai-Ho (open and close, active and passive) in order to entitle all 
things. In the universe all phenomena are complicated with infinite 
change according to its own rule. It may be Yin or Yang, soft or hard, 
open or close, loose or sharp. So that, in order to cause your opponent 
to express or to act, it would be rather through indirect or negative
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way to obtain the truth. To obtain the truth, informations through this 
way are valuable. Therefore, the alternate use of negative and positive 
ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may provide ad­
vantages for us.201 >
Lao Tzu, the great Taoist, in his work Tao Te Ching also pointed out similar
principles as a science of method for human conduct and argued that sometimes
the negative or indirect way (Yin) will override the positive or direct way
202(Yang) in conducting human affairs.
2) Cheng-Ch ' i (jP-^), Human Psychology, and Science of Method 
Kuei Ku Tzu discovered that man has emotional tendencies which con­
tains both human strength and weakness. In conducting human affairs a wise 
man should follow the human psychological tendency by disclosing one's strength 
and not mentioning his weakness. So that there will be no difficulty in per­
suasion and planning.
It is human nature to hear what he likes and to do what he desires. 
Therefore, a wise man will not disclose other's weakness but rather 
employ his strength; will not use his shortage but rather discover 
his skillness. So that, there can be no difficulty.
Therefore, in persuasions and diplomatic missions, the indirect and negative
way will be sometimes convince people more effectively than the direct and
positive way.
Furthermore, Kuei Ku Tzu also praises the merit of the principle of 
"extraordinary (Ch'i -^) among normal (Cheng ̂  )" in human affairs and psy­
chology. In ocher words, he points out the performance of "surprise out of 
the common" in human social conduct. Human nature, which contains curiosity 
and selfishness, can be manipulated appropriately and advantageously. Suc­
cessful operation of this human nature is important in a diplomatic negoti­
ation and persuasion. Moreover, in conducting either a national foreign 
policy or a military strategy, the advantages of "surprise out of the common" 
are incredible. However, the creation of the extraordinary, or surprise.
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will be up to a relative use of the normal, or common, which creates regu­
larity and blinds human mind to flexibility. The relationship between "sup- 
rise" and "common" is dialectical and reproductive in nature just like Tao 
and Yin-Yang, but with wisdom it can be subjectively manipulated. According 
to Kuei Ku Tzu, the use of the "suprise or extraordinary" is superior to that 
of the "common or normal" in general (Cheng bu ju Ch'i
In general, Kuei Ku Tzu follows the Taoist cosmic philosophy of Tao 
and Yin-Yang and investigates the materialistic nature and conditions of 
human affairs. His importance in scholarship is that he adopts the objective 
principle of Tao and Yin-Yang and advises a subjective manipulation of ma­
terialistic conditions into a synthesis in terms of Tsung-Heng Pai-Ho
active-passive interaction and the manipulation of contradictions) 
which is the science of method in human affairs. His students. Su Ch'in and
Chang Yi, applied these teachings to international affairs in operating the
balance of power. And another student of his. Sun Tzu (Sun Pin) applied these
206principles to military strategy and created a science of military stratagem. 
Thus, Kuei Ku Tzu was credited as being the founding father and theorist of 
the Tsung-Heng School and the School of Military Stratagem.
(3) The Philosophy of Tao, Yin-Yang and Tsung-Heng
Like the cosmic phenomena and principles of Tao and Yin-Yang as the
Taoist teaches, the opponent of Su Ch'in's system of alliance for collective 
defense was the system of coalition proposed by Chang Yi, Su Ch'in's class­
mate, for breaking the system of collevtive defense through a policy of divide 
and rule. If we put the system of Ho-Tsung on the side of Yin which is nega­
tive, passive and responsive in character, and put the system of Lien-Heng 
on the side or Yang which is positive, active and challenging in nature, 
the contradiction and struggle between these two can co-exist synthetically.
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llie process of the dialectical transformation of these two forms presents 
a synthetic track which is the Tao of Yin-Yang and Tsung-Heng and paves the 
way for progress, leading to the unification of China among the contending 
states in 221 B.C.
G) The School of Military Stratagem; Sun Tzu and the Art of War
(1) War and Politics in the Age of the Warring States
The relationship between war and politics is as intimate as brother­
hood throughout human history. War and diplomacy are two swords in conducting 
international relations. Carl von Clausewitz, a great Western philosopher 
of war, presents his view on the relationship between international relations 
and war: "Clashes of interests between two states are typically resolved by
the imposition of the will of one state upon that of another. Therefore, war
207is a normal phase in the relations among states." The definition of war
for him is: "l-Jar, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our
208opponent to fulfil our will." Thus, the nature of war is political rather 
than physical violence per se. In other words, just like diplomacy, war is 
a special form of politics among nations but in a violence sense.
The basic feature of the Warring States period in ancient China 
was war itself. Thus, warfare and the politics of Tsung-Heng diplomacy were 
two phases in the struggle for power and hegemony. As the failure of diplo­
matic manipulation in an unbalanced transitional period of the international 
system oscilated between the Ho-Tsung alliance and the Lien-Heng alliance, 
war was a magic alternative in pursuit of a national goal. Although the 
politics of Tsung-Heng diplomacy contributed a great deal in finalizing 
the period of Warring States war itself was so important that the unification
of all China (or world) by Ch'in might not have been completed without mili- 
209tary conquests. ~ The concept of a world government was eventually accom­
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plished through the realistic means of war.
(2) The Leading Feature of the Martial Classics
Because of the importance of war in relation to the conduct of inter­
national politics, there have been many people who devoted their efforts to 
military science. From certain historical records, many great administrators 
and philosophers, most of them realists, studied the role of war and civil- 
military relationships in early ancient China. The great administrators in­
cluded Chiang T'ai-kung or Chiang Shang of Chou, Kuan Chung of Chin
during the early Spring and Autumn period, Ssu-ma Jon-chu , Shang
Yang, Wei Liao C ^ i ^ ,  Wu Ch'i Sun Pin and others. Philo­
sophers who were concerned with the role of military affairs in politics were 
Lao Tzu, Hsun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei Tzu, and Kuei Ku Tzu. However, among these, 
the most prominent representatives of the group who devoted their efforts 
to the science of war were Wu Ch'i and Sun Pin. For thousands of years their 
eminent works. Sun Wu Ping Fa "The Art of War of Sun Tzu and Wu
Ch'i", have been regarded as indispensable for professional generals and 
policy strategists throughout Chinese history. The concept and theories of 
war elaborated by this group of people who were continuously involved in 
politics evolved into science of war referred to as the School of Military 
Stratagem, Ping Chia.
A great feature of the School of Military Stratagem was their phi­
losophical view of realism. They realistically regarded war as the means to 
the end from which peace could be secured. For example. Legalist thinkers 
like Kuan Chung, Li K'uei, Shang Yang, and Han Fei Tzu, put superiority on
"agriculture and war" and "power" as the necessary means for achieving
210national goals and survival. Sun Tzu regarded war as a grave concern
211of the nation which needed to be thoroughly studied. Ssu-ma Jon-chu in
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his work, Treatise of Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma F a ^.^‘~4)« stated: "It is justified to
employ war in order to stop war. ... Therefore, even a big nation will perish
if she abuses war. Although the world is in peace, a nation will be in danger
212if she ignores the possibility of war," Hsun Tzu, though not a member
of the School of Military Stratagem, viewed war from a moral and ethical
basis and approved of armies "for the purpose of stopping tyranny and getting 
213rid of injury."
(3) Sun Tzu and "The Art of War" (Sun Tzu Ping
The most distinguished representative of the School of Military 
Stratagem is Sun Tzu whose work The Art of War contains thirteen chapters 
of treatise which have survived past thousands of year.
1) The Philosophical Concept of Sun Tzu's The Art of War
War is peculiar to human affairs and it has its own characteristics.
The first of which is that there is something vital concerned with survival. 
Thus, it is positive, creative, and active rather than negative and passive 
in human mind and activity. Second, war is a competition and interaction of 
physical power. It is something obviously realistic in nature. Third, war 
has its own general rules in action. A complete understanding and following 
of these objective rules is necessary in planning and commanding in the inter­
action of physical violence. Thus war is an objective activity not a subjective 
imagination. Fourth, the conducting of war not only should follow the objective 
rules and circumstances but also need to be motivated in dynamic mobility. 
Therefore, the philosophical view of war is a unity of objective observation 
and subjective creativity in management. Fifth, war is a competition both of 
physical power and of human wisdom. All warfare is based on the deception 
and trickery which are dynamic according to the variety of circumstances. This 
philosophy of change and dynamic of war is dialectical in nature.
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According to these general characteristics of war, we will pursue 
some philosophical points in The Art o f  War by taking three views: the epi- 
stemological realism, the dialectical methodology, and the unity of subjective 
motivation and objective regularity.
(a) Epistemological Realism 
Sun Tzu's attitude towards epistemology is materialistic, that is, 
matter is primary and the knowledge is based on the concrete facts. By rea­
lizing the objective facts and circumstances, the result of a war, victory 
or defeat, could be predicted to a certain extent. This prediction is based 
on realistic factors rather than spiritual wishes.
What is called "foreknowledge" can not be elicited from spirits, nor 
from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It 
must be obtained from men who know the eneny situation.
From this point, Sun Tzu points out five concrete factors which deter­
mine the outcome of a war: "The first of these factors is Tao, moral influence;
the second, weather (t'ien); the third, terrain (ti); the fourth, command
215(chiang); and the fifth, doctrine (fa)." These five factors are the real
roots of a war's outcome. Thus, Sun Tzu concludes: "There is no general who
has not heard of these five matters. Those who master them win; those who
216do not are defeated,"
Furthermore, Sun Tzu points out the relativity of the knowledgement
of actuality. An objective analysis and comparision of the facts and situation
217will also determine the outcome of a war. The actual comparison and ana­
lysis of the relativity of powers between the enemy and yourself is the way 
to victory, because you can appropriately control the activity. Sun Tzu con­
cludes his view on the outcome of a war in general with these words: "There­
fore I say: 'Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will 
never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself.
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your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your eneny
2*18and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril'."
(b) Tao, Yin-Yang, and Dialectical Methodology 
Sun Tzu's concept of materialistic epistemology is not just a simple 
experiment, but a dialectical perception of reality through phenomena. Sun 
Tzu adopted the Taoist cosmic concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, the philosophy 
of change and the dialectical transformation of opposition, and applied them 
to the field of military science in order to construct his concept of war 
and strategic policy. Comparable to the concept of Yin and Yang, concepts of 
dialectical character do exist in the science of war. Specifically, they 
are the concepts of the advantageous and disadvantageous, directness and in­
directness, benefit and harm, siege and release, order and disorder, cowardice 
and courage, weakness and strength, offense and defense, action and inaction, 
normal (Cheng) and extraordinary (Ch'i), etc. All these concepts, like the 
nature of Tao and Yin-Yang, have a sense of unity and contradiction. In a 
certain circumstances they are changeable and transformable. Sun Tzu presents 
this dialectical idea in the conduct of military affairs. For example, Sun 
Tzu points out that the concepts of advantage and disadvantage are mutually 
reproductive and inter-locked. Like the concept of Yin-Yang and philosophy
of change, dangers are inherent in the advantages, ana advancagrc inherent 
219in the dangers- If one does not understand what is harmful, he does not
know what is beneficial either. Thus, only after evaluating both what is
harmful and beneficial he can, under certain conditions, alter the situation 
220towards his goal. Therefore, Sun Tzu advises: "Thus, those skilled in 
war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without 
assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Your 
aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn
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221out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy". 
With this principle, he comments on the conduct of war as "Thus, what is of 
supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is 
to disrupt his alliances. The next best is to attack his army. The worst
222policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.
This idea constitutes Sun Tzu's basic theme of political-military relationship.
Similarly, the concepts of the direct and indirect, siege and release,
order and disorder, cowardice and courage, weakness and strength, as related
to harm and benefit are all opposites, but can be altered dialectically.
Thus it is important to control those factors which may cause the alteration
under a certain circumstances. Sun Tzu points out this dialectical concept
vividly in his illustration of military strategy.
Nothing is more difficult than the art of manouver. What is difficult 
about manouver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn 
misfortune to advantage. Thus, march by an indirect route and divert 
the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after 
he does and arrive before him. One able tg.do this understands the 
strategy of the direct and the indirect.
The philosophical view of dialectic in "The Art of War" can be also
found through the idea:"Ground in which the a m y  survives only if it fights
224with the courage of desperation is called 'death'. Li Ch'uan, a commenta­
tor of "The Art of War", illustrates this idea: "Blocked by mountains to 
the front and rivers to the rear, with provisions exhausted. In this situa- 
tion it is advantageous to act speedily and dangerous to procrastinate.
This transformation from danger to safety or a nearly defeated situation 
to a victory illustrates the peculiar approach of dialectics. Sun Tzu fur­
ther points out the dialectical dilemma that "Apparent confusion is a 
product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, 
of s t r e n g t n . T h u s ,  he advises not to push situations to the extreme so 
as to secure the favourable position. Such as in siege of a city, "To a
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surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape. Do not press an enemy at
227
bay." All matters in the universe are dialectical in nature. They are 
reproductive and transformable from one extreme to the other. By the Taoist 
teaching of cosmology. Sun Tzu cleverly caught this wisdom and applied it 
to military science.
Furthermore, appropriate manipulation and control following the 
dialectical doctrine in conducting military strategy may alter a situation 
from unfavourable to favourable, weak to strong, few to many, defeated to 
victorious, defensive to offensive. The accomplishment of this transforma­
tion depends upon a subjective motivation according to the specific objective 
conditions and circumstances. Sun Tzu points out in his "The Art of War";
If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the 
same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide.
And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength 
to attack a fraction of his. There, I will be numerically superior.
Then, if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, 
those I deal with will be in dire straits.
Similarly, in the conduct of offense and defense, a dialectical operation
would gain a great deal of advantages. Sun Tzu comments that "Therefore,
against those skilled in attack, an enemy does not know where to defend;
229against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack".
The creation of uncertainty and ambiguity in the enemy is what Sun Tzu 
regards as the subjective motivation or creativeness.
The concept of Cheng (normal, common) and Ch 'i (extraordinary, 
surprise) which may be extracted Sun Tzu's general principle of military 
strategy originated from teachings of Kuei Ku Tzu, the founding father of 
Tsung-Heng School and a theorist of military strategy. It is dialectical in 
character. According to Sun Tzu, the arts of war and military operations 
are all derived from manipulation of the myth of Cheng and Ch'i. Under 
certain conditions, Cheng could become Ch'i and Ch'i could be changed into
-102-
Cheng. Like the nature of Yin and Yang, the variety of the interaction of
Cheng and Ch ' i could be endless and numberless.
In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but 
their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For 
these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as 
endless as that of in^gglocked rings. Who can determine where one ends 
and the other begins?
In military operation, for example, "the normal (Cheng) force fixes
or distracts the enemy; the extraordinary (Ch'i) forces act when and where
their blows are not anticipated. Should the enemy perceive and respond to
a Ch ' i manouver in such a manner as to neutralize it, the manouver would
231automatically become Cheng". This dialectical process constructs the
myth of the Cheng-Ch ' i concept which in the Taoist term is Tao. Kuei Ku Tzu
comments on the operation of Cheng and Ch'i: "The Ch'i manouver is better
232or more effective than the Cheng manouver. " Sun Tzu, Kuei Ku Tzu's
233student, elaborated on this concept in "The Art of War": "Generally, in
battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary or surprise
234to win". Moreover, Sun Tzu concluded: "That the army is certain to
sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of
235
the extraordinary and the normal forces". The alternation and transfor­
mation of these two forces, like the nature of Tao and Yin-Yang, are endless.
Now the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary 
forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; as inexhaustible as 
the flow of the great rivers. For they end and recommence; cyclical, 
as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn; 
recurrent, as are the passing seasons.
If we can summarize some principles of Sun Tzu's dialectical method­
ology, there are three general features. First, the military strategic theory 
in "The Art of War" contains the philosophical view of the unity of opposites 
which are self-denial and reproductive. It is dynamic, dialectical, and 
active in nature. Second, the methodological approach in "The Art of War"
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is that of realism. To mankind war is a vital matter of survival. Third,
Sun Tzu's dialectical methodology in "The Art of War" presents an important
concept of subjective exercise and motivation within the process of dialectics.
The combination of dialectics and subjective motivation consturcts an active
and realistic world-view and a scientific study of military theory. This
concept as expressed in "The Art of War" is much more progressive in social
practice than that of the Taoist School which has reduced its cosmic view
237of Tao and Yin-Yang into a passive and fatalistic world outlook.
(c) The Unity of Subjective Motivation and Objective Regularity 
Sun Tzu realizes that military operation is a matter of realistic 
competition and confrontation of human power and wisdom. This engagement 
concerns a great deal of subjective human motivation for struggle and active­
ness. But the function of subjective motivation is limited by the objective 
conditions and physical circumstances. Dialectically, however, the objective 
regularity, conditions and circumstances can be altered due to an appropriate 
subjective motivation. They are interrelated and mutually influenced. There­
fore, and appropriate evaluation of the specific situation of a military
operation must be based on a combined consideration of the subjective
238
motivation and the objective regularity. In "The Art of War", Sun Tzu
teaches; "Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation
and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects his men and they
239
exploit the situation". Military strategy and theory, like other matters 
in the world, has its own Tao, the natural law, and to follow this objective 
way will lead to an anticipated goal.
However, since the objective conditions are constantly changed due 
to various factors, it is vitally important to exercise subjective motiva­
tion and creativity in ordering events.
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And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant 
conditions. Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his 
tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be 
divine,
Because a certain factors depend on the other party, the enemy, it 
is necessary and important to alter circumstances in order to gain control of 
the situation.
Anciently the skilful warriors first made themselves invincible 
and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends 
on one's s e l f ;  t h e  enemy's vulnerability on him.
To exercise the subjective motivation in order to create favourable
conditions, for example, "The Art of War" points out several general princi­
ples according to the philosophical view of dialectics. First, to eliminate 
one's weakness means to strengthen one's self. To this point. Sun Tzu 
suggests ways to do this, such as political, social and economic reforms ;
military discipline and training; adequate preparation and supplies; keeping
secret, etc. Moreover, "It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will
not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness to meet him; not to presume
242that he will not attack, but rather to make one's self invincible. A
careful evaluation of the situation may also avoid traps which would cause
one's weakness. Therefore, "When he pretends to flee, do not pursue. Do not
attack his elite troops. Do not gobble preferred baits. Do not thwart an
243enemy returning homewards." All these teachings are the proper ways to 
minimize one's weakness.
Second, to induce the enemy to make the mistake of attacking means 
to increase one's favourable conditions and power. Dialectically, there­
fore, one's unfavourable conditions could be changed to favourable ones.
The ways to do so, according to Sun Tzu's teaching, include various strategy 
and techniques. The use of trickery and deception may be important. Sun Tzu 
points out; "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable.
- 1 0 5 -
feign incapacity; when active, incativity Anger his general and confuse
244him; pretent inferiority and encourage his arrogance." Adequate disposi­
tion of military force may also create a favourable condition for one's self
245so as to use full strength in attacking a fraction of the enemy. Distur­
bance is also an effective technique in altering an existing situation for
benefit. Thus, "When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well
246fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move."
Furthermore, other strategy and techniques such as the use of sur­
prise attack, "Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not
247expect you," and the employment of secret agents are all proper means to
weaken the enemy through subjective motivation.
In general. Sun Tzu recognizes that the objective law of physical 
conditions shapes the way of military operation. "Invincibility depends on 
one's self; the enemy vulnerability on him..., those skilled in war can
make themselves invincible but can not cause an enemy to be certainly
248vulnerable". But, dialectically the objective conditions can be altered
by subjective motivation through properly playing upon the enemy's vulner­
ability. He vividly presents this philosophical view of the unity of sub­
jective motivation and objective regularity in his work, "The Art of War".
2) Sun Tzu on War and Peace
Sun Tzu's philosophy of war and peace is politically oriented. In 
the first verse of "The Art of War", he presents the idea that war is 
greatly related to the politics which influence the survival or ruin of 
a nation. To this point, war is only a peculiar type of politics which 
contains physical violence and is a transitional and extraordinary stage 
of politics. The final goal of war is peace under which regular politics 
is performed. Sun Tzu recognized that on the road of politics there exist
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certain obstacles which block its operation. Therefore, in order for 
politics to be continued war, a special type of desturctive power, is 
necessary and inevitable in wiping out those obstacles. Thus, the use of 
war should be minimized unless there is no alternative. Sun Tzu elaborates 
this principle of war that:
Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact: to ruin 
it is inferior to this....For to win one hundred victories in one 
hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill.
To this point, Sun Tzu suggests that the political power derived
from military threat and strategy will be the best weapon in international
politics, the next best will be a skillful diplomatic manipulation with
favourable alliances. The inferior way in conducting international politics
250
is the performance of physical violence, warfare itself.
On the philosophy of war, in general. Sun Tzu concludes:"Thus, those
skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities
without assaulting theme and overthrow his state without protracted opera- 
251tions." This idea fully indicates the concept that war is for peace.
3) Sun Tzu on Protracted War
Sun Tzu teaches in his "The Art of War" that a protracted war should 
not be applied in an active offensive attack. This is because the lasting 
war may cause the change of conditions and circumstances which involve the 
military manpower, supplies, and morale. A quick attack and completion is 
the key for victory, especially when it is from a superior position.
Victory is the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons 
are blunted and morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their 
strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns 
the resources of the state will not suffice. Thus, while we have heard 
of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation 
that was prolonged. For ^^gre has never been a protracted war from which 
a country has benefited,
A philosophical view, thus, was pointed out in "The Spring and Autumn":
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"War is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselves 
253consumed by them." Therefore, Tu Yu, a famous general of Han Dynasty,
commented on Sun Tzu's teaching that "An attack may lack ingenuity, but it
must be delivered with supernatural speed,
Dialecticrlly, however, when one is under a defensive and inferior
position, the application of a protracted war may drain the enemy’s strength
and finally wage the war in victory. Thus, the use of protracted war is
dynamic and under the philosophical principle of dialectics. In modern
history, this point can be examplified by first, the Russian application
of protracted war in defense against Napoleon's invasion and Nazi Germany's
attack; second, the Chinese strategy of protracted war against Japanese
aggression during World War II; and third, Mao Tse-tung's protracted strategy
of revolutionary war with Kuomintang and in the Chinese civil war, 1945-1949.
Mao's concept of protracted strategy has been currently applied to Chinese
foreign policy in confronting international power politics.
However, the most important factor in fighting a protracted war is
popular support, especially in a nationalistic or a moralistic war. This
would involve certain special conditions and human factors. Therefore, in
general. Sun Tzu concludes ; "Hence what is essential in war is victory, not
255prolonged operation",
4) Sun Tzu On People's War
War involves a great amount of physical materials and human sources. 
The collection and operation of the national resources require the coopera­
tion of the mass of people and popular support. The people of a nation are 
the real vital factor in waging war. A harmonious relationship between 
government and population, superior and inferior, commanders and soldiers 
would obviously pave the way to victory. Thus, so vitally important as the
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people are, no wise man can Ignore them. Therefore, Wu Ch'i, another famous 
military strategist, sincerely teaches:
Anciently, those who planned against another state would surely 
first instrust the hundred clans (popular people) and then display 
affection toward the myriad people. There are four matters in which 
concord may be lacking. When there is discord within the country the 
army cannot be moblized. When there is discord in the army it cannot 
take the field. When there is lack of harmony in the field the army 
cannot take the offensive. When there is lack of harmony in battle 
the army cannot win a devisive victory. Therefore the generals of a 
sovereign who follow "The Right Way" (Tao), when about to employ the 
people, first establish concord and then undertake matters of great 
importance.^
Sun Tzu also realizes the importance of popular support of the
people. He teaches in his work, "The Art of War" that to fight a war the
government must be able to initiate the moral influence "which causes
people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany
257them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril," To obtain 
the support of the people, the government must treat them with benevolence, 
justice and righteousness, and have confidence in them. In the Confucian 
idea of benevolent rule, Jen-Cheng there will be a harmonious
relationship between the superior and the inferior in a government of Tao, 
the army will be united in mind, and all will be willing to serve their 
leaders. The people, thus, are happy with their government and the govern­
ment may direct the people without difficulties. "The Book of Changes"
says: "In happiness at overcoming difficulties,people forget the danger 
258of death."
Mao Tse-tung fully adopted this concept and initiated his revolu­
tionary war with the popular support of the peasants. Mao's army was a 
people's army which was mainly composed of peasants, and thus won over 
Chiang Kai-shek with a mass-supported people's war. Today, Mao's concept 
of people's war has not only been applied in Chinese military strategy
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but also in the operation of Chinese foreign policy.
5) Sun Tzu on Guerrilla Warfare
There are two general characteristics of guerrilla warfare, that 
is, mobility and deception. These two peculiar tactics may balance the 
general inferiority of guerrilla warfare. To conduct guerrilla warfare 
requires of the army a high degree of mobility. This is related to the 
principle of deception. Sun Tzu teaches that the variety of tactics 
necessary to make an active attack is possible only through great mobility.
It follows that when one rolls up the armour and sets out speedily, 
stopping neither day nor night and marching at double time for a 
hundred li, the three commanders will be captured.
Because of this mobile capacity, the army can avoid strength and 
strike weakness according to the various conditions. Furthermore, the army 
can apply the principle of deception to confuse the enemy and attack under 
a favourable condition.
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign 
incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that 
you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy 
a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, 
prepare against him; when he is strong avoid him. Anger his general 
and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep 
him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. 
Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect y o u . 260
Therefore, through the tactical manipulation of deception, one can 
dialectically alter the inferiority in strength of guerrilla warfare to 
superiority. One can concentrate while the enemy divides and thus become 
numerically superior. In this way, the general advantages of guerrilla war­
fare would appear through an active control. "When the enemy is at ease, be 
able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him




Moreover, the variation of terrain is also an important factor in
conducting guerrilla warfare. Appropriate use of terrain may be a great
262
help in the battle.
In gereral, though Sun Tzu does not specifically point out the form 
of guerrilla warfare, his concepts on deception, military mobility and other 
principles of war can be fairly applied in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. 
In his revolutionary struggle, Mao Tse-tung further developed and applied a 
great deal of Sun Tzu's principles in conducting guerrilla warfare.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL CONCEPTS 
ON CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY
I. THE ESSENCE OF MAOISM:
THE THEORETICAL GUIDE OF FOREIGN POLICY
Since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949,
Mao Tse-tung's thought has been the guideline for governmental policy and 
national ideology. Chinese public political attitudes and behavior, both 
internally and externally, have been greatly motivated and oriented by the 
principles of Maoism. In order to understand its essence and conceptual 
sources, it is of vital importance for us to investigate the basic principles 
and general characteristics of Maoism philosophically.
A) Philosophical Epistemology— Tao, Yin-Yang and Dialectical Materialism 
The concept of dialectical materialism adopted by Mao Tse-tung in 
his world-view is not something totally new. The Chinese Taoist cosmic con­
cept of Tao and Yin-Yang is dialectical and materialistic. But when the 
Taoists applied their cosmic views to human affairs, the factor of inner 
cause or subjective motivation was ignored and thus, a passive attitude 
towards the human world, or fatalism, resulted.^ The Mohist concept of 
pragmatism was principally materialistically based but it finally became
the idea of the "Will of Heaven" as a religiously oriented political belief
2
and thus turned into spiritualism.
The realist Legalism improved this concept of Tao and Yin-Yang in
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human affairs based on the theory of historical materialism, especially 
as asserted by Han Fei Tzu. Kuei Ku Tzu further elaborated the concept of 
epistemological realism and absorbed the Taoist concept of dialectics into 
his theory of the science of method. The representatives of the Tsung-Heng 
School, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, applied it to the theory of balance of power 
in international politics. And Sun Tzu, another student of Kuei Ku Tzu, 
applied this science of method further to his theory of military strategy 
and tactical practice.
In general, the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, dialectical materialism, 
as elaborated upon by the Chinese Legalists was much improved by their 
rivision with the active concept of the unity of subjective motivation and 
objective regularity, that is, putting the Taoist cosmic concept of dia­
lectics into human affairs.
The Marxist philosophy of nature and the theory of truth are based 
on the concept of historical and dialectical materialism. The epistemologi­
cal position for the Marxist on the idea of materialism is expressed by 
Lenin thus :
Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) 
as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of 
humanity ... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best^ 
an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it.
This tone is strikingly similar to the Chinese Taoist concept of 
Tao and cosmology. The Taoists see the human world as a struggle between 
ruling class and ruled class which is based on artificial institutions and 
moral concept, and thus, they conclude in teaching the concept of wu wei, 
do-nothing or inaction in order to eliminate the class gap and struggle 
which is derived from cosmic materialism. The Marxist concept of historical 
materialism which sees the class struggle as based on economic motivations 
is somewhat similar to that of the Chinese Legalists in its relations between
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basic structure and superstructure. The Marxist philosophy resulted in an 
active revolutionary political movement, not just a passive and idealistic 
philosophical teaching as the Chinese Taoism did.
Dialectical materialism for the Marxist is not a dogmatic pronounce­
ment, but "the laws of reality which are guides to further study and empirical
investigation, as well as guides to action, practice, and changes in human 
4history". "Communism proceeds not from principles; but from facts. It is 
no doctrine, but rather a movement".^ These words are very close to the 
"concept of change", the movement of Tao and Yin-Yang, as taught by the Book 
of Changes, and the Chinese Taoists. Marx and Engels did not regard themselves 
as founders of the dialectical laws of reality, but as descendants and syn­
thesizers of the early Greeks, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Diderot, Rou-
6sseau, Hegel, and Feuerbach.
Similarly, the Maoist concept of Tao and Yin-Yang and dialectical 
materialism is derived from both the classical Chinese concept of Tao and 
Yin-Yang and the modern Marxist concept of historical and dialectical mate­
rialism. As a classically educated Chinese, practising within the Chinese 
physical condition, Mao Tse-tung (and so too his "Thought") is highly oriented 
towards the Chinese mind. Acknowledging this Professor Harold C. Hinton says: 
"It has already been suggested that Maoism differs significantly in spirit 
from orthodox, or Soviet, Marxism-Leninism, and it will be shown later that 
Maoism has introduced major innovations in the fields of ’socialist revolution’ 
and ’socialist construction’".^
In the light of China’s long history and traditions, its sociopoli­
tical legacy and culture, and its destiny of modernization initiated by 
modern ideology, one would ask to what an extent Maoism is influenced by 
Chinese traditions. It seems to be bovious that there are salient points in
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the Thought of Mao Tse-tung that are unique to China, in contrast to the ex­
perience of the West. Thus, the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" has been officially 
defined as the synthesis of Marxist-Leninist theory and Chinese revolutionary 
practice. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Constitution of 1945 declared:
The Chinese Communist Party takes as its guide for all action the 
thought (szu-hsiang) of Mao Tse-tung— the thought that unifies the 
theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution-- 
and is opposed to any dogmatic or empiricist deviation.
It is Mao's thought rather than Marxism-Leninism which still serves as an
official ideology for the CCP and the Chinese people to this day.
The ideology of the Chinese Communist system is complicated and dif­
ficult to define. It is the source of morality and authority and the basis 
for a social order and a political program. Thus a Chinese professor, Mu Fu- 
sheng, points out that :
The Communist ideology offered a solution to ethical and aesthetic 
problems, an ontology, a theory of history, an epistemology, a pretension 
to philosophy of science, and a universal formula or "law" of thought,  ̂
the Dialectics, very much like the old Chinese formula of Yin and Yang.
With emphasis on the theory of contradictions, Maoist dialectical 
materialism is based on the duality of contradictions. Mao adopted the basic 
Hegelian notion, endorsed by Marx and Lenin, that contradiction within every­
thing is the primary cause of change, but he further suggested that a dif­
ferent kind of contradiction exists between two or more things, which is the 
secondary cause of all change and developement. "Mao's conception of the 
duality of contradictions--both within a thing and between two or more things 
— recalls a fundamental principle of Yin-Yang philosophy: that antinomy (or 
contradiction) is found between two entities (one Yin and one Yang) as well 
as within a given e n t i t y . I n f l u e n c e d  by the Taoist concept of Tao and 
Yin-Yang, Mao insists that without contradiction "each aspect loses the 
condition of its existence".
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Without life, death is nonexistent; without death, life is nonexistent. 
... If not for the existence of bad fortune, nothing can be known as 
good fortune; if not for good fortune, nothing can known as bad fortune.
These sentences are just the same as the sayings of Lao Tzu in his 
work, Tao Te Ching. As a matter of fact, in his pre-Marxist years, Mao was 
greatly influenced by the traditional Chinese Yin-Yang concept. He says:
I say: the concept is reality, the finite is the infinite, the temporal 
is the intemporal, imagination is thought, I am the universe, life is 
death, death is life, ... the Yin is the Yang, the high is the low.
This language is very much like that of Chuang Tzu, the great Taoist thinker
during the Warring States period. Unlike Hegelian antagonistic dialectics,
the traditional Chinese Yin and Yang principle is supposed to be in a mutually
complementary form in all beings at all times. The Yin is not an antithesis
to Yang but its temporary deflection. When a return from this deflection to
the perfect sta^c represented by Yang is completed, a cyclical nation of
13progress is presented. This kind of progress through the Yin-Yang antinomy 
differs from the "Hegelian logic of a linear progressive development to higher 
stages through thesis, antithesis, and s y n t h e s i s , w h i c h  was followed by 
Marx, Engels, and the modern Marxists.
Professor Hsiung Chieh points out: "The Yin-Yang reasoning has pro­
bably influenced Mao's theory of contradictions as much as Marx and Lenin 
have."^^ Mao has often cited the sayings of Lao Tzu and even once directly 
mentioned this great T a o i s t . I n  his work, "On Correct Handling of Con­
tradictions Among the People", 1957, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the bad 
things can be changed to good things and the good things can also become 
bad things. If one person or the government can correctly handle the con­
tradictions among the people which always exist, an unfavourable conflict 
could be altered into a harmonious u n i o n . M o r e o v e r ,  since 1949 two general 
tendencies, which could be regarded as adventurous and moderate, have existed
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in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. As Mao served in a position of a
balance wheel, the relationship between these two opposite lines has been
not one of hostility but rather of complementarity. Thus, as Robert J. Lifton
has observed, the thought of Mao is a "Way'‘, the Tao, a call to a particular
mode of being on behalf of a transcendent purpose and a synthesis of Yin and
18Yang, the adventurous and moderate. The complementary concept of Yin-Yang,
the contradiction uf co-existence, and its influence further reminds us of
a famous Chinese dictum of Mencius’ teaching: "A state without an adversary
and external threat is apt to perish," (wu-ti-kuo-wai-huan-che-kuo-heng- 
19wang). Following this idea, the policies of "building our country through
20diligence and frugality" and "self-reliance and arduous struggle" have
been launched and the existence of foreign enemies and the potential imperi­
alistic threat were strongly emphasized in current Chinese nationalism and 
nation-building.
Therefore, "If Mao drew from orthodox Marxism his concept of anta­
gonistic contradictions, it is quite possible that his theory of nonanta- 
gonistic contradictions owes mucn to the Yin-Yang heritage of Chinese thought. 
Like the Yin-Yang antinomy, Mao’s nonantagonistic contradictions are not
between truly antithetical polarities; such contradictions may continue to
21exist after the passage from capitalism to socialism". However, different 
from the Yin-Yang circular motion but in a way reminiscent of Hegelian tho­
ught, Mao sees the final resolution of all contradictions in an advance to-
22ward a higher stage of developemènt and progress.
Following this nonantagonistic but complementary concept of the Yin-
Yang antinomy and the Hegelian dialectical concept of a higher stage of
development, Mao explains the origins of human knowledge under a circular
23process and development. The interaction and transformation between Yin-
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Yang under certain conditions would provide the variety and complexity of
24world and human affairs. In general, while Mao recognizes the existence
of antagonistic contradictions, he prefers the promotion of non-antagonistic
contradictions, the complementary concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy, for better
and further development.
... Antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle 
of opposites. ... In accordance with the concrete development of things, 
some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into 
antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic 
develop into non-antagonistic ones. ...^^
As to the similar dialectical materialistic principle of the unity
of subjective motivation or creativeness and objective regularity, which the
Chinese Legalists, such as Kuei Ku Tzu, Su Ch’in and Chang Yi in the Tsung-
Heng School and Sun Tzu in the Military Stratagem School, suggested and ap-
plied in the international politics and military strategy, Mao also gives
his comments: "Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem
does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being
able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to 
27change the world".
In general, Mao’s philosophical epistemology synthesizes the tra­
ditional Chinese concept of Tao and Yin-Yang and the modern Marxist view 
of dialectical materialism. His concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy as applied 
in contemporary Chinese foreign policies can be illustrated by Sino-Soviet 
relations and Sino-American relations in the past and present.
B) Eclectism and Political Synthesis: Idealism and Realism; Internationalism
and Nationalism
The struggle between idealism and realism has a long history in all 
fields of human knowledge, both Western and Oriental. Just like the principle 
of dialectics in the universe, the swing between idealism and realism in
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human affairs has depended upon conditions and circumstances. This seems to 
be especially exemplified in Chinese history which can be divided into four 
periods, each of which can be characterized as leaning toward either idealism 
or realism.
The period of Spring and Autumn in ancient China may be regarded as 
the first stage which incorporated idealism as its concept of international 
politics. It was represented by the idealistic concepts of Taoist utopian 
anarchism, Confucian virtual culturalism, and Mohist internationalism of 
universal love.
The following period of Warring States may be regarded as the second 
stage, characterized by realism in its concept of international politics.
This stage was represented by Hsun Tzu's concept of eclectism, the Legalist 
concepts of law, authority, statecraft and power, the concept of balance of 
power by the Tsung-Heng School, and the concept of military stratagem re­
presented by Sun Tzu.
The period of the third stage was from the unified Han Dynasty (206 
B.C.) down to 1919's May Fourth Movement of republican China. The leading 
philosophical concept in this period was idealist Confucianism, from which 
the Chinese concept of international culturalism was derived. Due to the 
Western challenge of realism, the idealist Confucianism collapsed and caused 
the emergence of realistic nationalism.
The fourth stage was charaterized by a synthesis of idealist inter­
nationalism expressed in proletarian Marxist-Leninist internationalism and 
the Chinese ideal of Universal Harmony, and in the realist nationalism of 
power politics which is reflected in the concepts of anti-imperialism, anti­
colonialism, and national liberation movements. From 1919 down to the present, 
the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung are represen­
tative. Sun's first principle of his Three People's Principles is nationalism
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Figure 2
Major Trends of the Concepts of International 
Politics in Chinese History
Abbreviation;
I. : Taoism 
C. : Confucianism 
M. : Mohism 
L. : Legalism
N. : Nationalism 
IN.: Internationalism



















whicli he regarded as a necessary step and approach towards the ultimate 
Communist internationalism or Confucian Universal Harmony.^® (Figure 2)
Mao Tse-tung's commitment to anti-imperilaism and anti-colonialism, 
and to socialism and communism represent ideas similar to Sun's. As a gen­
eral philosophical attitude towards current Chinese society and conditions,
Mao teaches: "Ancient wisdom is for present use; foreign knowledge is for
29Chinese use (Ku-wci=chIn-^mng; Yang-wei-chung-yung)". Inspired by this,
on the question of internationalism versus nationalism, Mao insists upon
the synthesis and unity of these two.^ He emphasizes that patriotism or
nationalism is an indispensable step to the stage of internationalism. The
former is the inevitable approach to the latter.
We are at once internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, 
"Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors." ... The 
victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help 
the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation 
patriotism is applied internationalism.
For Mao and the Chinese Communists, the questions of internationalism 
versus nationalism and idealism versus realism seem to be without contra­
diction. For them one suplements the other and combining both is an indis­
pensable approach to the ultimate goal. This idea concides somewhat with the 
Chinese classical concept of the Yin-Yang antinomy for mutual harmony.
However, as an important step to the goal of internationalism, 
especially in the transitional period of today's world power politics, the 
spirit of nationalism has played a great role in current Chinese foreign 
policy, which has been expelicitly expressed in Chinese efforts for anti-
imperialism, anti-colonialism, and support of national liberation revolu- 
32tionary movements.
C) The Spirit of Ideology: The Thought of Mao Tse-tung
(1) The Chinese Tradition and Communist Ideology
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For thousands of years ideology has played an important role in 
Chinese thought and Chinese society. Confucianism shaped Chinese life for 
the past two thousand years. The new China since 1949 has been no exception 
and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung has taken the place of traditional Confucian 
doctrine.
The content of Chinese Communist ideology is vast involving questions 
of political power, organization, leadership, policy, and social ethics. In 
other words, "it is at once the source of morality and authority and the 
basis for a social order and a political p r o g r a m , U n l i k e  the West, at 
least since Machiavelli, China has never known a separation between morality 
and politics; such a separation is foreign to the Chinese tradition. Under 
the Chinese Communist regime, just as the Confucian prevailed in both 
state and society in the past, morality and authority are fused into one, 
which not only dictates public laws but also seeks to legislate the private 
morality of its people. However, unlike the Confucian system of the past, 
the real locus of authority today in China is not in the conscience of the 
individual as taught by Confucian doctrine but in the affairs of the nation. 
The teachings of Confucius have been replaced by the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 
Personal identification with the values of the regime has to be created in 
order to obtain the Chinese people's loyalty and willingness to make sacri­
fices. Meanwhile, the regime attempts to provide reasonable programs and 
justified revolutionary goals for the nation. As Professor Hsiung puts it:
In Mao's usage, the word "ideology" is coterminous with "culture". 
Communist ideology has replaced the Confucian 1^; it has taken over the 
letter's function as the culmination of what we in the West term social 
conscience, morality, religious faith, and constitutional law. In the 
metabolism of Communist China, a new combination of revolutionary na­
tionalism, socialist collectivism (comradeship), and Party discipline 
has supplanted the traditional combination of culturalism, familism, 
and bureaucratism.
Thus ideology is all-important. It is now believed that correct
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thought is the key to correct action, just as tradition taught that the mind
(hsin) determines people’s behavior and expands the individual’s psychic
consciousness. Instead of thumbing through the classics, the Chinese today
must study Marxism, Leninism, and especially the Thought of Mao Tse-tung,
which synthesize the traditional Chinese concepts and the modern philosophies
with respect to the current Chinese situation.
As Professor Hsiung says, the supremacy of ideology (szu-hsiang or
thought), "politics in command" (Mao’s phrase), "was not only anticipated
by Sun Yat-sen, Tseng Kuo-fan, and Wang An-shih but can be traced back to 
36Mencius." Through Mao’s synthesis these traditional precepts have become
merged with new concepts borrowed from Marxism-Leninism, such as the class
struggle and the function of a political party. It is interesting to note
that the Confucian tradition has shown a remarkable ability to absorb new
ideas and to renew itself even in the modern age, even in the communist
era. As to whether Chinese Communism departs from tradition, Professor
Hsiung Chieh points out that:
Throughout Chinese intellectual history, value has always been 
placed on synthesis rather than originality, which is essentially 
a concern of the West.... No Chinese thinker has departed from that 
tradition, not even Mao.^^
Professor Lucian W. Pye is also positive on the question of the
endurance of traditional Chinese culture and its influence on current
Chinese communism. He argues that the Chinese tolerance of contradiction
and of conflicting philosophies such as Confucianism and Taoism is an
outstanding characteristic of Chinese civilization.
An important characteristic of Chinese Communist ideology is the
concept of szu-hsiang (thought), which for Chinese Communists, like the
idea of hsin (mind) of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian thinkers, is the
38synthesis of mind and action, "the meeting ground of theory and practice."
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Thus, "the szu-hsiang (thought) of Mao Tse-tung" has been officially exalted 
as the synthesis of Marxist-Leninist theory and of Chinese revolutionary 
practice. Concerning the idea of hsin (mind), Chinese Communist leaders on
occasion use this term, which comes down from Confucian and Neo-Confucian
7 39works,
The concept of szu-hsiang is extremely important for Chinese 
Communism according to Mao's interpretation. It has been romanticized as 
the source of what amounts to a superhuman power. Chinese Communists argue 
that correct szu-hsiang provides total devotion to Communism and the Party 
and presents an indomitable spirit with inexhaustible strength, with the 
result that "stupidity gives way to intelligence, the difficult becomes 
easy, the dangerous path becomes smooth, and (the individual becomes)
40capable of achieving distinction and being outstanding in any kind of work.
The emphasis on human will power and the spirit of ideology by
Chinese Communists is seen in Mao's concern with Party rectification. His
fear of revisionism resulted in the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's.
It is revealed in the concept of the "people's war" and national defence
in Chinese foreign policy, and in such slogans as "in agriculture, learn
from Tachai", "in industry, learn from Taching" which were proclaimed by
41Mao in 1964 for Chinese nation-building.
Szu-hsiang, for Chinese Communists, has an independent existence and 
thus it is no longer within the Marxist concept of superstructure. There­
fore, proletarian szu-hsiang needs frequent ideological purification campaigns. 
Influenced by Chinese traditional philosophies, says Pye, "Mao thus contri­
buted to the long-standing tendency of Marxism-Leninism to move away from
a strictly sociological view of class; he regards ideological or intellectual
42positions as bases of the historical dialectic."
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Pye adds a summary comment on Mao’s synthesis of Chinese tradition
and modern Marxism:"In short, just as Marx had turned Hegel upside-down and
made materialism more important than idealism, so Mao turned Marx upside-
down and reasserted the supremacy of ideas. This feat of Mao was consistent
with the historical propensity of the Chinese to attach prime importance to
43intellectual and ethical considerations."
In general, unlike the original Marxism, the Chinese Communist 
concept of szu-hsiang actually consists of man, the subjective world, and 
his environment, the objective world, blended into an integral whole. The 
substructure, or economic base, and the superstructure, or ideology, in 
the original Marxist framework, are no longer separated but blended into 
a continuum as in the Chinese Yin-Yang concept.
(2) Ideology and Its Implications for World Revolution
Beside other factors, such as the Chinese conception of world 
politics and of China’s own proper world role, her national interest and 
historical experience, the relationship between goals and capabilities, 
and Chinese world prestige, Maoist ideology has played a major role in 
the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.
The ultimate goal of Marxism-Leninism, the internationalism of 
humanitarianism, connected with the classical Chinese Confucian "Great 
Harmony" (Ta-tung Society), Taoist Utopianism, and the Mohist concept of 
"Universal Love"--all these have inspired Chinese efforts for world revolu­
tion. However, in its international application. Maoism represents a speci­
fic strategy for world communism, attributed to Mao. Through the experience 
of the Communist revolution in China, Maoist strategy is a synthesis of 
the classical "left" strategy of the international Communisc movement, 
which provided the idea of a "united front from below", and the classical
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right strategy which emphasized the "two-stage" revolution (feudalism-to- 
capitalism and capitalism-to-socialism, as outlined in Mao's Ihe New Democracy) . 
Mao adopted the "left" strategy and agreed with the two-stage revolution, 
but rejecting the classical right strategy, he insisted on the maintenance
44of Communist hegemony from the very first stage of the two-stage revolution. 
Maoist ideology, which differs from that of the Soviets, has been a crucial 
factor in the Sino-Soviet split.
Unlike Soviet revisionism (the"Brezhnev Doctrine", the socialist 
imperialism examplified by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), 
China's view of herself as the "center of world revolution" means only that 
China is "a source of inspiration and ideological leadership for the under­
developed world rather than a center of direct organizational control or
45direct paticipation." The meaning of Chinese ideology is that the thought
of Mao Tse-tung is the creative application of Marxism-Lininism to Chinese
conditions, with the implication that other nations which have conditions
similar to China's might well follow her lead. Thus the Chinese interpret
Mao's famous phrases "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"
and "a single spark can start a prairie fire" to mean that it is China
who will provide this single spark and it is the underdeveloped third
world nations which will be the prairie fire in the world revolution.
From past reality and ideology, there is enough evidence to show that
the Chinese Communists are more concerned with insturcting or providing
models for other people as to how to conduct their own revolutions than
with participating or interfering in revolutions elsewhere as the other
great powers have done, the Chinese Communist leaders point out: "Revolu-
46
tion is self-inspired, it can not be exported." So the Chinese Communists 
"continued to express respect for nationalism and to think in terms of the
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need for ideological leadership of the world Communist movement, as distinct
from direct organizational control or intervention by any Communist super- 
47power.
With the idea which has roots in the classical Chinese concept of
humanism that "man (with the right ideology) is more important than weapons",
the practical conduct of Chinese foreign policy has emphasized the export
of its ideology rather than the export of material aid. This policy truly
manifests Mao's belief that correct ideology, szu-hsiang, is central to
Communist China's perception of its role in the world revolution as primarily
48
spiritual and ideological." As professor Lucian W. Pye asserts, the belief 
in human willpower and morality as the key to Chinese modernization is pro­
bably the true spirit of Chinese politics and provides the continuity of 
Chinese tradition. On this point. Professor Hsiung Chieh also suggests that 
"The Chinese Communist view recalls the traditional Chinese view of the world
as an ideologically defined hierarchical order based on a universal moral 
49code." Whereas in the past the universal moral code was Confucianism, at
the present, it is the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" based on Marxism-Leninism.
Professor John K. F air bank gives his view in similar words:
Since the pattern of the past cannot be entirely expunged, they
remain curiously interwined with new motifs. Peking today has a
Marxist-Leninist Maoist ideological orthodoxy as vigorous as 
Confucianism used to be; but it believes in progress toward a future 
millennium, not cyclical repetition descending from a golden age.
From the basis of such discussions, we begin to understand how im­
portant is the role of the human mind and ideology in Chinese politics,
whether in the past or the present.
II. THE LONG-RANGE GOAL OF FOREIGN POLICY;
INTERNATIONALISM
A) Idealism, Internationalism, and Humanitarianism
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The ultimate goal of Chinese foreign policy is the stage of humani­
tarian internationalism, world communism.
Defining this goal, Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "The ultimate aim
for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist
s o c i e t y . W e  Communists never conceal our political views. Definitely and
beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward
to socialism and communism. Both the name of our Party and our Marxist
world outlook unequivocally point to this supreme ideal of the future, a
52future of incomparable brightness and splendour". He further asserted
that the Chinese Communists were internationalists and devoted their efforts
53to the international emancipation of the proletariat.
However, to what extent does this ideal humanitarianism connect with 
Chinese traditions and philosophies? Professor Harold Hinton gives his 
answer:
To say that the Chinese Communist revolution is a non-Western revo­
lution is more than a truism.... Hence the Chinese Communist attitude 
toward China's traditional past is selectively critical, but by no 
means totally hostile. The Chinese Communist revolution, and the foreign 
policy of the regime to which it has given rise, have several roots, 
each of which is imbedded in the past more deeply than one would tend 
to expect of a movement seemingly so convulsive.
(1) The Chinese Spirit of Idealism and Communism
It is probably true that a commitment to some form of idealism is
a universal trait and evident in the history of all peoples. In the case of
China, there are obvious parallels between the classical Chinese concepts
of social and political idealism and modern communist thought. Hou Wai-lu,
a famous Chinese Communist historian, says:
In Chinese history there have been many concepts of active material­
ism, atheism, and simple dialectics. There also has been the concept of 
the ideal "Great Harmony (Ta-Tung)" world and the "Universal Peace (T'ai- 
P'ing)" world.
In Chinese history there are also various utopian thoughts... At 
that time many representative intellectuals proposed many different
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ideals for social reform, such as Confucius' "the aged to rest, the
young to be treated". Mo Tzu's "universal love and mutual benefit",
Lao Tzu's "utopian anarchism with small state and few people", Chuang 
Tzu's "world of absolute virtue", Hsu Hsin's "the ruling and the ruled 
working together", Mencius* "system of well-field cultivation".
The chapter of the Evolution of Rites about "Ta T'ung" (Great Harmony) 
was produced in a later time, and it may be regarded as the typical 
example of utopian concept in Chinese history.
In a further elaboration, we could find a similar theory of the 
"state" somewhere between Chinese Taoism and modern Marxism. The Marxist 
regard the state as an organ of the ruling class and an instrument to secure 
its own interest by exploiting the ruled class, while the Chinese Taoists 
reject all man-made creatures, such as political institutions, moral systems,
and social hierarchical classes. The Chinese Taoists urged the abolition of
artificial differences and entities including the classes and the "state", 
and thus provided a revolutionary concept for human equality and harmony 
much the same as the Marxists suggested.
Furthermore, the communist theory of "withering away of the state" 
also has its precedent in the Chinese Taoist utopian concept of anarchism 
stated in Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching".^^ Chinese Taoist concepts of anti­
aggression, anti-imperilaism, and the elimination of human exploitation for 
social sufficiency and harmony are obviously very similar to modern communist 
idealism in the philosophical sense.
Human equality and dignity, which the communists have advocated, is
also the basic spirit of Chinese Confucianism, which regards man as the center 
58of society. The ideal and final stage of communist society is a society 
of classlessness, equality, freedom, public cooperation and an atmosphere 
of human love. According to communist theory, it is stated that;
The classless society will show forth man's true dignity. Gone will 
be the exploitation of man by man. The individual will no longer live 
merely for himself and his family, but for all mankind. Society pools 
its labor, natural resources, capital and knowledge, .,. Such a society 
becomes then "an association in which the free development of each is
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59the condition for the free development of all."
Parallel to this portrait of ideal communist society, Chinese Con­
fucianism also provides a utopian picture in its final stage of Ta-T'ung 
society. Therefore, Professor Hou Wai-lu commented : "The ideal society of 
Ta-T'ung is a progressive s o c i e t y . T h e  Ta-T'ung society is characterized 
by human kindness, cooperation, equality, love, order, and morality. The 
people in the world at this stage are civilized and live harmoniously in 
order and peace, and there appears an ideal anarchist society of the Taoist 
"wu-wei" (do-nothing):
When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all; 
men of talents, virtue and ability were selected; sincerity was empha­
sized and friendship was cultivated. ...
Besides the aspects of political order and social morality, the 
economic condition in the stage of ideal communism is prosperous and, in 
the eyes of Marx, the principle of distribution is a fulfillment of needs, 
that is, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. 
With similar phrases describing the economic condition and the principle of 
distribution, the feature of Chinese Ta-T'ung society is stated:
A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, 
employment was given to the able-bodied, and a means was provided for 
the upbringing of the young. Kindness and compassion were shown to 
widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, 
so that they all had the wherewithal for support. ...
Moreover, like the evolutional theory presented by the Marxism which 
gives the transitional stages from capitalism to communism, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, socialism, and communism, the Chinese theory of the 
ideal Ta-T'ung society also points out three transitional stages of evolution, 
that is, despotism (chu-luan-shi), constitutionalism (hsiao-k'ang), and the 
Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung). In contrasting the descriptions of the stages 
provided by Marxist Communism and the Confucian Ta-T'ung society, it is in­
teresting to match them——the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat with
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the Confucian transitional stage of despotism, socialism with constitutionalism 
(hsiao-k'ang), and communism with the Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung). Comparing 
the spirit of the two systems, Marxist socialism in which the political me­
chanism, social morality and economic distribution are still under a realistic 
principle of "from each according to his talents, to each according to his 
worth"^^ is akin to the Confucian transitional stage of constitutionalism in 
which "the world has become like families in which each loves but his own 
parents and treats as children only his own children. ... The states build 
up their own defense system for self-security and the international relations 
are based upon the principles of and y i . I t  is probably fair to point 
out that it is the very stage of socialism or hsiao-k'ang toward which China 
is striving today. In essence, the final stage of communism for the Marxists 
is very much compatible with the final stage of the classical Chinese Ta-T'ung 
society.
Marx, Engels and their predecessors such as Plato, Thomas More, Saint- 
Simon, Fourier, and Owen, the so-called Utopian Socialists, have provided 
an ideal of communism for mankind. Although Marx and Engels represent a new 
synthesis with the "scientific socialism" of dialectical materialism, there 
still exists an inevitable gap between the theory and the practice. It is 
Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung who actually applied Marxism to various 
conditions. However, in matching the theory and the practice to different 
situations and places, the applications and interpretations obviously varied. 
Thus appeared the accusations of dogmatism and revisionism according to 
considerations of national self-interest, as manifested in the ideological 
split between China and the Soviet Union today. The gap between gaol and 
means is probably the reason for this dispute. Nevertheless, the communist 
parties led by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and other Marxists in various countries
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contribute the practical mechanism for implementation of the communist ideal. 
The present-day communist parties and movements in various countries and the 
three pre-World War II Communist Internationals are examples of communist 
internationalism. (Indeed, the Second and Third Internationals still exist 
in some form).
A  philosophic comparision between the classical Chinese concept of 
internationalism and the contemporary movement of communist internationalism 
is possible. Chinese Taoism and Confucianism did provide an ideal of inter­
nationalism for the future, but they left only the concept without practical 
means. Although Confucianism was adopted as the national doctrine from the 
Han Dynasty forward, its approach could not be practised in the chaotic and 
contending situation of international power politics which characterizes the 
modern world. It even failed in practice during the Warring States period.
However, the Chinese pragmatic Mohist School aimed not only at an 
ideal internationalism, the doctrine of "Universal Love" and "Universal 
Equality (Shang-T'ung)", but it also presented a practical apparatus— the 
international Mohist movement led by a highly-disciplined and militant Mohist 
group. Moreover, it is also interesting to note that the background of the 
Mohist movement, which was based on the proletariat, is akin to that of the 
current communist movement. Their spirit of humanitarianism and internatio­
nalism, of universal love and universal equality, is not very different from 
that of the modern communist doctrine.
The Mohist ideal of universal love and the society of universal 
equality contains certain principles similar to those of communist doctrine 
and which are currently advocated by the Chinese Communists. For example, 
both ideologies advocate a world in which the principle of universal love 
is performed without discrimination. Men regard other people as they do them-
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selves. They regard not only other families as their own families but also 
other countries as their own countries. In this world of equality, men love 
each other so that the strong will not oppress the weak; the majority will 
not ignore the minority; the rich will not exploit the poor; the bourgeoisie 
will not look down upon the proletariat; the wise will not take advantage 
of the common. It is a world without war and a society of peace. All nations 
of the world regardless of size will be treated as equals. There is no ag­
gression nor exploitation from the big powers but mutual benefit and assis­
tance. On the above principles, Mo Tzu really speaks for the proletariat
66and the weak members of mankind.
Furehtermore, acting as a vanguard in the international scene, the 
Mohist group positively strove to save and to relieve the weak nations from 
the invasions of the strong nations. This might be regarded as similar in 
spirit to the communist doctrine of liberating the oppressed and exploited 
peoples and weak nations--namely the Third World nations and peoples— from 
the oppressing and exploiting class and nations--namely the capitalist im­
perialist nations and the superpowers.
If we could find an explanation for its failure to obtain popularity 
during the latter part of the Warring States period and thereafter, the pro­
letarian-oriented Mohism lacked a strong scientific methodology such as 
dialectical materialism with which the contemporary communist movement has 
armed itself. It was the later Chinese Legalism which adopted the philoso­
phical methodology of dialectical materialism to complete its mission of 
Chinese unification during the period of the Warring States.
Thus, the ideal of utopian concept in ancient China was criticized 
by a current Chinese Communist author as follows:
We can not idealize the concept of Ta-T * ung in Chinese history re­
gardless of the factor of historism. ... Due to the limitations of
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history the previous philosophers did not understand the general rule 
of social development and were unable to point out a common way towards 
the realm of T a - T ' u n g .^7
(2) Mao Tse-tung's View on the Great Harmony Concept and Marxism-Leninism 
It might be argued that political idealism is much easier to initiate 
than to practice. A feasible approach to filling the gap between the ideal 
heaven and the physical world has been the general task of most philosophers 
and statesmen throughout history.
The concept of Great Harmony has actually existed for a long time in 
Chinese history and has been espoused by leading personages, including a 
number of emperors since the time of the Han Dynasty; statesmen such as 
Wang Mang of the Han Dynasty, Wang An-shih of the Sung Dynasty, and K'ang 
Yu-wei of the Ch'ing Dynasty; philosophers such as Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming; 
and republican revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yat-sen. Like their prede­
cessors and contemporaries, Mao Tse-tung and his associates also anticipate 
the ideal state of the Great Harmony in the future. In his work, "On the 
People's Democratic Dictatorship" (June 30, 1949), Mao outlined the ultimate 
goal of Chinese communism in these words: "But for the working class, the 
labouring people and the Communist Party the question is not one of being 
overthrown, but of working hard to create the conditions in which classes, 
state power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind 
will enter the realm of Great Harmony (Ta-T'ung)
However, Mao criticized his antecedent idealists for taking the 
stage of the Great Harmony as only dream, without any practical or scientific 
implementation. He cited Marx's words in his work, "On New Democracy": "He
(Marx) also says, 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
69various ways; the point, however, is to change it'.""^ On this point, Mao 
suggested the adoption of whatever there might be in which foreign or ancient
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cultures would be useful to China today and to her future.
To nourish her own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal of 
foreign progressive culture, not enough of which was done in the past.
We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the 
present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the ear­
lier cultures of other nations,...
Without ignoring the Chinese classics and traditional cultural treasures,
he carefully takes an attitude of synthesis and points out the inevitable
connections between the old and the new.
It is imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people which 
had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character from all the 
decadence of the old feudal ruling class. China's present new politics 
and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, 
and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her old culture; 
therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off.^^
With this critical attitude, Mao not only praised but also has been 
influenced by the invaluable traditional concept of the idealist's "Great 
Harmony". But he pointed out that:
From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, Chinese 
progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth 
from the Western countries. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Kang Yu-wei, Yen Fu and 
Sun Yat-sen were representative of those who had looked to the West 
for truth before the Communist Party of China was born.^^
Mao adds that, although "Kang Yu-wei wrote Ta T'ung Shu, or the Book of Great
73Harmony, he did not and could not find the way to achieve Great Harmony". 
K'ang Yu-wei, a Confucian scholar of modern times, followed the Confucian 
ideal of the Ta-T'ung society and drew the ideal picture in his work Ta T'ung 
Shu which provides the One-World philosophy but without any concrete or 
practical approach for reaching this goal.
With Marxism-Leninism, Mao argued, "Bourgeois democracy has given 
way to people's democracy under the leadership of the working class and the 
bourgeois republic to the people's republic. This has made it possible to 
achieve socialism and communism through the people's republic, to abolish 
classes and enter a world of Great Harmony (Ta T'ung) " . A f t e r  his cri-
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ticism and synthesis of idealism and realism, both in Western and Chinese 
phases, he confidently concluded that to achieve the ideal stage of Great 
Harmony for human beings, "The only way is through a people's republic led 
by the working class.
Professor Hou Wai-lu points out in the preface of his work "The Ideal 
of Ta T'ung in Chinese History" that the traditional concept of Ta T'ung in 
China was the product of an oppressed class conducting a brave class struggle 
for achieving its great ideal. "The world of Ta T'ung is the prospect which 
human beings have been longing for for about a thousand years or more. However, 
this great ideal will be fulfilled in this generation by our h a n d s . I n  the 
conclusion, he comments:
Although the former Chinese philosophers had the ideal of Ta T'ung, 
they could not find a road towards the realm of Ta T'ung. Only through 
the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and Chinese revolutionary practice, 
and only through the leadership of the Communist Party, could a concrete 
way be scientifically pointed out towards socialism and communism. Thus, 
we could critically absorb the valuable part of former philosophers' 
beautiful ideal concept, and realize it.^^
B) The Role of China in World Communism
On the point of relationship between the Chinese revolution and the
world communist movement, Mao Tse-tung gave a clear-cut statement: "The
79Chinese relolution is part of the world revolution". That is, the first 
and most important step of this thesis is the Chinese revolution itself, 
through which there would be a revolutionary new China to play a role in the 
world revolution. Mao continued:
In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is a
politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is
politically free and economically prosperous, we also want to change
the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of
the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the 
sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China.
In the meantime, when the world bourgeoisie-captitalist front col-
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lapses, the established socialist state should give active support to the 
liberation of all colonies and semi-colonies in order to fulfill the ultimate 
goal of world revolution. Thus, it is the role of China to give active support 
to the colonial and semi-colonial oppressed nations, namely the Third World 
nations, for their national liberation movements.
In regard to the thesis of the extension of humanitarianism to all 
the world, we can extract it from certain Chinese classics. The proletarian- 
based Mohist movement with its doctrine of relieving the suffering and oppre­
ssed nations and peoples is representative. The general spirit of the Mohists 
is the same as that of today's communist movement in which members devote 
their efforts toward ideal internationalism. Moreover, the Confucian one- 
world view and spirit of jen, which should be extended from the individual 
to the family, then to the nation, and finally to the world, presents a 
similar spirit of internationalism. The Confucian doctrine of "(Now the man 
of perfect virtue), wishing to be established himself, seeks also to esta­
blish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others,
82(chi-yu-li-er-li-jen; chi-yu-ta-er-ta-jen)", is one example of the essentials 
of Confucian internationalism.
Following this traditional concept, Sun Yat-sen, the great modern 
Chinese revolutionary, developed his famous principle of Chinese foreign 
relations saying that China should unite "in a common struggle with those 
nations of the world which treat us as equals". On this point. Sun postulated 
the formation of an international united front for anti-imperialism and anti­
colonialism, in which China would support the small and weak nations actively
83in their national liberation movements.
Mao Tse-tung elaborated Sun's view of this point but from a different 
class standpoint in his work "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship".^^
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He pointed out the Chinese role of a proletarian international united front 
with language generally similar to Sun's:
Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world 
which treat us as equals and united with the peoples of all countries.
That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Demo­
cracies and with the proletariat and the broad mass of the people in 
all other countires, and form an international united front.
Thus Mao clearly outlined the Chinese role in international relations as one 
connected with the world communist movement. Furthermore, in order to recon­
cile the contradiction between nationalism and internationalism, he argues 
that under the communist theory of internationalism national liberation 
patriotism is in fact the application of internationalism. Since China is 
currently struggling at this stage, he seems to insist that fighting in defense 
of the motherland is the only way to defeat imperialism and achieve national 
liberation. "And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible 
for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emanci­
pation".®^ From the philosophy of Yin-Yang, the reconciliation of nationalism 
and internationalism actually exists within the contradiction.
However, parallel to the Confucian cultural concept of the Middle 
Kingdom, the center of the world, ideologically, the Chinese Communists con­
sider China as only the center of inspiration for world communism rather 
than a center of direct intervention and control of the world communist 
movement, as the Soviet Union considers itself. It is probably due to the 
traditional heritage and cultural influence that the Chinese concept of 
leadership of the world revolution tends to be more dieologically oriented 
than was Trotskyism or than is the hard-line policy of the Soviet Union, as 
evidenced in the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the direct 
Soviet control of other Eastern European nations.
On the question of traditional influences on contemporary Chinese
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concepts and policies, it might be appropriate to cite Mr. Joseph Alsop's 
comment on his recent visit to China. He concluded:
They are too Chinese. The right way to see the New China, in truth, 
is to forget the Communist label, and to consider the revolution as 
a specifically Chinese event. China's majestic history even teaches 
that this was, in some sense, a characteristically Chinese event.
As a matter of fact, the Chinese simply have blended those concepts and ideo­
logies whether Chinese or foreign which they think useful for the benefit 
of China and the world's future.
In general, the long range goal of world revolution to which the 
Chinese Communists are currently devoted is still within the traditional 
conceptual framework of culturalism, although in a different style.
III. THE IMMEDIATE GOAL OF FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
After two thousand years the idealist Confucian concept of culturalism, 
a system of suzereignty and cultural superiority, collapsed for the first 
time when it was challenged by the Western powers with their modern concept 
of nationalism during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to western superiority 
in science and technology, China was defeated by the imperialist nations and 
her traditional confidence in her cultural predominance was bankrupt after 
the first western challenge in the Opium War in 1840. Worse than that, there­
after, China was required by the imperialist powers to submit to the unequal 
treaties and was treated as having a so-called "semi-colonial" status in 
the international community.
The realist concept of patriotism or nationalism then was emerged 
with the sole purpose to save China from invasion and collapse. Persons like 
Hung Hsiu-chuan, K'ang Yu-wei, Yen Fu, and Sun Yat-sen devoted their efforts 
to save China. Revolutionary movements such as the Movement of the Taiping
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Heavenly Kingdom, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, and 
the May Fourth Movement were typical examples of this concept of realism to 
create a basis for Chinese nationalism. Especially, the May Fourth Movement 
brought the concept of nationalism or patriotism to its peak in 1919 and 
indirectly gave birth to the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, when a group 
of Chinese intellectuals adopted Marxism-Leninism.
The first impetus for the establishment of the Chinese Communist 
Party was to save China from imperialist oppression and economic exploitation 
by the western captitalist powers. Furthermore, it also aimed to wipe out
OQthe traditional feudalism and to build a new China. The basis upon which 
the Chinese Communists worked toward their goal was Marxism-Leninism. The 
principles of Marxism-Leninism coincided with Chinese needs in two major ways, 
which may be described as realism and idealism. Realistically, Marxism- 
Leninism might satisfy Chinese nationalism in order to liberate China from 
foreign imperialism and create a strong new China; idealistically, it would 
strive for humanitarian internationalism as conceived by Chinese world-view.
By 1949 the victory of Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese civil 
war ended the rule of Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese Mainland, and Chiang 
was forced to flee to the island of Taiwan. At that time the international 
situation was under an atmosphere of bipolar cold war which was later re­
inforced by the Korean War in the early 1950's. The Chinese civil war between 
the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists, which was strictly an 
internal affair, was unfortunately disturbed and complicated by the American 
containment policy in Asia in support of Chiang Kai-shek's government as part 
of the anti-communist bloc. The Sino-American confrontation in the Korean 
War and the American support of Taiwan in violation of Chinese territorial 
integrity thus have made the United States the number one enemy of the People's
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Republic of China in foreign policy.
On the other hand, the mixture of ideological dispute and national 
interests has also caused the once intimate Sino-Soviet relations to fall 
apart since 1960. The increasing border conflicts between China and Russia 
have further reinforced the collapse of their partnership and even reached 
the brink of physical warfare.
It is interesting to note that no matter whether it is because of 
the difference of ideology or of the national interest involved, the great 
powers in the world seem to be inevitably in a condition of antagonism. Thus, 
it is our task to look into how the Chinese viewed the world situation and 
the roles of the two superpowers in international politics in the light of 
China's foreign policy in a global context.
A) Chinese Rivalry with the Superpowers
(1) Nationalism
1) Conceptual Heritage and Background
Nationalism has played a great role in modern international relations,
especially after World War II. As a Chinese Communist leader soberly pointed
out: "Where there is oppression there is resistance, and where there is
89aggression there is struggle against aggression”. The concrete facts to 
reflect this principle can be realized by the struggles of national liberation 
movements against those western imperialist colonial powers in the under­
developed areas, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the emergence of new 
states in the international community since 1950's.
In the long traditions of China, the concept of nationalism did once 
appear in the ancient chaotic periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, 
when many independent states emerged. The struggle among the states at that 
time was conducted by various means, such as physical violence, territorial
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annexation through conquest, domestic political and economic reforms, and 
the mobilization of national morale for national restoration. All these forms 
of striving for national interest have presented a primitive type of natio­
nalism similar to the modern concept of nationalism.
The Chinese Confucian view of international order has realistically 
put the state as an immediate transitional vehicle towards the realm of ideal 
universal harmony, the stage of Ta T'ung. "The ancients who wished to illu­
strate illustrious virtue throughout the world (t 'ien-hsia) first ordered
90well their own nations". This transitional stage in which the states st­
ruggled among themselves in the world of chaos in order to give a good go­
vernment to their own people by social and political reforms was called the 
"small tranquility (hsiao-k'ang)".
Mencius also pointed out the necessary stage of nationalism leading 
the way to the ideal society. He argued the principle of national self- 
determination for peoples and urged that the states should be independent 
standing on their own feet. In support of this principle he approved the con­
cept of a "just war" for self-defense. In the mood of nationalism Mencius 
urged the necessity of national motivation for self-reliance and arduous
91 Istruggle for nation building. All these ideas have been the general prin­
ciples of current Chinese nationalism advocated by the Chinese Communists.
During the late part of the period of Warring States, the concept 
of nationalism initiated and proposed by the Chinese Legalist thinkers and 
administrators had developed to an extreme and resulted in a trubulent world 
order of power struggles and territorial conquests. However, nationalism 
disappeared when Ch'in conquered all her contemporary rival states and uni­
fied the Chinese empire in 221 B.C. This concept of nationalism did not 
reappear until the modern age of Chinese history in the late part of the
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nineteenth century.
Since the great Han and T'ang dynasties, China has been a self-centered 
and civilized world as far as Chinese experience reached, China regarded her­
self as the center of cultural superiority among the surrounding barbarian 
states. This idea remained firm in Chinese minds even long after it had ceased 
to be true in fact after the western challenge in the nineteenth century.
Thus a concept of cultural superiority and of political suzerainty based on
92the tributary system in international relations was developed. Professor 
C.P. Fitzgerald points out that, "The whole growth of the Chinese empire, 
throughout more than 3,000 years, had been built on this principle; the bar­
barians were conquered, then absorbed and turned into Chinese by slow assi­
milation and cultural influence". He continued: "Territory once won for civi­
lization must not be given back to barbarism; therefore, territory which was
once Chinese must for ever remain so, and if lost, must be recovered at the
93first opportunity." Truly, this territorial concept is a by-product of 
the Chinese culturalism. It is interesting to note that this concept of cul­
turalism has been transformed into a peculiar type of Chinese nationalism 
after its failure in the cultural area proper. As to whether this concept 
has influenced the current communist government of China, Professor Fitzgerald 
gives an affirmative answer: "It is unlikely that these old ideas have wholly
disappeared; indeed there is much evidence to suggest that in a new form
94they are ver%: much alive".
Accordingly, it seems to be that the most important role for the 
Chinese Communists in the current stage of world order is to carry out the 
mission of Chinese nationalism. As early as 1945, and frequently since then,
Mao Tse-tung used an ancient Chinese fable "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed 
the Mountain" to preach the resolute will of the Chinese people to struggle
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against imperialism and for nationalism. His words reflect the highly moti­
vated willpower characteristic of Chinese traditional exhortation:
Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. 
One is imperilaism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party 
has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work 
unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart. Our God is none other 
than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together
with us, why can't these two mountains be cleared away?^^
In his speech at the plenary meeting of the 26th session of the Ü.N. General
Assembly, Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation pointed out the
spirit of the Chinese struggle for national liberation:
... In order to win national independence, freedom and liberation, 
the Chinese people, advancing wave upon wave in a dauntless spirit, waged 
protracted heroic struggles against imperialism and its lackeys and 
finally won the revolution under the leadership of their great leader 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party.
The Chinese today have confidence that China will achieve self-respect, inter­
national prestige, and world power. Thus, in his speech to the People's
Political Consultative Conference in September .1949, Mao T.ie-tung proclaimed:
97"Our nation will never be an insulted nation any more: We have stood up."
(Map 3)
2) Sino-American Hostility: Struggle for National Interest
Blended with ideology and national interest since 1949, the antagonism 
between China and the United States seemed to be inevitable in the inter­
national power-politics of the post World War II period. As far as national 
interest is concerned, Sino-American relations have been mainly jeopardized 
by (a) the Korean War, (b) the Taiwan Question, (c) the American sphere of 
influence in the Far East.
(a) The Korean War
The Chinese decision to intervene in Korean War in 1950 was mainly 
due to reasons of self-defense and national security. This decision was 
reached with extreme reluctance but it was inevitable. Professor Harold C.
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Hinton considers that "the CPR's entry into the Korean War was motivated over­
whelmingly by concern for its own security, and only very secondarily by con­
cern for North Korean survival. Still less important, apparently was a desire
98to reduce American and enhance Chinese influence in the Far East."
For the past two millennia the Chinese view of foreign relations to­
wards its border states and neighbor kingdoms has been the concept of suze­
rainty under the tributary system, especially those remote states such as 
Burma, the states of Indo-China, and some of the pre-Dutch states of Indonesia. 
To those states, Chinese assumed no obligations for their defense and never 
intervened in their internal affairs. But as far as the Chinese national se­
curity is concerned, the bordering states such as Korea and Annam, and also 
Tibet, served a strategic purpose. Should these states be in enemy hands, 
a real danger to China would result. Moreover, they have long been under 
strong cultural influence and formed a kind of extension of the Chinese world. 
Since the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States the Chinese concept 
of culturalism has become so deep that the view that territory once won for 
civilization must not be given back to barbarian and therefore territory
which was once Chinese must for ever remain so has not been changed even at 
99the present time.
Traditionally, Korea was under Chinese influence and cultural system 
and even had, in antiquity, actually been a Chinese p r o v i n c e . H o w e v e r ,  
for the past century due to the weakness of the Ch'ing Dynasty it was dominated 
first by Russia, then by Japan as a step for the invasion of Chinese Manchuria, 
demonstrated in the Manchuria Crisis and the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 
1930's. Due to past experiences on national security, China was seriously 
concerned with the Korean War in 1950 when it became a serious threat to 
China, especially as the new-born communist regime was just established.
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The situation of 1950 was extremely dangerous to the Chinese Communist 
regime when the United States reversed its hands-off China policy and launched 
the containment policy in Asia after the outbreak of the Korean War. When 
General MacArthur proposed to rearm Japan and decided to invade Manchuria 
in association with Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan, without paying 
attention to Chou En-lai's warning, this finalized the Chinese decision for 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . T h e  Chinese criticism of the American intervention in Korean 
War was voiced in a speech by Chou En-lai:
In fact the attack by the puppet Korean troops of Syngman Rhee on 
the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the instigation of the United 
States Government was a premediated move by the United States, designed 
to create a pretext for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam 
and the Philippines. It is nothing but a^gurther act of intervention by 
U.S. imperialism in the affairs of Asia.
To this day, China still accuses the United States with an imperialistic
103occupation of Korea.
From the example of the Korean War, Professor Harold C. Hinton has 
provided his view on the Chinese concept of national interest in the conclusion 
that :
It is one of the main themes of this study that when the CPR (Chinese 
People's Republic) has employed overt violence toward outsiders, as 
it did in Korea, it has generally done so mainly in order to protect 
its security rather than to enhance its influence. The latter, after 
all, can usually be promoted more safely and more effectively by poli­
tical means.
(b) The Taiwan Question
Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which resulted in 
American support to the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan, the Taiwan 
question has been the essential issue of Sino-American relations for the past 
two decades. For the Chinese the appearance of American troops and military 
bases in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait is the symbol of American imperialism 
against China, just as the Chinese have experienced in the past. "We are de-
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termined to liberate Taiwan" has been the unshakable slogan and chief policy 
since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. After the 
settlement of Korean War in 1934, Chou En-lai issued his report on foreign 
relations to the Central People's Government Council and pointed out that 
one of the "tasks now before us" was "to take determined action on the li­
beration of Taiwan so as to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial 
i n t e g r i t y " . T o  this point, China seemed to charge that American protection 
of Taiwan was violating its own principle of the Open Door Policy by inter­
fering in China's internal affairs. It also implies the continuation of na­
tional humiliation imposed by western imperilaism since the Opium War in 
the nineteenth century.
The Chinese political attitude and insistence on the Taiwan question, 
which includes not only the American military intervention but also the so- 
called "Formosa Independence Movement" and "Two-Chinas" policy supported by 
the United States and Japan, has not been changed for the past two decades 
in spite of American hostility and containment in various means through 
military, political, economic, diplomatic fields, etc. Due to the realistic 
shift of power-balance in Europe and Asia since the 1960's and the collapse 
of the American image of communist expansion as examplified by Chinese cau­
tious actions and political behaviors in the international relations, American 
policy marked a great change when President Nixon took over the administration 
in 1969. The Taiwan question, a key issue in the Sino-American talks in 
Warsaw for more than a hundred times since 1958, did not reach any acceptable 
agreement until the Ping-Pong Diplomacy began in April, 1971 and Nixon's 
China trip in February, 1972 with a joint communique.
Historically, Taiwan was part of China for a thousand years until 
it was ceded to Japan by the imperial Ch'ing government in 1895 due to the
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Chinese defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War. When Japan was defeated in 
World War II, Taiwan was due to return to China as stated in the Cairo Decla­
ration of December 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.^^^ The American 
attitude toward this status of Taiwan was confirmed by President Truman's 
statement in January, 1950 that "in conformity with the Cairo Declaration 
of December, 1943, it was the U.S. view that Taiwan belonged to China". He 
further clearly pointed out that "If, as the administration contended, Taiwan 
was Chinese, there could be nothing but trouble for the United States if it 
intervened to separate the island from the mainland g o v e r n m e n t " . H o w e v e r ,  
while U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson raised no doubts about the Chinese 
claim to Taiwan, he hinted that "the administration would not hesitate to
occupy this part of China if in a major war situation such occupation would
108be strategically advantageous for the United States." Unfortunately, the 
outbreak of the Korean War several months later made his assumption a reality 
and the United States has unilaterally occupied China's Taiwan for the past 
two decades.
As early as 1956, Premier Chou En-lai made a policy speech on Taiwan
to attack the so-called "Two-Chinas" policy as American intervention in
109Chinese internal affairs. This continued unshakable Chinese position on 
the Taiwan question which caused the inevitable antagonism between China 
and the United States and international tensions in the area of the Far East.
The Chinese insistence of legitimate rights on Taiwan might actually 
root in the traditional Chinese concept of culturalism and suzerainty. Though 
it is under the Communist ideology, the present Chinese government continues 
to accept the old view that "once part of China, always part of China" as 
a general policy. That is, that "lands which were once Chinese are by right 
always Chinese", and that "any division of the empire and any cession of
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territory is at best temporary, invalid, and u n j u s t " . A s  Professor
Fitzgerald puts it:
The Chinese, therefore, have never felt, or indeed thought, that 
territories lost in the age of Manchu weakness were fully and finally 
lost; that frontiers fixed against their will or inclination were per­
manently drawn; that any encroachment upon the fullest possible claim 
that China could justify had any validity. One constant aim of Chinese 
foreign policy is to recover such frontiers and annul such cessions.
In this Chinese view, the appearance of American troops in Taiwan and the 
recognition of the Chinese Nationslist regime are regarded as not only a 
denial of the just claim that the island is a Chinese province but also a 
national humiliation with the continuation of Western imperialism. Conse­
quently, the United States has been treated as the major enemy by China for 
the past twenty years because American refused to give up Taiwan. To reinforce 
this concept and policy, for the past two decades the statement that "Taiwan 
is an inalienable part of China" has been the general prerequisite to esta­
blish diplomatic relationships between China and other nations in the world.
Moreover, from the ideological humanitarian viewpoint of traditional 
jen or benevolence in the light of Chinese long-range-goal foreign policy, 
Taiwan seems to be destined to be liberated from the Western capitalist 
imperialism as a first priority. Confucian teachings state: "The ancients 
who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world first ordered
well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regu-
112lated their families." Taiwan has long been a member of the brotherhood 
of the Chinese family although forcibly separated from the motherland since 
1895. Thus, the first task of both idealist communist world revolution and 
realist nationalism could be none other than the liberation of Taiwan.
The frozen Sino-American relationship began to dissolve on the way 
towards normalization when the United States adopted the Chinese position 
that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" in the
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Shanghai Joint Communique which resulted from President Nixon's China trip 
in February, 1572. This important milestone document for the normalization 
of the Sino-American relationship specifically pointed out the crucial issue 
of Taiwan in the following phrases:
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between 
China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization 
of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the 
People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan 
is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; 
the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military 
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government 
firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, 
one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent 
Taiwan" or advocate the "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 
that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not 
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settle­
ment of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect 
in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will 
progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan 
as the tension in the area diminishes.
The prospect of a Sino-American relationship developed further toward 
normalization by Dr. Henry Kissinger's China trip and talk with Chinese leaders 
including Chairman Mao Tse-tung beginning on February 15, 1973. The Kissinger 
Mission resulted in an establishment of formal diplomatic liason offices in 
both Peking and Washington in order to speed up the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States.
It appears to be that the long-standing antagonism between China and 
the United States in regard to the national interest on the Taiwan question 
will be gradually terminated and a better relationship can be foreseen 
in the near future when the traditional concept of the Middle Kingdom is 
respected on the basis of general principles of peaceful coexistence.
(c) Sphere of Influence
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When the Korean War broke out, the United States extended its con­
tainment policy from Europe to Asia, This action developed increasing security 
pressure against China, and thus began the Sino-American confrontation over 
the sphere of influence. American appearance in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philip­
pines, and then expanding military encirclement in Indo-China and Southeast 
Asia in the forms of SEATO and bilateral treaties with nations in these areas 
during the early and mid-1950's created a great threat to Chinese national 
security. It was difficult for Chinese to tolerate American hostility, es­
pecially in such close proximity is in Korea, Taiwan and Indo-China.
Similar to Korea, the relations between China and Vietnam could be 
retraced about two thousand years. Under the Chinese concept of suzerainty, 
both Korea and Vietnam were strongly influenced by Chinese culture and served 
as an important strategic buffer whenever China had a strong government. In 
the Chinese mind, these two states are regarded as a natural sphere of Chinese 
influence and even a kind of extension of the Chinese world. From the view­
point of Chinese national interest, it is important that they should not be 
controlled by a hostile power. Thus, when these buffer states were threatened, 
China was not reluctant to become involved with full support as examplified 
in the Korean War and the Indo-China War.
Other than in these two buffer states, China's interests with the 
more distant neighbor states such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Indo­
nesia, and Malaya are seen as less vital. China merely regards these states 
as areas of political-cultural spheres of influence and as international 
united fronts for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. In the lands beyond 
the Chinese sphere of traditional influence, such as Western Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, Africa, or the Pacific region, Chinese foreign policy is 
guided by traditional culturalism, in the modern ideological form of Marxism-
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Leninism, rather than by considerations of national security.
In general, due to American hostility and containment policy toward 
China, which involves mutual national interest concerns, the Sino-American 
confrontation for spheres of influence in the buffer zone areas has been com­
petitive for the past two decades. The Chinese policy towards these areas 
seems to be traditional, national, and strategic rather than ideological in 
character. Thus, Professor C.P. Fitzgerald gives these words :
In her relations with the borderlands Chinese policy is manifestly 
traditional, national, strategic, and only modified to a minor degree 
by the ideology of communism. It is indeed very doubtful whether the 
policy and actions of an equally strong non-Communist China would be 
perceptible different.
After almost two decades American involvement in the Vietnam War 
was finally terminated when the United States decided to withdraw from that 
area and signed a cease-fire agreement on January 25, 1973. The Sino-American 
confrontation over spheres of influence in these vital areas, along with the 
Taiwan issue, greatly diminished and thus it contributed to a normalization 
of the Sino-American relationship.
3) Sino-Soviet Dispute: Struggle for National Interest
Sino-Soviet relations have constituted an important part of current 
international politics and may vitally affect the peace of the world.
When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Chairman 
Mao proclaimed China's "leaning-to-one-side" policy toward the Soviet Union 
which formulated the intimate Sino-Soviet partnership in the early 1950's. 
China initially seemed glad to accept Soviet seniority and aid, although the 
Russians regarded China as a second-rate state in the Communist bloc. However, 
a reversal of policy and attitude between these two giant communist nations 
occured after the death of Stalin, and their mutual attacks and conflicts 
became apparent in 1960. Mao Tse-tung once said philosophically: "In given
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conditions, a bad thing can lead to good results and a good thing to had 
results. More than two thousand years ago Lao Tzu said: 'Good fortune lieth 
within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good'".^^^ Truly, a friend can be 
an enemy and an enemy can be a friend. This reverse is just the dialectical 
principle of Yin and Yang taught by the Chinese Taoists, As far as the national 
interest is concerned, the given conditions for the dialectics of Sino-Soviet 
relations can be generalized by several phases. That is, (a) the issue of 
nuclear weapon and economic assistance, (b) the border disputes, (c) the 
role of leadership and sphere of influence.
(a) The Issue of Nuclear Weapon and Economic Assistance
A nation's military strength probably is one of the major factors 
determining its power status in modern international politics. A strategic 
nuclear capability obviously is the key to being a great power today, such 
as the United States and the Soviet Union.
Owing to the realization of the importance of military power, espe­
cially as negatively experienced during the past century of Western impe­
rialism, the Chinese Communists are very interested in building up nuclear 
weapons for China's national interest. The Chinese goal of becoming a mili­
tarily effective nuclear power is generally inspired by the following purposes:
"(1) the desire for a more credible deterrent against an American attack;
(2) the desire for increased influence within the Communist world; (3) the 
desire for additional means of supporting wars of national liberation; and 
(4) the desire for additional means for establishing Chinese hegemony in 
Asia".^^^ Thus, the Chinese expected Soviet assistance in this field from 
the beginning and hoped for wholehearted support from their socialist big 
brother.
It is now evident that China received Soviet assistance on the nuclear
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wecipons program in 1957 when Chinese officials, such as Premier Chou En-lai
ami I'oreign Minister Ch'en Yi, in 1958 and later admitted that China would
118have nuclear weapons in the near future. This help, however, was suspended
in 1960 when the Soviets halted such assistance. This dispute over these 
nuclear relations, which produced sharp polemics between China and the Soviet 
Union, was disclosed by Chinese sources. In a comment on the Soviet Government's 
Statement of August 3, 1963, the Chinese pointed out that they signed an ag­
reement with the Soviet Union on "new technology for national defense" on 
October 15, 1957, which was unilaterally broken by the Russians on June 20,
1959, because the Russians refused to provide the Chinese with "a sample
120of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture=" From
the sources disclosed by both Chinese and Soviet documents in their charges, 
it appears that after signing the agreement in 1957, the Russians began to 
put limitations and conditions on their committed assistance to China,
perhaps to bargain for permission to place Soviet controlled strategic
121
missiles on Chinese territory and to station a united fleet in the Pacific.
The Chinese regarded these actions as an assault on China's sovereignty 
similar to that experienced in the past and, therefore, strongly rejected 
the Soviet demands.
As members of fraternal countries in the socialist family, in the 
Chinese eye, the Soviet Union should give wholehearted support to its bro­
thers in order to hasten the achievement of their common goal of world 
revolution. The Chinese traditional Corfucian concept of the family system 
provides the rule of fraternal relationship that the elder brother should 
treat the younger brother with kindness, not arbitrary dictation. The nations 
in the world family should behave according to Jd (the rite), mutual respect
and good faith, especially in the fraternal socialist world. According to
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the Confucian concept of chun-tzu (superior man) and hsiao-jen (small man),
the Chinese maintain that the lower-grade nations are full in mind of
profit (li) and national self-interests and thus will be more aggressive as
examplified by the power politics of the capitalist imperialism, but the
higher-grade nations are full in mind of virtue, ethics and the spirit of
righteousness as expressed in the proletarian internationalism by socialist
countries. Therefore, the Soviet demands in the case of Sino-Soviet nuclear
relations at the expense of Chinese interests have seriously violated the
spirit of Marxism-Leninism and have turned into the socialist revisionism
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similar to the capitalist style of imperialism with mind of profit.
In the Chinese mind, sincerity and trustworthiness as taught in 
the Chinese traditions should be the general principles in conducting inter­
national relations, particularly within the ethics-orientec socialist world.
A harmonious relationship among nations depends upon a nation's good faith 
and humility toward other nations. Therefore, Russia's demands and repudia­
tion of the Sino-Soviet agreement for a nuclear weapons program were regarded 
by the Chinese as lack of trustworthiness and good faith. This experience 
has virtually driven the Chinese from relying upon the Russians for help, 
and they have persisted on a policy of self-reliance thereafter. This policy 
was especially reinforced by the Soviet's total withdrawal of economic 
assistance from China in 1960 when China was at that time enduring hard- 
times due to natural disasters.
The Sino-Soviet dispute over the issue of nuclear weapons was fur­
ther widened when China decided to go ahead with her own nuclear program 
without Russian assistance. Fearing that Chinese success would threaten 
them, the Russians started importuning the Chinese to abandon their nuclear 
program and rely instead on the Soviet Union on the basis that preventing
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the spread of nuclear weapons was in the interest of China because of China's
backward economy and her. feasibility of a small nuclear capacity only. The
Soviets argued that Chinese development of a nuclear capability would
stimulate the further spread of nuclear weapons and merely place China in
an even less stable position as the potential target of an American nuclear 
123strike. The Chinese reply to this point was evidently filled with a tone 
of strong sentiment of Chinese nationalism.
Is not China very poor and backward? Yes, it is. The Soviet leaders 
say, how can the Chinese be qualified to manufacture nuclear weapons 
when they eat watery soup out of a common bowl and do not even have 
pants to wear?
The Soviet leaders are perhaps too hasty in deriding China for its 
backwardness. They may or may not have judged right. But in any case, 
even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a 
hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders 
nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists.^^^
John Dixon, and Australian film director, interviewed the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in September, 1963, about the issue of Sino- 
Soviet nuclear relations. He asked: "In view of Soviet assurrances about 
the defence of China against foreign aggressors, why does China regard it 
as essential to construct her own atomic weapons?". Ch'en Yi's answer was 
filled with nationalist sentiment and complete distrust of Soviet sincerity 
and friendship. He said:
In the first place, what is this Soviet assurance worth? ... How 
can any one nation say that they will defend another - these sort of 
promises are easy to make, but they are worth nothing. Soviet protec­
tion is worth nothing to us. Atomic weapons are in use by other powers 
- so therefore we need atomic weapons for our defence. It may be ten- 
fifteen-or twenty years before China can solve the technical problems 
involved in making atomic weapons, but however long it takes - we will 
do it!
It's the same with the USSR - they do not treat with us on a basis 
of equality. They think that they are an orchestra conductor and that 
we must always follow their baton. They act as if we must always listen 
to their orders. But this is their leadership.... They can do as they 
please, but we will build our own strength up. Hje China question will 
only be solved by China standing up for herself.^
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This tone reminds us of Mencius' teachings of self-reliance and
the realistic Legalists' advice of self-strengthening in the light of the
ruthless nature of power politics in the world. Mencius' advice of a nation's
defense on its own feet seems to be particularly important for the Chinese
today as indicated in their experience with the Russians in the past.
Ironically, a news report in early 1973 disclosed that China was developing
an international ballistic missile that was even larger than the largest
Soviet SS-9 by approximately 20 per cent in volume and "is also building
concrete and steel silos to protect it against surprise attack
Moreover, the nature of Sino-Soviet economic relations and the
Soviet suspension of economic assistance to China in 1960 have contributed
to the widening split between Sino-Soviet relations. In general, the nature
of Soviet assistance, except in the early years of 1950 has been of little
significance and less favourable to China but more in Soviet national interest.
For instance, the total Soviet loan to China "during the letter's first decade
of existence represented only 2 per cent of China's current fiscal revenue
127at that time; the significance of Soviet assistance is very limited.'
Li Hsien-nien, the Chinese Vice-Premier in charge of financial affairs,
further comminted in September, 1959;
However, with the exception in the earlier years of the founding of 
our country when the Soviet Union granted us some low-interest loans, 
this assistance was primarily conducted through the trade processes in 
a mutually beneficial way. ... Our financial resources for national 
reconstruction relied basically on internal accumulation, or the survi­
val through our own strength.
Furthermore, Professor Cheng Chu-yuan pointed out: "China's trade with the 
Soviet Union was conducted under unfavorable circumstances. The over-valua­
tion of the ruble exchange rate since 1950 proved to foster Soviet exploita­
tion." To this point, it is interesting to note that "About 60 per cent of 
China's aid to foreign countries has been on a gratuitous basis, while all
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129Soviet loans to China have been repayable with interest".
Thus, in the Chinese view, the Soviet profit-hunger economic policy 
toward its fraternal countries appears to be no different from that of capi­
talist imperialism. It is not only contradictary to Marxism-Leninism but 
also contrary to the Chinese traditional mind of humanism and the "chun-tzu" 
(superior man) behavior.
By and large, the Chinese sentiment of nationalism against the Soviet 
Union reached its peak in 1960 when the Russians decided to withdraw all 
their assistances from China. This action by the Russians was a vital blow 
to the Chinese economy and national reconstruction. Almost all of the major 
projects under construction with Soviet aid were interrupted and the effect 
on the Chinese industrialization program and the disturbance on the development 
of nuclear weapons were almost incalculable. To this, one can imagine the 
Russian's intention in trying to slow down the Chinese economic development 
and delay an earlier Chinese nuclear threat. However, in the Chinese eye, 
this incident merely exposed the ugliness of Soviet motives. To them, such 
behavior was that of a "small man" (hsiao-jen) ; in Chinese terms, it is 
virtually "dropping a stone into the well where a person fell in and was 
aiowning" (luo-ching-hsia-shih). Therefore, the Russians have been bitterly 
condemned by the Chinese as betrayers of the Marxist-Leninist spirit of 
internationalism.
In fact, along with mutual distrusts the Sino-Soviet conflict has 
been enlarged and has resulted in increasing military tensions with more 
than one million troops stationed on each side of the border preparing for 
possible war. On the Russian side, there is fear of a future Chinese threat 
when China catches up with them in strength. On the other side, the Chinese 
seriously distrust the Russians and are speeding up their nuclear program
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and simultaneously building and digging air-raid shelters around the country
130in an effort to defend themselves against a possible Soviet nuclear strike.
(b) Border Dispute
The Sino-Soviet border question has had a long history and can be
traced back to the period of the imperial government of the Ch'ing Dynasty
when China was challenged by Western imperialist nations. Today, regarding
the issues of Sino-Soviet boundaries, the Chinese, under the influence of
nationalism,regard the Russian tsarist government as the imperialist nation
who had imposed unequal treaties on China. These were the Treaty of Aigun
(1858), the Treaty of Peking (1860), and the Treaty of H i  or St. Petersburg 
131(1881). During the period of Sino-Soviet partnership in the 1950's, the
border question had not been raised. Since 1960, the border disputes have
been frequently brought into open charges of intended subversion by each
side. For instance, the Chinese condemned Soviet subversive activities on
Chinese minorities along the border area. They charged:
In April and May 1962 the leaders of the CPSU used their organ and 
personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive acti­
vities in the H i  region and enticed and coerced several tens of thou­
sands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union. ... To this 
day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, 
unheard of in the relations between socialist countries.
Especially, after the border crisis of Chenpao or Damansky Island
in the Ussuri River in March, 1969, the Chinese began to accuse the Soviet
government of new tsarist imperialism which included naval expansion in the
133Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. Thus, a
Chinese government statement proclaimed that "all of the treaties relative 
to the present Sino-Soviet frontier are unequal treaties, and all should be 
annulled". In the Chinese eye, as noted by Chou En-lai, "a great area
135of China had been ceded to Czarist Russia as a result of unequal treaties". 
Traditionally, under the concept of culturalism since the periods
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of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, the Chinese have held the view that, 
"Territory once won for civilization must not be lost to barbarism" and that 
"once part of China, always part of China" regardless of the influence of 
current communist ideology. According to this concept, the Chinese traditionally 
did not draw clear-cut lines or national boundaries between China and her 
neighbor states in the modern sense of nationalism but only a vague range 
of suzerainty and civilized areas. Today, in the light of traditional cul­
turalism and modern nationalism, the Chinese government is willing to nego­
tiate definite lines or national boundaries with neighbor countries, but 
they want to reserve the right to claim the lost territories which were ceded 
to foreigners under unwilling conditions.
Realistically, in considering her present power status and physical
capability, the Chinese government has been very cautious in handling the
border problems with the Soviet Union and agreed that despite of the facts
of unequal treaties in the past, noted fay Chou En-lai, "China is still willing
137to take the old treaties as the basis for defining the boundary line".
Therefore, on September 11, 1969, the Soviet Premier Kosygin on his way home 
after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai 
in Peking to reach an agreement on negotiating the border dispute. It was 
reported that Chou En-lai was promised by the Soviet Premier that the Sino- 
Soviet border question would be settled through appropriate negotiations 
without using military threat by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, however, 
the Russians after that immediately started their military build-up along 
the Sino-Soviet border line in an attempt to bargain for power. This action 
was regarded as a lack of good faith and trustworthiness by the Chinese, 
and they began preparing for a defensive war to prevent a possible Russian 
first strike.
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Probably owing to their different traditions, cultures and concepts, 
the negotiations which have been underway since the 1960's regarding the 
Sino-Soviet border questions have been complicated, and an appropriate so­
lution seems to be far off. For the Russians, there is a fear of possible 
Chinese demographic pressures on Soviet territory and the so-called "yellow 
peril" which the Russians once experienced in the thirteenth century at the 
hands of the Mongols. In the Chinese view, however, both tsarist and communist 
Russia are regarded as still the crude and hairy barbarians with gain-hunger 
minds from the northern steppes, an appropriator of Inner Asian territories
that once belonged to China, and "as a power historically ready to take ad-
139vantage of any weakness in China to make further depredations." Starting 
on this point, the Sino-Soviet border relations have far to go.
(c) Leadership and Sphere of Influence 
For many centuries, even since the periods of the Spring and Autumn 
and warring States, the golden Han and T'ang dynasties down to the Ch'ing 
Empire, China regarded herself as the center of the world, the center of 
civilization. With such a cultural superiority among her barbarian neighbors, 
she never had an ally and she never sought a friend. Add to this her experi­
ences of anti-imperialism and nationalism in the past century and the Chinese 
are further convinced that China has never had a true friend but stands alone 
for self-reliance. For China, it was proved that "when they had been strong
they had needed no ally; when they were weak, allies had proved to be false 
140friends". The Japanese aggression of China, the American China policy
before and after World War II, and the Russian behavior, while ostensibly a 
Chinese ally since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, have 
all contributed to this Chinese belief that China needs to be physically 
powerful and culturally or ideologically superior. This obviously has to
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include not only the traditional geographical areas of spheres of influence 
in Asia but also in a global sense. Thus, Professor Fitzgerald pointed out; 
"What her policy must seek to avoid is the kind of settlement which would 
leave her permanently in the second rank, for their experience in recent 
years and long history alike have conditioned the Chinese to believe that 
supreme power is their heritage and that any inferior status is but the pre­
lude to further decline,
Soviet global competition with the United States for spheres of in­
fluence has caused the Russians to ambitiously expand their domination to 
Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Pacific Asia and thus has dis­
turbed the peripheral buffer states for China, such as Mongolia, Korea, 
Vietnam and the other Indo-China states, India, and Pakistan, This Soviet 
disturbance has constituted a great threat to China's national security, 
as presented in the recent military tension along the Sino-Soviet border 
areas with military bases, missiles, and millions of troops. Therefore, to 
achieve national security China has competed with the Soviet Union for spheres 
of influence at least in these buffer areas through various means, such as 
ideology, military, economic, political and moral supports.
Moreover, to the Chinese, the nuclear stalemate might lead to a Russo- 
American detente achieved at China's expense as shown by the Russo-American 
summit talk at Camp of David in 1960. This would disturb their whole system 
of struggle against U.S. imperialism in order to liberate Taiwan, their ap­
propriate role in Indo-China, and the international united front for world 
revolution. For instance, the Chinese charged that the objective of Russo- 
American cooperation was to monopolize the nuclear weapons at the expense 
of Chinese interest,
On the aspect of leadership, Soviet internal and external policies
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during the Khruschev era and afterwards have been viewed by the Chinese as 
the betrayal of the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, and the Chinese claim that 
the Soviets can no longer provide the leadership for a socialist camp and 
world revolution. The following developments have been cited by the Chinese 
as evidence of this: 1) Soviet utilization of an internal incentive system 
in economic policies,which in effect encourages the revival of capitalism;
2) the Soviet policy of big-brother-dictatorship, the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
over the fraternal countires in Eastern Europe as illustrated by Russia's 
role in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Warsaw Pact, Hungarian 
suppression of 1956, Occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, etc.; 3) the 
Soviet attitude of arrogance of power and lack of good faith toward China;
4) the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and compromise with the United 
States in collaboration for two-superpowers' hegemonism at the expense of 
the Third World nations for world domination. In the Chinese view, all these 
actions by the Russians are similar to that of capitalist imperialist and 
thus should be condemned by the true Marxist-Leninist devotee as "Soviet 
revisionist social-imperialism". Consequently, the Chinese now claim to be 
the upholders of pure Marxism-Leninism under the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 
"and denounce Russia as faint-hearted, 'revisionist', and too ready, for 
fear of nuclear war, to betray world revolution in favour of a form of co­
existence which would in reality lead to the perpetuation of the capitalist 
society".
China's tradition of standing alone and her culturalism today, in 
the case of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, seem to have regained a 
traditional role and confidence that China is the center of aspiration for 
ideology and culture while the Soviet Union has proved deviate from the true 
Marxism-Leninism, To this point. Professor Fitzgerald observed:
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It also reinforces the traditional Chinese view of the world, which 
sees China as the centre, the sole upholder of true civilization, the 
lawgiver to the barbarians. There can be now no doubt that this view, 
in a modern form, is prevalent in China and is positively stated in the 
many polemical articles which have appeared since the dispute with the 
Soviet Union has come into the open.^^A
In fact, as far back as 1949, the Chinese claimed that their revolution was 
the model for the underdeveloped, or "semi-colonial” countries and areas, 
such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these countries had faced 
the similar conditions as China did, and Mao Tse-tung had made a basic con­
tribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism through the experience and 
practice of the Chinese revolution. This claim implied that the future re­
volutions among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America should be 
based and guided with the Chinese model towards their goals, and China 
could provide that interpretation of the orthodox doctrines of communism 
most applicable in thier needs.
Along with this claim, the Chinese recall that the old Confucian 
idealist teaching, that "the true ruler needs no armies, for the barbarians 
and foreigners will be attracted to him by the very virtue of his government," 
will not be enough as long as capitalist imperialism and revisionist social- 
imperialism exist. It appears that a political synthesis of Confucian idealism 
and the Legalist realism as advocated by the great ancient thinker, Hsun Tzu, 
must receive top priority. Through his own experiences Mao Tse-tung teaches 
that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. The Chinese thus 
decided "that purity of doctrine is not enough: armed force may often be 
needed to establish the rule of a true d o c t r i n e " . I n  Chinese history, 
many Confucian Emperors were of this opinion too, and acted on it.
In the light of Sino-Soviet dispute and the shift of the world power balance. 
Professor C.P. Fitzgerald commented:
The Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed: it has
146
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been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as 
to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture.
Mao Tse-tung had to "enrich the treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought", 
so that the contents of that treasury could become current coin in China; 
it was inevitable that Chinese Marxism should be found to be purer than 
that of Russia, that Mao should be hailed as the greater prophet, and 
that "some people" should be shown to be in error. There cannot be two 
suns in one sky.
The dialectics of Sino-Soviet relations which shifted from friend to 
enemy have changed the world power system from bipolarity to a triangle re­
lationship, a form of the balance of power. It then inevitably brings Sino- 
American relations at once from enemy to the current friendship when given 
conditions such as national interests in the Taiwan issue plus U.S. involvement 
in Indo-China are in the process of change.
The correct handling of the contradictions among the nations depends 
upon the objective given conditions according to the principle of dialectical 
materialism, Tao and Yin-Yang. This seems to be very true in the current 
case of a triangle relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet 
Union.
(2) Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Paism
1) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background of Anti-Imperialism
Ideologically, in the light of nationalism and internationalism, the
doctrines of anti-imperialism and anti-superpower-hegemonism or anti-paism,
constitute the main themes of China's foreign policies today.
In fact, the term "imperialism" in modern times is vague and difficult
to define and subject to various schools of thought for definition according
to their political environments. The modern realist school led by Hans Mor-
genthau defines "imperialism" as "a policy that aims at the overthrow of
the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more 
149nations". To this concept, it is merely an objective observation and
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without value judgement. The Marxist theories of imperialism which were fur­
ther elaborated by Lenin in attacking the Western capitalist expansionism 
and colonialism are based on an economic viewpoint and value-concept oriented 
to serve the revolutionary purpose on behalf of the exploited countries and 
peoples in light of nationalism and proletarian internationalism. They also 
provide a definite criterion to distinguish progressive or reactionary and 
historical or antihistorical wars.^^^
In addition, other definitions and theories of "imperialism" have 
also been varied according to the different criteria of judgement, such as 
motive, cause, and goals being used. Thus, how some scholars view "the word 
’imperialism' is, therefore, entirely at the mercy of its user", and "the 
term loses its historical connotation and becomes a purely theoretical 
system",  ̂ Nevertheless, in a general perception, the concept of imperialism 
appears to reflect not only the reality of a power system but also an ethical
norm that, "a superior-inferior relationship in which an area and its people
152have been subordinated to the will of a foreign state", or "the relation-
153ship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control".
To Chinese, this tone of ethics referring to "imperialism" relates 
to her traditional concepts and cultural heritage in regard to current Chinese 
foreign policies of anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism. The Chinese have 
not provided a clear definition of "imperialiam", but their general criteria 
to define it are not based on such factors as power relations, race, national 
interest, or religion, etc. Instead, they make the differentiation of rela­
tionships between ruling and ruled, oppressing and oppressed, exploiting and 
exploited, or equal and unequal, with great ethical connotations. The rela­
tionship between these categories with the imposition of will by the former 
upon the latter identifies the chief features of imperialism both morally
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and psychologically. However, according to Chinese traditions, if a peculiar 
relationship is established on the basis of willingness or voluntary accep­
tance with respect to mutual benefit or rule of virtue, it may not be regarded 
as imperialism, such as the Confucian political concept of virtue (Wang Tao), 
or the tribute-system in the past.
Imperialism, in general, can involve a great array of actions, such 
as intervention, expansions, and arbitrary imposition in international re­
lationships, and it is characterized with excessive actions of immorality.
Lao Tzu teaches dialectics that explain, "If the quality of a thing has de­
veloped to its highest pitch, then that quality inevitably changes and becomes 
its o p p o s i t e . T h u s ,  nationalism is the outcome of imperialism in this 
respect, Lao Tzu's philosophy of wu-wei or inaction in international relations 
contributes to an extent to the doctrine of anti-imperialism. He claims:
"When one desire to win over the world by action, I find that he will never 
have a moment of rest. The possession of the world is something ordained by 
the nature. ... Those who try to gain by action are sure to fail; those who 
try to hold are sure to lose."^^^ The Chinese communists see these dialectics 
and Mao Tse-tung, thus, points out: "The U.S. imperialists and reactionaries 
of all countries are paper tigers", which not only contains philosophical 
meaning but also has psychological importance. For instance, to the inter­
national united front of anti-imperialism against the United States in the 
Vietnam War, the Chinese expressed their full support to the Vietnamese 
people in a similar tone of philosophical confidence: "The heroic Vietnamese 
people are sure to win! The diabolical U.S. imperialists are sure to be de­
feated! It is interesting to note that Mao Tse-tung once cited Lao Tzu's
words to strengthen his "paper tiger" thesis:
Lao Tzu said, "The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?"
U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries.
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have not only "threatened" us with death but actually put many of us 
to death.157
Nevertheless, Lao Tzu further pointed out: "Those who take delight
15Sin the killing of men cannot win the approval of the whole world". This 
teaching of anti-imperialism and anti-war was elaborated by the Chinese 
Communists with the factor of human willpower in a theory of people's war 
for struggle. To the philosophy of dialectics, human willpower plays an active 
and positive role in the process of change.
The three Indo-Chinese peoples, uniting together, daring to fight, 
persevering in protracted war, defying difficulties and advancing wave 
upon wave, will certainly defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their 
running dogs.
Victory surely belongs to the three heroic Indo-Chinese people! 
Dialectically, it is to imply that once the oppressed or invaded peoples 
and nations are daring to fight to death against imperialist policies of 
war, the imperialist aggressors will eventually turn from the real tiger into 
the paper tiger because of their inner immoral and unjust nature.
On a general basis of anti-imperialism, Chuang Tzu, a Taoist thinker, 
employs the concept of Tao and nature to distinguish what is of nature and 
what is of man. The imperialist intervention and aggression is what is of 
man and the national self-determination is what is of nature along with the 
historical trend. As a leading naturalist thinker, Chuang Tzu condemns the 
imperialist aggression and intervention backed with force which will impede 
human progress seriously.
Moreover, in the classical Chinese concept of international relations, 
the Mohist doctrine of universal love and non-aggression had further contri­
buted to the concept of anti-imperialism. Mo Ti saw the world of disorder 
as due to the lack of mutual love and respect, and it thus resulted in a 
struggle for self-interest at the expense of others. He was wholeheartedly 
against great power interventions and aggressions. He regarded equality as
- 1 8 1 -
the immediate general principle of international relations despite their 
power status or size in the world, because they all should have equal rights 
to e x i s t , T o  implement this doctrine, the Mchists organized themselves 
as a fighting group to help other nations defend themselves. Moreover, Mencius 
also condemns the foreign policy of imperialism and regards the policy of 
war and aggression as the greatest criminal action of mankind and that "death 
is not enough for such a crime".
Today, in a similar tone, the Chinese Communists charge the great 
powers’ policies of intervention and gunboat diplomacy upon the weaker nations 
as criminal aggressive actions.
Everyone knows that to seize another country's territory, to infringe 
upon another country's sovereignty and to interfere in another country's 
internal affairs is to commit acts of a g g r e s s i o n .
On the issue of American intervention in Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Gov­
ernment charged the U.S. as being an aggressor. The American policy of con­
tainment which disturbed the world system and interfered with other nations' 
internal affairs was also labeled as aggressive and doomed to failure.
On the other hand, to form an international united front of anti­
imperialism, the Chinese criticized American imperialist and aggressive po­
licies in Indo-China, Latin America and other Third World nations. With the 
U.S. invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970, the Chinese charged the American 
aggression as the enemy of the whole world, especially the Indo-Chinese people.
To support the nationalist movements and anti-American imperialism of 
the Latin American people, the Chinese Government condemned the U.S. gunboat 
diplomacy and aggressions on Latin American nations in light of the Dominican 
Republic issue in May, 1965;
The assertion by the Johnson Administration that troops had been 
sent to the Dominican Republic to "protect the lives and ensure the sa­
fety of American nationals", to "preserve law and order" and to "esta­
blish an international zone of refuge" is nothing but a pretext habi-
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tually used by imperialist gangsters. This only serves to reveal once 
again that U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of the people of the 
Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries as well as.all 
people of the world who cherish peace, independence and freedom.
Furthermore, after the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960's, the Chinese 
on the one hand condemned the U.S. imperialism of conducting world-wide mili­
tary, economic and political interventions and, on the other, they also charged 
the Soviet actions in international relations as the cunning style of a "small 
man" (hsiao jen) with shameless conspiracies and double-dealings behind the 
scene. Thus, the Russians, as revisionists' social-imperialism, would be even 
more dangerous than the capitalist imperialism to the Third World nations 
and peoples. Regarding the Sino-Soviet border disputes, particularly on the 
issue of Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River in 1969, the Chinese condemned 
the Soviet Government as the new tsars and socialist-imperialism.
Moreover, the Chinese regard the Soviet world-wide policies of inter­
ference and expansionism in the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe, and other 
areas as similar to that of U.S. imperialism. They condemn the Soviet's 
greediness of self-interest and a gain-hunger-oriented mind on the basis of 
traditional Chinese idealist concept. For instance, the Chinese criticized 
the Soviet conspiracy and intervention in the Middle East as follows :
Through the recent developemnts in the Middle East, the Arab people 
have learnt an important lesson. They have come to gradually recognize 
the sinister features of the Soviet revisionist clique as those of a 
false and treacherous friend. Israel's armed aggression against the 
Arab people was in essence a frantic attack jointly plotted by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. It was also a joint U.S.-Soviet 
political manoeuvre to trap the Arab countries. ... One day it voiced 
"support" for the Arab people and the next day it engaged in behind- 
the-scenes dealings with the United States and cooked up a so-called 
"cease-fire" resolution in the U.N. Security Council, a most shameless 
betrayal of the Arab people.
In general, according to her traditions and heritage, China appears 
not as a material-interest seeker nor profit-gain expansionist but rather 
as a center of ethical-cultural influence and an ideological promoter, to
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wliich Lhe charater of "chun-tzu" (superior man) is seriously distinguished 
from that of the profit-raind "hsiao-jen" (small man). To emphasize this 
view, Confucius once said: "The mind of the superior man is conversant with 
righteousness; the mind of the small man is concersant with gain".^^^ Mencius 
also opposed the concept of gain but advocated the concept of justice or 
righteousness and virtue in one's behavioral motivation. He holds the position 
against the concept of profit or gain which is imperialistic and aggressive 
in nature at the expense of others.
In retrospect, it seems to be hard to doubt that there exists ample 
evidence to prove the linkage between the classical conceptual heritage and 
the contemporary Chinese position of criticism of the two superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.
2) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background of Anti-Paism 
Associated with the concept of anti-imperialism, there has been a 
peculiar concept of anti-paism or anti-superpower hegemonism, in China's 
foreign policy today. Historically, it was rooted in the traditional heritage 
of denouncing the big power's hegemonial control with force by the idealist 
thinkers. This concept of anti-superpower hegemonism first originated in the 
concept of "Way of Hegemony" (Pa-Tao) and "Way of Kingship" (Wang Tao) during 
the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, and thus it would pro­
bably be difficult for Westerners to understand without closely examining 
its content and heritage.
In the traditional Chinese mind, the status and label of superpower 
hegemonism is a bad thing which is contrary to the teachings of humility. For 
the past years, the Chinese Communists constantly declared that China would 
never be a superpower although other nations were trying to include China 
in the group of superpowers status in the light of China's rising inter­
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national position. To Chinese, this offer which the Westerners have been 
seeking and regarded as honorable prestige is merely a humiliation in the 
sense of a nation's good faith. In a joint editorial article "New Year Message" 
of Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) in 1973, it was pointed out: "Chairman Mao also ins­
tructs us to 'dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hege­
m o n y ' " , S o m e  scholars once pointed out that the excessiveness of nation­
alism might be turned into imperialism. The last phrase of Chairman Mao's 
instruction "never seek hegemony" can be fairly explained as a precaution to 
reflect this concept on the eve of China's rising position. The Chinese Premier 
Chou En-lai has constantly stated before foreigners that China had no intention 
of assuming the role of a superpower in international politics "neither now 
nor even in the future". "We will always stand together with oppressed coun­
tries and peoples in firmly opposing power politics of superpowers". Premier 
Chou said.^^^ To this unique idea of anti-hegemonism, there has been a lin­
kage with the Chinese traditional concept of Pa Tao which needs more elabo­
ration.
The concept of "Pa" or hegemony was very popular in the international 
politics during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States (771- 
221 B.C.). All ambitious leaders of big states at that time were eager to 
seek the status of hegemony, ^  or Fang-Po, a superpower position. Thus, in 
Chinese historical records, there appeared five recognized hegemonial leaders 
or superpowers (Wu-Pa) in the period of Spring and A u t u m n . I n  advocating 
his moral concept of anti-imperialism, Mencius first initiated his theory 
of Pa (Hegemony) and Wang (Kingship):
He who, using force, makes a pretense to benevolence, is the Pa 
which requires to be a great power. He who, using virtue, practices 
benevolence--is the Wang which need not wait for being a great power.
... When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart.
They submit, because their strength is not adequate to resist. When subdues 
men by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely 
submit.
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As a Confucian ideal, Mencius strongly condemned the "Way of Pa" (Pa Tao) by 
the great powers but endorsed the "Way of Wang" (Wang Tao) by states in con­
ducting benevolence with virtue. To reject the exercise of force by great 
powers, Confucius also hinted the difference between Wang and Pa that, "A
horse is called a chi (a kind of leading horse) not because of its strength,
173but because of its other good qualities".
Hsun Tzu, a Confucian realist thinker and the great synthesizer of 
the idealist school and the realist school into his own thought, elaborated 
Mencius' concept of Wang and Pa rendering it into a feasible approach to 
keep world peace and security. He was against the abusing exercise of force 
but not too much against the particular rule of hegemony such as the Ch'in 
state of his time. However, he would have preferred the better quality of
174kingship rule, Wang Tao, which was the higher grade of politics and almighty.
In his mind, to abuse the force would cause a superpower gradually to weaken 
because it was not following the correct principle of Tao. In fact, for Hsun 
Tzu, the principle of Wang Tao is the synthesis of idealism and realism, a 
combination of the virtue and the force which would be almighty, while the 
Pa Tao is merely to abuse force without virtue.
In contrasting Hsun Tzu's concept of Wang Tao and Pa Tao with current 
Chinese foreign policy, there certainly appear similar tones and themes.
That is, on the one hand, China builds up its strength politically, econo­
mically and militarily, and on the other hand, she preaches the truth of 
ideology, the spirit of Marxism-Leninism without using force abroad. Sne 
resolutely refuses to assume the role of superpower in world politics and 
strongly condemns the exercise of force and power politics to impose arbi­
trary wills upon other nations by two superpowers' hegemonism. Obviously,
China is favored to be the center of truth of ideology along with the majority
- 186-
of nations in the world, but not the center of hegemonial power for control
and dictation with force. The Chinese Government pointed out:
U.S. imperialism is now calling China a "potential superpower", im­
plying that China may also squeeze into the ranks of the superpowers 
some day. Thank you, American lords, but China will never accept this 
kind of compliment! China will never seek the so-called big-power posi­
tion, We will for ever stand side by side with all nations subjected to 
aggression, control, intervention or subversion by superpowers; we will 
for ever stand side by side with all oppressed people and oppressed 
nations. The Chinese people will fight together with the people of the 
whole world to resolutelyj^^^ash the doctrine of big-nation hegemony 
(ta-kuo-pa-chuan-chu-yi) !
The Chinese attitude and policy of avoiding big-power hegemonism but 
standing along with the small and medium-size and oppressed nations to fight 
against the superpower's international dictatorship virtually reflects a 
parallel tone and spirit of classical Mohist doctrine of universal love and 
anti-aggression. The Mohists regarded all nations in the world, big or small, 
as equal, each with rights to survive and be free from others' aggression or 
interference. They severely condemned the big-power dictatorship in inter­
national relations. The Mohist group led by Mo Ti not only preached this 
doctrine but also actively threw themselves in the fighting line side by 
side with the attacked or small and weaker nations to deter the big-powers' 
aggressions. The Mohist spirit of proletarian internationalism and humanita- 
rianism does coincide with the current spirit of Chinese foreign policy of 
anti-superpower hegemonism with Marxism-Leninism,
In general, the Chinese criticism of superpower hegemonism can be 
summed up in the following themes: (a) spheres of influence, (b) superpower's 
role in the United Nations, and (c) issues of nuclear weapons, disarmament, 
and arms control.
(a) Spheres of Influence 
China has severely charged the two superpowers' contending and col­
luding to monopolize international affairs and to divide the world into
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spheres of influence respectively.
U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism always subject other 
countries to aggression, subversion, intervention, plunder, control and 
bullying. The two superpowers are contending and at the same time col­
luding to monopolize international affairs and practise hegemony. ...
... In the 50s U.S. imperialism was swashbuckling as the sole world 
overlord, claiming wildly that the whole world must put under U.S. 
"leadership". In the 60s, the United States and the Soviet Union con­
tended for world hegemony and domination.
Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century, 
the Latin American nations have been traditionally under American economic 
exploitation and control and military intervention. The United States holds 
many interests in this area and it is an exclusive and incompatible sphere 
of influence for Americans. This American monopoly and concern was ironically 
evidenced by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in a show down with another super­
power, the Soviet Union. Thereafter, a "gentleman agreement" of mutual respect 
of spheres of influence seems to have been reached between these two super­
powers. However, the Chinese pointed out that, "The Latin American people's 
struggle against U.S. imperialism deepened in 1971. It has pushed forward 
Latin America's mounting historical current opposing the superpower's hege­
mony and safeguarding national interests and state sovereignty in recent 
178years." Although the Latin American nations are in the process of revo­
lutionary struggle for national liberation from American control, they are 
still under the U.S. hegemonial influence and plunder economically, militarily, 
and politically.
On the other side of the ocean, the Soviet Union has conducted its 
hegemonial domination over the Eastern European nations which have been 
regarded as an unquestioned sphere of influence for the Russians. The Soviet 
hegemonial monopoly was generally evidenced in its suppression of the Hun­
garian revolution in 1956 and its occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. To 
challenge the Soviet right of domination, the Chinese criticized the so-called
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Brezhnev Doctrine as an outright doctrine of hegemony similar to that of the
Americans. They attacked:
First, the theory of "limited sovereignty". ... You have imposed 
your all-highest "supreme sovereignty" on the people of other countries 
is "limited", whereas your own power of dominating other countries is 
"unlimited".
Secondly, ... the "international dictatorship" you refer to simply 
means the subjection of other countries to the new tsars' rule and 
enslavement.
Thirdly, ... A "socialist community" indeed! It is nothing but a syn­
onym for a colonial empire with you as the metropolitan state.
This "Brezhnevism" is imperialism with a "socialist" label, it is 
outright hegemonism, naked neo-colonialism.
In addition to these two restricted areas of spheres of influence, 
the two superpowers after 1950 also launched their policies of expansionism 
and intervention for competition in the Far East, South and Southeast Asia, 
Europe, the Middle East, and even Africa. After I960, these two superpowers 
seem to have cooperated with mutual understanding for a divided world domi­
nation. In general, China has broadly condemned the United States and the 
Soviet Union constantly contending at one time and cooperation at another
time for a joint hegemonial control of spheres of influence in a global 
180scene.
(b) Superpowers' Role in the United Nations 
Since the establishment of the current international organization 
in 1945, the United Nations has been criticized as a playground of power- 
politics and bloc cold-war by the two superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, for their own national interests. They have played dominant 
roles and exerted control in almost every field or function of the United 
Nations, including such issues as membership, UN chief executive selection 
and the international civil service, UN peace-keeping operations, and UN 
economic and social functions. To these phenomena. Professor John G. Stoes- 
singer precisely pointed out:
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During the past twenty-five years, both superpowers have tried to 
use the UN as a vehicle for the advancement of their individual, anti­
thetical foreign-policy interests. In this quest, the Organization has 
been a more important vehicle for the United States than for the Soviet 
Union, because the United States has successfully involved the UN in 
more activities that have served its national interest. ... No less 
important, however, has been controlled politically and financially by 
the United States and its military allies. On the several occasions when 
UN action threatened U.S. national interests, the United States reacted 
vigorously— by casting "hidden" vetoes, infringing on the neutrality 
of the Secretariat, crippling a UN agency through outside bilateral 
agreements, and embarking oi> similar courses of action.
The superpowers' utilizing the structurally ceremonial and powerless United
Nations as a vehicle to dictate to the other member states for its own national
interest today is similar to the situation and style of the foreign policies
of the five hegemonial leaders (wu pa) during the period of Spring and Autumn,
when they were operating the policy called "controlling the Son of Heaven
182in order to dictate to the vassals" (chia-t'ien-tzu-i-lin-chu-hou).
Therefore, China today severely criticizes the two superpowers'
hegemonial role in controlling the world peace-keeping organization and urges
the majority nations to stop the condition of big-nation monopolies. Although
the increasing members of the Third World countries in the United Nations
since 1960 has gradually checked and balanced the superpowers' roles to a
certain extent, the monopolies of the latter are still influential and des-
183tructable to UN functions.
Before the restoration of her legitimate seat in the U.N, in October 
1971, China condemned the U.S. hegemonial role and policy of imperialism 
"which, in its obstinate stand of hostility towards the Chinese people, has 
for the past twenty years manipulated the voting machine of the U.N. and 
installed in the U.N, the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has long been spurned 
by the Chinese p e o p l e " . T o  elaborate the Chinese case in the light of 
current American defeat, the Chinese further commented on the irresistible 
trend of the UN development in the future :
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The baton cf U.S. imperialism in the United Nations has become more 
and more ineffective, and it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. 
imperialism to continue to manipulate the U.N. voting machine. An in­
creasing number of countries have risen against the crime of U.S. impe­
rialism and its accomplice in playing power politics and practising 
hegemony in the United Nations.
(c) Issues of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Arms Control
Obviously, in contemporary international politics, the military 
technology of nuclear weapons contributes a major factor for a nation to be 
ranked as a great power. All nations in the world, big or small, are sensitive 
on this issue; especially, the great powers are extremely reluctant to see 
the nuclear proliferation of their rivals in obtaining nuclear weapons. For 
the past two decades, both the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted 
their efforts to improving their nuclear weapons and simultaneously to pre­
venting the other nations from developing nuclear weapons, particularly China. 
Thus, as early as July 25, 1963, when a nuclear test-ban treaty was signed 
by the representatives of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union 
in Moscow, the Chinese charged it was merely an instrument to consolidate
the great powers' nuclear monopoly and to fool the people of the world with
,. - 1 1  186 a superficial language.
China further condemned the Soviet Union's cooperation with the
capitalist imperialism as an effort to monopolize nuclear weapons for world
187domination at the expense of other nations in the socialist camp. There­
fore, part for her own national security and interests and part on behalf 
of the non-nuclear and less-powerful nations, China criticized the conspiracy 
of two superpowers' hegemonism and urged the non-nuclear countries to unite 
for resistance.
There are more than 130 countries in the world. All countries, big 
or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, are equal. It is absolutely imper­
missible for two or three countries to brandish their nuclear weapons 
at will, issue orders and commands, and lord it over in the world as 
self-ordained nuclear overlords, while the overwhelming majority of
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countries are expected to kneel and obey orders meekly, as if they were 
nuclear slaves.
On the questions of disarmament and arms control, the Chinese Government 
rejected the Soviet proposal of convening a world disarmament conference in 
August, 1972. In the Chinese eye, it would merely be an "empty talk club" 
and "only serve to hoodwink and lull the people of the w o r l d " . ^^9 Realis­
tically, on the other hand, China's attack on the Soviet proposal of disar­
mament in the U.N. has special strategic importance in the light of current 
military power balance for politics. As Mr. Joseph C. Harsch pointed out in 
the Christian Science Monitor in November, 1971, China not only speaks for 
the majority of less-powerful nations but also is concerned with her own 
national security and interest.
The nuclear arms race is moving to a moment in history of special 
importance to the Chinese. It will be the moment of their greatest 
danger and greatest vulnerability.
It will be the point at which Russia will do one of two things; 
either allow the Chinese to develop a nuclear deterrent against Russia, 
or take drastic military action to wipe out China's growing nuclear 
capacity.
For China, it means the absolute necessity for any protection and 
help it can get from any source during this critical phase. And there 
is help to be found in the UN, where lots of small countries share 
China's discomfort over being vulnerable to the big nuclear powers.
To this view. Chairman Mao's instruction in the New Year message of 1973 to
"dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony" does
provide a certain mood and evidence.
Furthermore, the Chinese pointed out the reality of two superpowers' 
hegemonism which is the key obstacle to a meaningful step for disarmament 
and arms control today in promoting world peace and security.
The actual situation in the world today is this; the two superpowers 
-are maintaining military bases of various kinds, including nuclear bases, 
and stationing large numbers of their armed forces, including nuclear- 
missile forces, in many countries; ... To varying degrees, all the 
countries in the world with no nuclear weapons and those with few nu­
clear weapons are exposed to their threat. The most urgent question today 
is the withdrawl of foreign armed forces, rather than the reduction of
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armaments. Let the two superpowers withdraw all their armed forces, both 
conventional and nuclear, back to their own countries. If they do not
even want to effect a withdrawl, how can one believe that they are wil­
ling to make an arms reduction?
In general, the Chinese position of anti-two-superpowers' hegemonism
has gradually gained support from a majority of nations in the world for the
past years, particularly from Third World nations. Due to this fact, the world
power balance is shifting to a situation which makes China available to speak
for the weaker nations to a certain extent. As Professor Hans Morgenthau
pointed out, the reality of whole world politics was the struggle for power
between nations with the policy of maintaining the status quo and the nations
192with policy to overthrow the status quo. However, for the Chinese, they 
not only realize this realistic truth but also inject their traditional value 
and ethical concept into the theme cf international politics for their ideal 
goal. In the light of national liberation movements in the Third World nations 
and China's policy of resolute opposition to the superpower's hegemonism, 
the Chinese concluded: "Countries want independence, nations want liberation, 
and the people want revolution; this has become an irresistible trend of 
history.
B) Chinese Attitude Towards International Law, World Order and 
International Organization
(1) Conceptual Heritage and Modern Background
1) The Nature and Role of International Law
The modern concept of international law might be new for the Chinese 
but the general rules of interstate relations were not unknown to the ancient 
Chinese people. A systematic body of general rules of interstate relations 
had developed during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Wariing States 
but it collapsed and ceased at the end of the Warring States period with 
the unification by Ch'in state in 221 B.C. Thus, when a similar style of
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modern interstate rules came into being during the past several centuries, 
it seemed to be difficult for the Chinese to recall in a current expanding 
global interstate relations. Under their own traditional concept of world 
order since the Han Dynasty in the first century, the Chinese response to the 
modern Western-developed system of international law had appeared to be naive 
and lacking knowledge when China faced the Western imperilaist challenges 
during the past. The Chinese concept of international law during the early 
republican period was mainly oriented with a Western-style of conducting 
international relations until the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China in 1949.
Based on the Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese see international law 
in terms of class struggle. In their mind, the modern international law system 
is solely the product of the states with European backgrounds in the Western 
civilization and thus it lacks universality in a global sense. According to 
the Marxist-Leninist theory, the superstructure of international law only 
serves the national interest of the ruling class of capitalist nations in 
exploiting the oppressed and underdeveloped countries and areas. The Chinese 
argued that the reason that international law survived the addition of non- 
Western states in the past was part because Western nations stood in a pre­
dominant power to enforce it and part because it contained a certain degree
194of practical utility and adoptability.
Therefore, in the Chinese eye, the role of modern international law 
is merely an instrument of the foreign policies of the capitalist-imperialist 
nations for global expansion and aggression. They reject the "purely lega­
listic viewpoint" of international law but regard it as the servant of nati­
onal policy. By giving the facts to illustrate this point, scholars in Chinese 
Mainland such as Ying T'ao, Wei Liang, and Wang Yao-t'ien pointed out that 
as a source of modern international law, the Covenant of the League of
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Nations "was signed by the victor powers of World War I to maintain their
acquired interests over the vanquished and to prescribe a post-war inter-
1 9 Snational order most amenable to their tight grip on their colonies."
They further charged that in nearly all major international treaties after
World War II it appeared that the great powers intended to protect their
interests by imposing treaties favorable to them on the weaker states. For
example, through nominal "equality of opportunity" clauses the capitalist
powers may acquire special privileges because of their financial superiority.
The Marshall Plan provided the chance for the United States to interfere in
the internal affairs of the "Marshallized" countries. Other bilateral trade
agreements between the capitalist, highly industrialized nations and the
underdeveloped countries actually opened the door for the exploitation of
natural resources by capitalist and imperialist nations.
Particularly, the Chinese pointed out the Taiwan issue as a typical
example of utilizing international law as instrument for American foreign
policy. Before the outbreak of the Korean War no nation, including the United
States, had challenged the Taiwan status of returning to China according to
the Cairo and the fotsdam Declarations. However, when the Korean War broke
out on June 27, 1950, President Truman said that "determination of the future
status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a
197peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations".
There is no legal ground which could be set forth to explain this reversal
of America's position on the Taiwan question except political consideration.
Therefore, in his severe criticism, one Chinese writer, Ying T'ao, wrote;
In the Western capitalist world, suppression of the weak by the 
strong and the eating of small fish by big fish are not only tacitly 
condoned by bourgeois international law but also are cloaked with a 
mantle of "legality".
Thus, because of the very nature of international law as an instrument
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for the implementation of a nation's foreign policy, the Chinese attitude
regarding it, was that;
International law is an instrument for settling international problems. 
If this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist cause, 
or to the cause of peace of peoples of the world, we will use it. But 
if it is disadvantageous to our country, to socialist enterprises or 
to peace enterprises of the people of the world we will not use it and 
should create a new instrument to replace it,^^^
They further criticized the so-called "science of international law" as merely 
the theoretical instrument to defend the imperialist big power's policy of 
aggression and war. Theories of the Naturalists, Positivists, Grotians, the 
Normativists (Kelsen) and the Social Solidarists (Duguit) all serve this 
p u r p o s e . W i t h  this criticism, certain scholars believe that there actually 
exist two separate systems of international law side by side, one bourgeois, 
which is used as means for oppression and struggle of power among the bour­
geois nations, and the other socialist, which is based on the principle of 
proletarian internationalism with rights and obligations of mutual assistance 
from each other. The reality of all treaties and agreements between capitalist 
and socialist countries is merely the result of struggle and power balance
between the two parties which does not reflect the common value but a com- 
201romise. Other scholars hold that there is only one system of international
law which is applicable to all states and reflects the constant change as 
a result of the growth of new centers of power and process of transition 
from capitalism to socialism.
However, the majority view which might be considered as a semi­
official point provides that a "general recognized" principle or a body of 
perrmptory norms (jus cogens) exist side by side with "modern" existing 
norms which are subject to reform according to current needs and conditions.
The former will apply to all states, while the latter will be performed 
within the socialist countries and the bourgeois countries separately. For
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instance, botli the principle of proletarian internationalism and the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence or the UN Charter will be applied in the 
treaty concluded with the socialist countries, but the treaty concluded with 
the bourgeois nations does not contain the principle of proletarian inter-
T  202nationalism.
As the state apparatus, the nature of law and international law which 
is backed with force for application is by no means virtue or benevolence 
but violence and curelty in the eyes of Marxists. Mao Tse-tung once pointed 
out :
The state apparatus, including the army, the police and the courts, 
is the instrument by which one class oppressed another. It is an ins­
trument for the oppression ofgggtagonistic classes; it is violence and 
not "benevolence" (jen-ts'u).
In retracing this idea in the Chinese traditions, Confucius also pointed
out the inferiority of the "law" in comparing the "virtue" and "li" or rite
204to keep world order and peace. He seems to argue that the performance 
of international law backed with enforcement, which is frequently resulting 
in interstate war, will easily fall into the way of hegemonism. Pa Tao, an 
international dictatorship by the great powers. To conduct the principle of 
li, ethics or rite in international relations, there will be no arbitrary 
enforcement and dictatorship but a harmonious relationship under the way of 
kingship, Wang Tap, with mutual respect and assistance in accordance with 
propriety, righteousness and virtue.
The concept of big power or superpower hegemonism which is based 
on force has been severely condemned in Chinese tradition, including today's 
Chinese Communists. But the concept of virtue or rule of ethics, li-chih, 
which is based on the performance of benevolence, good faith, mutual respect, 
and righteousness or justice has been honored traditionally, for Confucius 
gave the argument that.
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When a leader's conduct is correct, his policies will be effective 
and respected without the enforcement. If his conduct is not correct, 
he may issue forces and orders, but none will follow.
With this view in mind, the spirit and theme of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence which China holds today as a set of general principles for inter­
national relations whether with bourgeois or socialist, big or small nations, 
might be regarded as similar to the idea of or rite in Confucian terms.
On the other hand, China practises the ethical principle of proletarian 
internationalism with the socialist nations and the oppressed nations on a 
basis of mutual assistance. This principle becomes an improtant part of 
international rules within the socialist countries and among the oppressed 
nations and peoples.
2) The Nature and Role of War and Peace
The dialectics of war and peace, like Yin and Yang. paves the way, 
the Tao, of historical development. The process of change between war and 
peace provides various concepts and theories of international relations 
throughout human history. Both war and peace have been glorified and condemned 
by different philosophers and thinkers on the basis of various conditions, 
concepts and theories. As Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military theorist, 
pointed out, war is something vital concerned with survival which connects 
seriously with the welfare of mankind. Thus, we need to exam closely the 
nature and role of war and peace in the light of current Chinese foreign 
policy and world politics.
(a) The Dilemma of War and Peace
Most Chinese philosophers in history have been seeking peace and 
order and condemn war as a calamitous evil. Meanwhile, however, they cannot 
but recognize the reality of existing war in human society. Lao Tzu and 
Chinese Taoists advised eliminating the conduct of war to a minimum in order
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not to abuse the force, but they did not leave war as an approach for peace. 
Hsun Tzu realized the dilemma of war and peace which follows the law of dia­
lectics, the Tao and Yin-Yang. Thus, on the one hand he condemned the evil 
phase of war but on the other hand he realistically adopted the policy of 
war to stop war for the sake of peace and justice. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s 
philosophy of war holds the point that the purpose of war is for peace and 
subject to the command of politics.
In a similar tone, the Chinese Communists today hold the same 
concept of war and peace to view this dilemma of contradiction. They recognize 
the evil of war but realistically admit that the only approach to destroy 
war for peace is through war itself. Mao Tse-tung gives his view;
War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally 
eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant 
future too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to 
oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolu­
tionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national 
revolutionary war, and to^pppose counter-revolutionary class war with 
revolutionary class war.^^°
We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but 
war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the 
gun it is necessary to take up the gun.^®^
To clarify these two kinds of war, the Chinese define just war as the war
of progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialistic nature, while the unjust
war is defined as reactionary and imperialist aggression at the expense of 
208others' interests. The line between the just and unjust war is drawn on
the basis of ethics and morality which emphasizes a difference between the
welfare of a whole people and the interest of a certain privileged group of
people. Therefore, under Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "Our
country and all the other socialist countries want peace; so do the people
of all the countries of the world. The only ones who create war and do not
want peace are certain monopoly capitalist groups in a handful of imperialist
209countries which depend on aggression for their profits." In fact, this
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line of differentiation presents nothing new but traditional in character.
In their concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-aggression, Mencius,
Hsun Tzu, and Mo Ti all condemn wars of imperialism and aggression, espe­
cially those imposed by the great powers' hegemonism upon the small and 
weaker states. However, they approve fighting a defensive just war against 
imperialism. Both Mencius and Hsun Tzu advised fighting the defensive war 
of justice on the basis of self-reliance and with support of the whole people, 
a theory of people's war, which has been performed in today's China. Mo Ti 
and the Mohist followers urged fighting a defensive war of justice not only 
on the basis of self-reliance and a nation's whole people but also extending 
active mutual assistance under the principles of universal love and non­
aggression.^10 To this aspect, the spirit of the Mohist international movement 
is akin to that of the current Communist principle of proletarian interna­
tionalism.
In regard to the belief of virtue and human progress, all the just- 
war proponents hold an optimistic view for a final victory, because they 
believe people are the basic motive of historical progress. Therefore, both 
the ancient Chinese just-war theorist and current Chinese Communists have 
emphasized the concept of people's war. The former gave the concept of virtue 
and righteousness or Wang Tao, and the latter provided the concept of pro­
letarian revolution on the basis of class struggle. Chairman Mao pointed out:
When human society advances to the point where classes and states 
are eliminated, there will be no more wars counter-revolutionary or 
revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace 
for mankind. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war springs from 
the desire to eliminate all wars; herein lies the distinction between 
us Communists and all the exploiting classes.^11
(b) War as a Means of Politics
War can never be neutral but is always an integral part of politics.
Mao Tse-tung viewed the nature and role of war as follows:
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"War is the continuation of politics". In this sense war is politics 
and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has 
never been a war that did not have a political character.
When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot 
proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from 
the way. ... When the obstacle is removed and our political aim attained, 
the war will stop. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the 
war will have to continue till the aim is fully accomplished. ... It can 
therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is
politics with b l o o d s h e d . ^12
Truly, this philosophy of war can be found not only in modern Western thought 
but also in the ancient Chinese classics. Lao Tzu recognized the reality and 
function of war in conducting international relations but urged its minimum 
use. When Mencius, Hsun Tzu, and Mo Tzu approve the war of justice, it implies 
that war contains the proper political character. They admit war as a weapon 
to eliminate and wipe out the obstacles of politics in promoting political 
virtue and r i g h t e o u s n e s s . S u n  Tzu, an eminent ancient Chinese military 
theorist, also viewed war as one way to continue politics along with the 
diplomacy in serving a nation's foreign policy. When a national goal is 
achieved, the less use of war, the better; the art of war is political in 
nature.
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's 
strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to 
attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities 
only when there is no alternative.
Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle.
They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state 
without protracted operations.
All these words reflect the fact that war contains its political purpose
for peace and is not allowed to abuse.
This concept of political-military relationship has been traditionally 
followed by Chinese statesmen and military strategist throughout history, 
including today's Chinese Communists. From the Marxist-Leninist approach 
looking at the nature of war, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that under certain 
conditions and circumstances, the peaceful means for socialist transformation
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is impossible under an extreme reactionary and feudal system such as the 
conditions in China before 1949; revolutionary wars are obviously needed for 
political p r o g r e s s . T h e r e f o r e ,  Mao Tse-tung gave his famous teaching: 
"Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun'"^^^ He explained:
Without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor 
the Communist Party would have any standing at all in China and it would 
be impossible for the revolution to triumph. In these years (the eighteen 
years since the founding of the Party) the development, consolidation 
and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolu­
tionary wars; without ar^|^ struggle the Communist Party would assuredly 
not be what it is today.
Accordingly, the Chinese Communists urged armed struggle and fighting a 
revolutionary just-war against the imperialism, colonialism, and war of ag­
gression of great powers in international relations.
In conclusion, regarding the general concept of war and peace, there 
do exist similarities and connections between the ancient Chinese classical 
theories and contemporary Chinese thoughts, especially, when we consider that 
the Chinese Communists are performing their policies in such a physical con­
dition with the long tradition and brilliant civilization of the past.
(2) Policies in Practice and International Organization
Regardless of the various schools of thought on world order and 
peace during the ancient periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring States in 
China, there did exist certain general rules and principles in regulating 
interstate relations. The rules of or rite which contained the concept 
of the equality of states and national independence were popularly accepted 
as general rules or international laws of international relations at that 
time. The concept of equal sovereignty, whether for big or small states, and 
diplomatic rules were commonly recognized and performed in the ancient Chinese 
family of states. In addition to these general rules in practice certain
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moralist concepts of international behavior such as "teh" (virtue), "yi"
(justice or righteousness) and "hsin" (trustworthiness or good faith) being
performed in the system were greatly honored. They were also regarded as
the qualitative requirements for a state to obtain leaderhsip in the world
218family. To the Confucian thought, it was the way of kingship, Wang Tao.
In attempting to act as a leader, the big states at that time fre­
quently initiated bilateral or multilateral alliances, international treaty 
organizations, and interstate leagues or conferences for diplomatic, political, 
and military purposes. For instance, in 546 B.C. a great peace movement was 
initiated and resulted in a disarmament conference with fourteen participant 
states including big, middle and small states, and this has been regarded 
as an ancient precedent of the League of Nations by modern scholars. This
international league contributed to international peace for a period of
219forty years in the Chinese family of nations at that time.
Similarly, in modern times because of the increasing interstate 
relations, a system of international rules and laws has been developed. The 
politics of leagues and conferences has been popular too, particularly after 
two world wars in the twentieth century. The great powers have played a 
dominant role in the forms of international organization and collective- 
security politics, such as the League of Nations after World War I and the 
United Nations after Wrold War II. The five permanent seats of great 
powers in the power nucleus, forming the Security Council of the United 
Nations, fairly reflect the current realist international power-politics, 
especially the two superpowers' role of hegemonism since the founding of this 
world organization in 1945.
To face the reality of global international relations with various 
social systems and ideologies, the Chinese Communists have recognized the
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general principles of international law, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, applicable to all state in the world. In a joint communique of 
China and India in 1954, these principles were first time set up to improve 
Sino-Indian relations. They are: 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; 2) Non-aggression; 3) Non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs; 4) Equality and mutual benefit; and 5) Peaceful 
co-existence. It was expected that these principles could further serve as 
general rules of international relations in the world. The joint communique 
stated :
iTie Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they 
should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as 
well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied 
not only between various countries but also in international relations 
generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security 
and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to
a feeling of confidence.^20
This body of peremptory norms has also been enacted in the United Nations
221Charter which China endorsed. As early as 1956, Mao Tse-tung expressed
his view on the Chinese attitude toward the general rules of international
relations to keep world peace and order. He said:
To achieve a lasting world peace, we must further develop our friend­
ship and co-operation with the fraternal countries in the socialist camp 
and strengthen our solidarity with all peace-loving countries. We must 
endeavour to establish normal diplomatic relations, on the basis of mu­
tual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and of equality
and mutual benefit, with all countries willing to live together with
us in p e a c e . 222
Accordingly, the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has 
been the general criteria used in establishing diplomatic relations between 
China and all other countries in the world. The diplomatic relations concluded 
on this basis between China and the non-communist Afro-Asian nations. Western 
capitalist nations, and other nations since 1949 are examples.
As a matter of fact, in the theory of Marxism-Leninism there is no
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sense of "nation" but only class difference, because "nation" is the product 
of the capitalist s y s t e m . ^^3 Consequently, there should be no sense of inter­
national law emanating from this class-struggle world outlook. However, the 
reality of the present nation-state condition is a transitional stage from 
captialism or feudalism to socialism and communism in which a set of temporary 
international rules are necessary for a better and smoother socialist trans­
formation.
Similarly, the main purpose and function of the establishment of an 
international organization is to keep world peace and order for a smooth 
transformation along with human progress under fundamental and generally- 
accepted international rules. The Chinese Communists' attitude toward an 
international organization is based on this premise and they, therefore, 
endorsed the United Nations Charter and its general structure. Mao Tse-tung 
agreed upon the spirit and framework of the United Nations and said on the 
eve of the United Nations San Francisco Conference in 1945:
In regard to the establishment of an institution to preserve inter­
national peace and security, the Chinese Communist Party completely 
approves of the proposals made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference....
The Chinese Communist Party has already sent its own representative to 
join the Chinese delegation at the San Francisco Conference in order 
to express the will of the Chinese people.^24
Idealistically, the Chinese expected that under the principle of 
universality, the United Nations would embrace all nations and peoples, 
regardless of size and other differences in the world family, on the basis
of internationalism with mutual respect and equality. Similar to the Mohist
concept of universal love and non-aggression, the Chinese hoped that under 
the general principles of peaceful coexistence, the majority of nations and 
peoples could express their wills under the doctrine of national self-deter­
mination. Moreover, it appears that the Chinese hoped that under the system
of collective security of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations as
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an international body could play the role of world police co preserve justice 
against aggressions and protect the general rights of all nations. As protec­
tors of justice embodied in the power nucleus of five great powers in the 
Security Council, the Chinese expected that the two socialist members with 
permanent seats, China and the Soviet Union, could check and balance the other 
capitalist great powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France 
at least in policy-making for future socialist transformation.
In retrospect, this theory of preserving world peace and justice 
under a set of general rules of international relations centered in an inter­
national organization has its precedent in the ancient Chinese Mohist concept 
of international fcrce and movement to implement the doctrine of universal 
love and non-aggression. To preserve rithteousness and peace against aggre­
ssions it was reported that Mo Ti and his disciples had performed quite 
successfully in stopping the aggressive wars and frequently had paid great
2 2 ' 'sacrifices to save the small and weaker nations from big-nations' invasions, 
This spirit of hsia (the knights-errant) and proletarian internationalism 
apparently has influenced the current Chinese attitude toward the role and 
function of the United Nations,
Unfortunately, the role and practice of the United Nations for the 
past quarter century have been far from its ideal and theory stated in the 
Charter. Since the bipolar cold war developed after World War II, this world 
organization has gradually become a playground of two-superpowers' antagonisms 
and bloc power-politics in seeking their national interests at the expense 
of the other majority nations in the world. Particularly, since the outbreak 
of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China with a quarter of the world 
population has been technically blocked for two decades from participating 
in this world organization by the United States under its hegemonial role.
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Because of this unfair situation and power-politics, the Chinese bitterly 
attacked and mobilized the small and medium-size nations against the two- 
superpowers' hegemonism in the United Nations.
In view of the two superpowers' control of the United Nations, Vice- 
Premier Ch'en Yi presented the Chinese view on the international organization 
in front of a group of Japanese correspondents as early in 1965. He said:
The United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and 
has today become a place where two big powers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions. This state of affairs 
has not changed even though dozens of Afro-Asian and peace-loving coun­
tries have made no samll efforts in the United Nations. China needs not 
take part in such a United Nations.
During the U.S. war of aggression against Korea, the United Nations 
adopted a resolution naming China as an aggressor. How can China be 
expected to take part in an international organization that calls her 
an aggressor? Calling China an aggressor and then asking the aggressor 
to join, would not the United Nations be slapping its own face?
Thus, the Chinese urged the international organization to reform and establish
a revolutionary United Nations in accordance with the spirit and principle
of the UN Charter and free from the superpower's control and manipulation.
They further demanded the correction of past mistakes of the United Nations
and the implementation of the general principle of universality for membership,
227naturally including the restoration of China's legitimate seat.
After a long diplomatic battle aided by both her rising status in 
international relations and the support by the majority nations, China even­
tually defeated the United States' block in the General Assembly with res­
toration of her legitimate rights in the United Nations on October 25, 1971. 
With this victory, China on the one hand continues to attack the two super­
powers' hegemonial role in the United Nations and on the other hand works 
to mobilize the majority small and medium-size nations to break the super­
power's monopoly leading eventually toward the correct way for the United 
Nations. Taking the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations
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as an example, the Chinese commented on its perspective in the future.
All countries, big or small, should be equal; the affairs of a coun­
try must be handled by its own people; the affairs of the world must be 
handled by all the countries of the world; the affairs of the United 
Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states— this is the 
irresistible trend of history in the world today. The restoration of 
the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United 
Nations is a manifestation of this t r e n d . ^28
In supporting the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter as general rules and as a means to maintain world peace and security, 
China warned the United Nations to avoid the past failure of the League of
229Nations and play its due role for justice and the promotion of human progress. 
Based on this attitude of goodwill, China presents her willingness to cooperate 
with the majority nations for this goal and to contribute to human progress.
In China's first policy statement at the United Nations General Assembly in 
November, 1971, the Chairman of Chinese Delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua said:
We hope that the spirit of the United Nations Charter will be really 
and truly followed out. We will stand together with all the countries 
and peoples that love peace and uphold justice and work together with 
them for the defense of the national independence and state sovereignty 
of various countries and for the cause of safeguarding international 
peace and promoting human progress.^30
It appears that China is willing to play the revolutionary role of 
vanguard with the support of majority nations to uphold the general rules 
of international law and preserve justice and world peace through the inter­
national organization. This spirit of revolutionary vanguardism seems to be 
connected with the idea of hsia in an international scene which the Mohists 
and their followers have traditionally advocated in Chinese history.
In conclusion, the general charateristics of the Chinese views on 
international law, an international organization, and world order are much 
more moral and ethically oriented and emphasized than those of the modern 
Western nations. Since China was admitted to the United Nations and began 
playing an influential role in international relations, some observers have
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recently pointed out that China's attitudes and actions will be likely shaped
by the pressures and styles existing within the United Nations' network.
They believe China will act, even if not speaking, in a similar style customary
2T1to a great power under the Western system of international politics. How­
ever, this argument which is based on the modern realist school of thought 
and mainly derived from a Western-oriented analysis of nation states and 
nationalism may only partially true in that China will be flexibly and prag­
matically working in the present framework of an international system so as 
to cooperate and associate with most of the nations in the world under the 
general principles of peaceful coexistence for world peace, order and human 
progress. However, China constantly and seriously expresses her resolute re­
fusal to act the role of a great power or superpower like the United States 
and the Soviet Union.
Conversely, certain observers indicate that China will continue its 
historical task of anti-imperialism and conduct the revolutionary change of
the international system towards the ultimate goal of revolutionizing human 
232consciousness. To synthesize these two points of view, the complementary
nature of classical Yin-Yang dialectics might provide an appropriate view 
on Chinese behavior in current world politics. China will follow one phase, 
the Yin, cooperating on the formal level within the present system of inter­
national relations realistically competing and contending national self- 
interest under nationalism which has played a vital role for the past century. 
On the other phase, the Yang, China will positively commit herself to adopt 
an ethical and moral style of diplomacy and political behavior in international 
relations which has its traditional heritage and concepts. The concept of 
Wang Tao (politics of virtue), the leadership with virtue which was postulated 
by Confucius, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti and most dynasty emperors and intel­
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lectuals throughout the past Chinese history reflect well the moral and cul­
tural identity of Chinese tradition. This peculiar Chinese characteristic, 
which has been injected into the ideology of communism expressed in China's 
attitude towards international relations and foreign policy since 1949, should 
not be under-estimated and ignored in predicting China's role in the future.
To support this point, Professor John Cranmer-Byng also gave his view of the 
Chinese attitude towards international law and the United Nations:
One essential quality, which both versions of this faith in China's 
special mission have in common, is their "imprinted" belief in the 
relevance of Chinese cultural values and life style as an inspiration 
to guide other peoples of the world in the future. As a result of the 
Cultural Revolution China is being propelled forward by revolutionary 
fervour just as much as by nationalism. It would not seem realistic, 
therefore, to take it for granted that China will come to accept the 
total ethos on which the western-evolved system of international law 
and relations is based without a struggle to modify it substantially, 
even though in the tactics and mechanic.! of diplomacy she maintains 
very considerable flexibility.
Thus, he further pointed out the possible pattern of Chinese international
behavior and foreign policy in the future.
According to this analysis, therefore, China will continue to display 
both "ethical" and "self-interest" styles in her foreign relations. She 
will go along with the basis international system of international re­
lations as practised within the United Nations, though attempting, under 
certain circumstances, to change what she feels to be intolerable in 
that system as judged by her own ethical s t a n d a r d s . ^34
In describing synthesis, which has been a major theme of the Thought of Mao
Tse-tung, Professor John Cranmer-Byng appears to speak in a tone consistent
with the Tao (the Way) and Yin-Yang dialectics.
C) Chinese Attitude Toward Weaker Nations, Nationalities, and Disputed 
Territories
(1) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background
1) The Spirit of Wang Tao; The Politics of Virtue 
In addition to her positive policies of anti-imperialism and anti- 
paism, the phase of Yang, China also conducts its negative policy of sup-
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porting the national liberation movements of the small and weaker Third 
World nations on the basis of the humanitarian aspect of Marxism-Leninism, 
the phase of Yin. (Parenthetically, the words "positive" and "negative" are 
used in the special framework of the Yin-Yang dialectic; they do not imply 
strictly opposite meanings, but contrasting or complementary elements of a 
phenomenon which interact to produce dialectical change). This negative or 
humanitarian aspect of foreign policy also contains two phases--idealistic 
and realistic. Idealistically, it provides a moralistic expression of humanity 
and equality with the ultimate goal of world communism, strongly connected 
with traditional Chinese ethics. Realistically, it serves to strengthen 
Chinese nationalism and an international united front of anti-imperialism. 
Differing from the Western type of support and the Western attitude strongly 
based on national self-interest and use of force (the Pa Tao) towards the 
weaker developing nations, the nature and the style of Chinese support for 
and attitude toward these nations and peoples are based on the politics of 
virtue or the spirit of Wang Tao (brotherhood), in Chinese terms.
(a) Support of the National Liberation Movements 
The policy of defending and supporting the smaller and weaker and 
particularly the attacked states against great power aggression and imperi­
alism has been traditionally honored by Chinese idealist thinkers. For 
instance, in the ancient Spring and Autumn period a great power's rescue of 
a small state from another great power's attack would be highly praised by 
the people in that interstate community, and thus, the prestige or leadership
of the former would be greatly enhanced. The Confucian thinkers regarded this
235kind of moral behavior as the way of virtue, the Wang Tao. Another school 
of political idealists, the Mohists, preached the doctrine of universal love 
and non-aggression and devoted their efforts to help and support the weaker
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and attacked states against great power aggressions. Mohists' ethical and 
moral behavior have developed the spirit of hsia and proletarian internati­
onalism throughout Chinese history.
On the basis of virtue and benevolence, Confucius taught: "Now the 
man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to 
establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge 
others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves; --this 
may be called the art of v i r t u e " . F o l l o w i n g  this traditional concept of 
virtue. Sun Yat-sen in his principle of nationalism of the "Three People's
Principles (san min chu i)" urged the Chinese to "unite in a common struggle
237with those nations of the world which treat us as equals". After achieving
her own security and national development China is logically obligated to
help and support the smaller and weaker nations and peoples in their struggle
for national liberation.
In connection with this moral and ethical tradition, reinforced by
the modern proletarian internationalism of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese
Communists support the national liberation movements of the oppressed and
underdeveloped nations and peoples. Mao Tse-tung teaches in a tone similar
to that of traditional internationalism:
What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt 
the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the 
spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every 
Chinese Communist must learn. ... ^8
The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help 
those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist
duty.239
During his first trip to the Arab-African countries in 1963-64, Premier 
Chou En-lai stated China's attitude toward the Third World nations in a voice 
of tradition. At the press conference it was reported:
Premier Chou En-lai said; Ci.e of the main contents of the foreign
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policy of the Chinese Government is active support for the national 
democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China is a coun­
try that has been liberated from the colonial shackles of imperialism.
We shared the same lot as the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Naturally we sympathize with and support each other. Moreover, since 
China has won its own victory, it has the obligation to support countries 
which have not yet won victory or are about to win it.
On the consistency of China's policies towards the lliird World nations, as
well as China's general foreign policy for the 1970's, it was stated in the
political report to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party delivered
by the late Defense Minister Lin Piao:
The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent. It is:
To develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation 
with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; 
to support and assist the revolutionary struggle of all the oppressed 
people and nations; to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries 
having different social system on the basis of the Five Principles
Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on expediency; it is a policy
in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and 
we will persist in doing the same in the future.
Similarly, in his political report to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party, Premier Chou En-lai repeated the same principles of China's 
242foreign policy. In general, China s emphasis on the spirit of inter­
nationalism and its consistency truly reflects traditional Chinese ethics 
and moral concepts advocated by the various classical schools of thought.
Moreover, in addition to the spirit of proletarian internationalism 
another special feature of Chinese foreign policy differing from the Western 
style has been the policy of non-intervention. As Professor J.D.B. Miller 
observed, "The Chinese leaders have not given armed support to any revo­
lutionary movement; their use of war has been confined to their own bor­
ders". This point is supported by the fact that there have been no 
Chinese armed forces stationed abroad during peacetime, nor any Chinese 
armed intervention in other nations' internal affairs, in contrast to the 
record of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The
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past two episodes of Chinese military operations (in the Korean War and the 
Sino-Indian border conflicts) were strictly initiated by and limited to the 
consideration of China's critical national security. After the armed conf­
licts terminated, Chinese troops were immediately pulled back to her own 
territory. Unlike the Americans and the Russians, the Chinese have never 
conducted military intervention in other nations' internal affairs as these 
two superpowers have done in their satellite states or in their spheres of 
influence, as in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. China's emphasis on the prin­
ciples of national self-determination and the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence has ruled out armed intervention as a normal approach in her 
foreign policy. Tlie Chinese attitude of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism 
and opposition to the policy of war and aggression reflect this posture of 
non-intervention. China actively encourages the Third World nations to wipe 
out the great powers' policy of intervention and proclaims: "Today, the 
struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism,
colonialism and power politics and for winning and safeguarding national
244independence has become an irresistible historical current."
To understand this pacific character of Chinese foreign policy, it 
would be appropriate to recall the traditional Chinese concept of Wang Tao, 
the spirit of kingship or of culturalism (in essence, Wang Tao means "All 
men are Brothers".) The Chinese regard the military approach in a nation's 
foreign policy as the Pa Tao, the way of hegemonism, which has been tra­
ditionally condemned. Because, Mencius pointed out: ''When one by force 
subdues men, they do not submit to him in heart. ... They submit, because 
their strength is not adequate to resist." As soon as the great powers' 
leadership and forces decline, their satellites would reverse their posture 
of submission and respect. Consequently, the great powers are constantly
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seeking for armament to keep the status quo and thus find themselves in a 
situation of constant military tension and insecurity.
In contrast, the Chinese arc conducting their foreign policy on the 
basis of the pacific "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" intermingled 
with the traditional moral spirit of Wang Tao. Actually, this non-military 
and nun-aggressive principle of interstate relations was proposed by a great 
number of classical Chinese thinkers. However, the Chinese Communists point 
out that although non-military peaceful-coexistence is a suitable policy 
for relations among states, it does not apply to the conditions between 
oppressed peoples and their oppressors in an individual nation or in the 
world. This is because, according to Lenin's theory in "The State and Re­
volution", those who hold power will not relinquish it peacefully and the 
imperialist oppressors and local reactionaries ultimately must be overthrown 
by revolutionary war. Particularly in the underdeveloped areas and states, 
conditions are even worse. Therefore, Mao Tse-tung teaches that political 
power is based on armed struggle. The Peking Review points out:
The principle of peaceful co-existence can apply only to relations 
between countries with different social systems, not to relations 
between oppressed and oppressor nations, nor to relations between 
oppressed and oppressing classes. For an oppressed nation or people 
the question is one of waging a revolutionary struggle to overthrow 
the rule of imperialism and the reactionaries; it is not and cannot 
be, a question of peaceful co-existence with imperialism and the re­
actionaries.
Accordingly, the Chinese Communists do encourage local armed struggles 
against the colonialism and reactionary governments, based on the people’s 
war concept, in the underdeveloped areas and nations. They provide inter­
national moral support and material assistance for the local national 
liberation movements. But the Chinese retain their military policy of non­
intervention. In the Chinese view revolution in each country is made by the 
people of that country and can not be exported, either by the Chinese or
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by any other foreigners. Lin Piao, then Chinese Defense Minster, pointed out 
the doctrine of self-reliance as an important theme in the theory of people's 
war :
Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the 
masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their 
own efforts; there is no other way.^^^
Foreign military intervention in a nation's revolutionary movement, if ob­
jected to by the native people, is deemed by the Chinese as nothing other 
than imperialist aggression. Therefore, it is contrary to the traditional 
spirit of Wang Tao and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For, in Lin Piao's
words, "the liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves
247--this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism".
In connection with Chinese traditional anti-militarism, the concept of 
Wang Tao, Professor Peter Van Ness observed, regarding Chinese support of 
wars of national liberation in the Third World;
Generally speaking, it has not been Peking's policy to commit Chinese 
troops to support foreign wars of national liberation. As of 1965, the 
only Chinese troops known to be stationed outside China's borders for 
any purpose were Chinese service troops engaged in rebuilding bombed 
out roads and railroads in North Vietnam. ... However, no Chinese 
combat troops have yet been known to have fought in the revolution 
in the South. The situation that would be most likely to prompt a 
Chinese decision to commit troops to the battle in the South would 
be one in which Peking felt that the national security and integrity 
of China were drastically threatened (analogous to the Korean situation 
in the autumn of 1950), but this would be very different from committing 
Chinese troops for the purpose of advancing a war of national liberation 
per se.
(b) Leadership and Virtue: Revolutionary Model of the Third World
The positive phase of the traditional Chinese Wang Tao theory rests 
on establishing a model of virtue for others to follow. This is essentially 
the Chinese Communists' present attitude towards the Third World nations 
and peoples. This aspect of "virtue-model" politics originated in classical 
Confucianism. Confucius said:
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The conduct of political affairs by the Way of Virtue may be compared 
to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the fellow stars 
revolve around it.
Let his words be sincere and faithful, and his actions honorable and 
careful; — such conduct may extensibely be practiced among the rude bar­
barians of the South or the Nroth, Otherwise will he be appreciated even 
in hie neighborhood?^^^
Confucius emphasized that the model of virtue would attract others and thus
these others would be culturally influenced and assimilated into a harmonious
relationship. To serve as a model in the international community, and to
attract its fellow states, a nation needs to be disciplined by revolution
and to possess and prize its own culture. Confucius taught:
Therefore, if remote peoples are not submissive, all the influences 
of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be 
so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented
and tranquil.251
Accepting this concept of virtue, Mencius elaborated it in his thesis of
Wang Tao and asserted: "When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts'
252core they are pleased, and sincerely submit". Thus, both the Confucian
idealist and realist followers, Mencius and Hsun Tzu, advocated the way of 
leadership on the basis of virtue and ideology, a universal model of culture.
For the past two thousand years, from the Han Dynasty down to the
Ch'ing Dynasty, this classical Confucian concept of virtue-politics has
been developed and applied in the Chinese concept of suzerainty, a tribute
system of world order and foreign relations with the peripherial states.
With her cultural superiority, China has traditionally conducted the chi-mi
or "loose rein" policy and the policy of i-i chih-i or "using barbarians to
check barbarians" as general strategies to manipulate the surrounding states
and to control frontier areas throughout the historical dynasties. This policy
253has been regarded as compatible with the classical Confucian tradition.
In connecting and blending this classical tradition and the modern 
revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communists since
-217-
the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 have claimed that the 
experiences of the Chinese Revolution and modernization could serve as a 
model for revolutions in the countries of the Third W o r l d . T h e y  argue 
that the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", which led the Chinese Revolution, is 
the application of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism in China. There 
are a great many similarities between Chinese conditions and those of the 
Third World nations. Mao's theory of revolution and the Chinese experiences 
of socialist construction would be applicable, therefore, to the areas of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America. To compete with the Soviet Union in the 
light of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese leaders excluded the Russian 
October Revolution as a leading revolutionary model applicable to the Third 
World nations and underdeveloped areas. In his famous essay "Long Live the 
Victory of People's War ! ", Lin Piao pointed out that the contribution of 
Mao Tse-tung to Marxism-Leninism was his establishment of a revolutionary 
model for the Third World nations which contained essential differences 
from the Russian October Revolution. He wrote:
The October Revolution took place in imperialist Russia but the 
Chinese revolution broke out in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. 
The former was a proletarian socialist revolution, while the latter 
developed into a socialist revolution after the complete victory of 
the new-democratic revolution. .. .
Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war ... has not only been 
valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary stru­
ggles of the oppressed nations and people throughout the world.
In the Chinese mind the Soviet Union is too Western to direct the revolution 
in the underdeveloped areas or the colonial and semi-colonial countries or 
the East, or even to understand the prerequisites of such a revolution.
China, the most populous of the underdeveloped nations and the most experi­
enced in dealing with imperialism has to assume the leading role as a revo­
lutionary model under Marxism-Leninism for national liberation movements 
of the Third World nations.
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In addition to the aspects of political ideology and socialist re­
volution, the Chinese leaders further pointed out that the experiences and 
approaches of Chinese economic development and socialist construction can 
serve as a model of national modernization for the underdeveloped nations 
too, 'fhe pattern of the Chinese Five Year Plan economic program has attracted 
a great many developing nations, although that attraction was temporarily 
disturbed by the setbacks of the "Great Leap Forward" and the natural dis- 
sasters of 1959-61. Similar to the agriculture-based economies of most under­
developed countries, China presents her tested economic policies as a balance 
between national and local development, between agricultural and industrial 
investment, as well as a balance between light industry and hea''/y industry 
(the so-called "Two Legs Walking", liang-t'iao-t'ui-tso-lu, principle). 
Moreover, the Chinese teach the important principle of self-reliance, which 
they have learned from their experiences, as essential to avoid foreign 
imperialist control and exploitation. For the Chinese, the principle of self- 
reliance is the key to national independence and economic growth without 
foreign intervention. Therefore, Tseng Yun, a Chinese leader in charge of 
economic affairs, pointed out:
Revolution cannot be exported. The revolution in a country can only 
be made by its own people. ...
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese 
people continued to follow the policy of self-reliance in socialist 
construction. ...
The practical experience of the Chinese people has fully testified 
to the correctness of the view . . . that2 5 gvery socialist country must 
rely mainly on itself in construction".
In general, for the past two decades, Chinese revolutionary policies 
concerning political, economic and social issues have been given close at­
tention by most nations in the world and widely adopted by the developing 
nations of the Third World as models for their national modernization. In 
connection with Mao's revolutionary theory of armed struggle and the national
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liberation movements of the Third World nations. Professor Harold C. Hinton
concluded; "One important principle that the CPC does preach to the newly
independent nations is the maintenance of armed forces allegedly for the
main purpose of protecting themselves against 'imperialism, colonialism,
and neo-colonialism'. ... The CPC of course rejects any suggestion that the
Soviet Union (or for that matter the United States, India, or Yugoslavia)
257offers any kind of model for the developing countries."
In reviewing the traditional Chinese Wang Tao concept, the approach 
of China's foreign policy and her international behavior do contain certain 
special features differing from the hegemony-oriented Paism of the two super­
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not believe 
that the western capitalist nations can give a correct direction for the 
developing nations due to their incorrect ideology, while the right way and
appropriate approach will always come from culturally superior China, tern-
258pered by her authentic experiences.
Despite their cultural pride and ideological self-confidence, the 
Chinese also accept the traditional teachings of humility, one of the major 
features of the Wang Tao theory, to avoid the aggressiveness of great power 
hegemonism (Pa Tao) and great power c h a u v i n i s m . ^^9 xo the Chinese, an 
attractive model is more effective than artitrary dictation or forcible 
suppression, either in domestic or foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung once spoke 
in a nationalistic mood of humility, as the typical Chinese revolutionary 
intellectuals did, in a discussion of China's future role in the world.
He said :
In another forty five years, ... China will have undergone an even 
greater change. She will have become a powerful socialist industrial 
country. And that is as it should be.... and she ought to have made 
a greater contribution to humanity. ...
But we must be modest— not only now, but forty-five years hence, 
as well. We should always be modest. In our international relations.
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we Chinese people should get rid of great-pcwer chauvinism resolutely, 
thoroughly, wholly and completely.
We must never adopt an arrogant attitude of great-power chauvinism 
and become conceited because of the victory of our revolution and 
certain achievements in our construction. Every nation, big or small, 
has its strong and weak points.^61
In summary, China's attitude toward the weaker and underdeveloped 
countries has been strongly associated with and influenced by the traditional 
concept of Wang Tao and spirit of humanity.
2) The Nationalities Question
(a) Theoretical Analysis of the Question of Nationalities
For 4,000 years, through the dynasties of Hsia, Shang, Chou, and 
still today, China has been a multi-national country. When the ancient Chou 
feudalism broke down and the periods of Spring and Autumn and of the Warring 
States followed, the original Chinese civilization around the Yellow River 
enjoyed a great expansion through interstate interaction and military con­
quest, culminating in a unified Ch'in Empire in 221 B.C. Following dynasties 
of Chinese history, Han, T'ang, Sung, Yuan, Ming and Ch'ing, further con­
tributed to Chinese territorial and cultural expansion from the areas of the 
Yellow and Yangtze rivers to the present national boundary. Throughout this 
long period of racial and cultural assimiliation, China has embraced a great 
number of ethnic peoples into her national realm. Within this large Chinese 
family of peoples, the Han nationality make up more than 90 per cent of 
the population and the ethnic minorities consist of other peoples with a 
total population of about thirty-five million altogether.
Tlie most impressive feature of the Chinese ethnic assimiliation 
during the past several thousand years has been the process of cultural 
interaction rather than modern nationalism. Except in the Spring and Autumn 
and the Warring States periods, which were similar to modern international 
systems, the Chinese concept of nationality was generally, if vaguely, iden­
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tified with unlversallsm (the concept of t ’ ien-hsia— all-under-heaven, or 
treating all mankind as a whole). The only differentiation between the Chinese 
and other peoples in the world was based on the criteria of cultural level 
and civilization. Once the wild barbarians were civilized by Chinese culture 
or merged into the Chinese system there could be no difference between the 
Chinese the other peoples. This traditional Chinese concept of culturalism 
survived until challenged by the modern Western concept of nationalism in 
the nineteenth century.
Traditional Chinese universalism, rather than nationalism for the 
ethnic groups and peoples, is the Chinese Communist policy today. This policy 
is not entirely inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism, which holds a similar 
attitude towards the question of national minorities. However, instead of 
using the traditional cultural line, the Chinese Communists today argue 
that the fundamental cleavages of world society are along class rather than 
national lines. The official Party position is:
"Nations" are artificial units which came into being with the rise 
of capitalism and which are destined to disapear when capitalism is 
replaced with communism; nationalism is a club used by capitalists to 
keep the world proletariat divided and subdued. When the proletariat 
lays siege to world power, then, according to the theory, nations and 
nationalism will vanish. ^
Accordingly, in the view of communist internationalism any claim for national 
independence of an ethnic minority in a socialist country is counter-revo­
lutionary and will not be permitted. Only in capitalist and colonial coun­
tries are such claims correct and operative. In a proletarian socialist 
country the oppression of one nationality by another is impossible, so if 
an ethnic minority demands independence, it is automatically an agent of 
world imperialism and thus an enemy of "the p e o p l e " . O n  the basis of 
the spirit of internationalism, a Chinese leader, Chang Chih-i, argued;
In the present-day world, the American imperialists continue at
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the head of the colonialist camp. They stubbornly oppose lasting peace 
and people's democracy and cling to their policies of encroachment and 
colonialism. If we cannot satisfactorily unite the national minorities 
within our borders, this might have the effect of pushing them out of 
the great family of the Chinese People’s Republic, handing them over 
to imperialism, and causing slavery to be imposed upon them. This is 
not the way for Communists.
lie further pointed out certain miserable historical experiences of several
nationalities for independence such as Mongols and Uighur controlled by the
Russians and the Tibets by the Great Britain since late nineteenth century
to support his arguement;
In recent history, certain national minorities in our country have 
experienced independence movements. Not only did these meet with complete 
failure, but before one foot could get picked up to walk away from the 
motherland, the other foot had already sunk in the trap set by the 
imperialists. This historical lesson has served as a warning for the 
leading personalities of China's comparatively large national minorities.
Til is kind of internationalism and humanitarianism has certain simi­
larities with the traditional Chinese concept of culturalism. According to 
the Chinese Confucian concept and the system of suzerainty, once non-Chinese 
territories and peoples are civilized by Chinese ideology and culture from 
barbarism, they should not be lost to other barbarian control. The Chinese 
attitude toward their frontier areas and peripheral states was built on this 
principle for more than 3,000 years. The actual process whereby the conquered 
barbarians were absorbed and turned into Chinese by slow assimilation and 
cultural influence was compatible with traditional Chinese idealism and 
humanitarianism. Any attempt at disunion or claim of separation from the 
orthodox center of civilization, the motherland, would be regarded as bar­
barian rebellion, and thus harmful and disadvantageous to both the minority 
people and the people of the whole system. As early as the period of Spring 
and Autumn, Confucius praised the prime minister of Chin state, Kuang Chung,
as a great man of virtue for defending Chinese civilization against barbarian
26 7encroachment and saving China, the Chou feudalism, from disunion. The
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general goal of foreign policy at that time and since was the preservation 
of the Chinese system of suzerainty and cultural influence. The so-called 
right of national self-determination in the modern style was not understood 
and in fact definitely denied.
Thus, the traditional Chinese attitude and the current Chinese Com­
munist policy on the question of nationalities are alike in opposing cultural 
disunion and national independence. Unlike the Soviets, who adopted the 
principle of "national self-determination" to implement federalism, the
Chinese, although endorsing and honoring this Soviet principle, have pre-
268ferred only to allow national regional autonomy within a united country.
In opposing the Western concept of national self-determination and 
separation, Mao Tse-tung commented on the question of the minority nationa­
lities and urged the elimination of both great llanism and local nationalism.
He said:
It is imperative to foster good relations between the Han people and 
the minority nationalities. The key to this question lies in overcoming 
Han chauvinism. At the same time, efforts should also be made to over­
come local nationalism, wherever it exists among the minority nationa­
lities. Both Han chauvinism and local nationalism are iiarmful to the 
unity of the nationalities; they represent a special contradiction 
among the people which should be overcome.
According to Marxism-Leninism, the principle of "national self-determination"
is not a call for national separation nor the breaking off and separate
establishment of small nation states, but is simply a practical manifestation
270of profound opposition to national oppression of all kinds. Therefore, 
the Chinese Communist Party concludes:
In sum, the principal aim of Marxist-Leninists insisting on the 
necessity of recognizing the right of national self-determination is 
that of opposing imperialism by seeking to make allies of the oppressed 
nationalities in the socialist revolution of the international proleta­
riat; it is clearly not their aim to advocate indiscriminately the 
separation of each nation nor to urge the establishment of a great number 
of small nation-states.
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The Chinese Communist policy on national minorities has led to a 
decision to establish autonomous regions (which are mostly arouuu the national 
frontier and border areas) instead of a political federalism as the Soviet 
Union has chosen to do, with its different historical background and tra­
ditions. The major autonomous regions in China today, are Inner Mongolia, 
Sinkiang Uighur, Tibet, Kwangsi Chuang, Ningsia Hui, and a number of autonomous 
chous (prefectures), which were Chinese national frontier areas in the past, 
occupied by barbarians. These regions have enjoyed quite a lot of autonomy 
as they did under the traditional Chinese system of suzerainty during the 
past two thousand years. Following the Confucian theory of Wang Tao in the 
past, the Chinese adopted the general policy of chi-mi or "loose rein" in 
dealing with barbarians. Perhaps influenced by both idealist Mencius and 
realist Hsun Tzu, there were two approaches to implementation of this Con- 
cucian theory. Professor Yang Lien-sheng, a Chinese historian at Harvard, 
describes them as follows: "In the Confucian classic, the Tso Chuan, one 
discerns two tendencies, one toward pacifism and the other toward militarism 
as the most effective means for dealing with the barbarians. Most views
were mixed with various amounts of idealism and realism, persuasion and 
272intimidation". The Chinese attitude and traditions of "loose rein" and 
local administrative autonomy for the ethnic minorities can be traced back 
to the Han Dynasty. Professor Yang gives a historical survey of this policy:
Most of the definitions of chi-mi were made in Han times. Pan Ku's 
chi-mi pu-chueh or "keeping under loose rein without severing the 
relationship" was c principle already current in the time of Han Wu-ti.
With the establishment of the chi-mi fu chou or "military and civil 
prefectures under loose rein" by the T ’ang dynasty on its frontier, 
the expression chi-mi became part of a technical term referring to a 
special institution. ... The Sung continued the institution of ch-mi 
chou. The Ming also used the terms chi-mi chou hsien, "prefectures and 
districts under loose rein".... Such prefectures and districts under 
loose rein constituted a frontier prefectural system in name but a 
frontier feudal system in reality. The efforts made by the Ming and 
Ch'ing dynasties to convert them into regular prefectures and districts
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273(a process known as kai-t'u kuei-liu) yielded only limited results.
With this tradition of the local chi-mi institutional system under the loose- 
rein policy, as a means for cultural and ideological transformation of 
minorities into the Chinese system, the Chinese Communists today have also 
set up similar autonomous regions and prefectures (chou), respecting the 
specific conditions and customs of the ethnic minority groups, as a tech­
nique for an appropriate socialist transformation. The Party attitude is one 
of equality, brotherhood and mutual help toward the national minorities 
within a united China, but at the same time the Party strongly opposes local 
nationalism and any claims of national disunion and separation. The Party 
position is given in these words:
We must rely on the principle of nationalities equality in order 
to eliminate contradictions among the nationalities; to give the 
national minorities democratic rights; to let them manage their own 
internal affairs; to respect their religious beliefs, spoken and 
written languages, and customs and habits; to assist them in improv­
ing their economic conditions of^^^fe; to help them train cadres and 
establish armed forces, etc.
Throughout Chinese history, China has been truly culturally inter­
nationalist and expansionist in her concept of world order. In certain 
ways, that historic posture is compatible with the contemperary Chinese 
Communist concept of proletarian and ideological internationalism, as 
in the Communist position on the question of nationalities.
(b) Policies on Frontier Areas and Bordering States
According to the Communist Chinese theory on the minority nationa­
lity question, any claim of national independence and separation from the 
socialist motherland under the banner of national self-determination for a 
certain nationality should not occur. Since under the general spirit of 
proletarian internationalism, the principles of national equality, solida­
rity, and mutual help are fully operative, a movement for independence must
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be mistaken and unjustified. Should such claim or such a movement occur, 
it must represent bourgeois local nationalism under the influence of 
foreign imperialist plots. These plots or intrigues of the imperialists 
and the local reactionary forces must be put down and crushed for the sake 
of proletarian welfare as a whole.
Since the establishment of the People's Republic, China has been 
confronted with two major problems of local nationalism and claims for 
independence, namely, the Tibetan rebellion and the Taiwan Independence 
Movement. The national minorities in other frontier areas have been fairly 
satisfied and their living conditions have greatly improved, approaching 
the level of the Han majority. The Han and the national minorities have 
been intermingled to a certain degree under the policy of solidarity, a 
process which has contributed greatly to the principle of proletarian 
internationalism. Ulanfu, an important minority leader (Inner Monglia), 
wrote in I960:
With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and the found­
ing of the Chinese People's Republic, the reactionary rule of imperial­
ism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in our country was overthrown. 
National oppression was thoroughly eliminated. Equality and solidarity 
among the nationalities were established and the relations among them 
radically changed. China entered a new era of friendship co-operation 
and simultaneous development of the nationalities.
In both of the critical cases involving an independent movement, 
the Tibetan rebellion and the Taiwan Independence Movement, the Chinese 
Communists regarded them as plots and conspiracies of the local bourgeois 
reactionaries in collusion with foreign imperialism. In the case of Tibet, 
the Chinese Communist leaders pointed out:
Imperialism began its rabid aggression against all the nationalities 
in China from the beginning of the 19th century, militarily, political­
ly, economically and culturally, Tibet was no exception. At the very 
outset, imperialism resorted to brute force in the hope of occupying 
Tibet by armed invasion and turning it into one of its c o l o n i e s . 276
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The foreign imperialist nations to which they referred were Great Britain
and the United States associated with India. These western powers were
charged with having conspired in an imperialist plot for the so-called
277"independence of Tibet" since the Second World War. In 1950, the Chinese
Communists entered Tibet and set up Tibetan local government for socialist
transformation. However, they charged the U.S. and British imperialists
with obstructing the Chinese campaign for national unification by creating
278the "Tibetan Independence Movement" When the Tibetan armed rebellion 
broke out in March, 1959, the Chinese regarded this uprising as a plot 
engineered by foreign imperialism and thus quickly sent troops to put it 
down. The People's Daily commented in March 1959:
The local government of Tibet and the reactionary clique of the 
upper social strata there, in collusion with impcriniinti, the 
Chiang Kai-shek bandits and foreign reactionaries, have openly torn 
up the 17-article Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation 
of Tibet, abducted the Dalai Lama and launched an armed rebellion.
These monstrous crimes, betraying the motherland, disrupting unifica­
tion of the country and undermining national unity, are absolutely 
intolerable to the people of all nationalities throughout the country 
including the patriotic people of Tibet.^
On this subject of the armed suppression of the Tibetan rebellion. 
Premier Chou En-lai made an official report. He generalized the policy of 
the Central People's Government on Tibet and explained the reason for 
military suppression of the revolt. He said:
The policy of the Central People's Government in regard to the 
Tibet region has always been clear. In accordance with the stipulations 
of the Constitution, we have always adhered to the principle of the 
unity of all the nationalities of our country and the unity of the 
Tibetan people themselves and have stood for the institution of nation­
al local autonomy in Tibet. ... But the former local government of 
Tibet and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata continued 
their collussion with the imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek gang and 
foreign reactionaries on whose forces they attempted to rely to split 
the motherland, restore the imperialist aggressive forces in Tibet, 
and preserve a backward, dark, reactionary and cruel serfdom in Tibet.
... Their activities seriously violated the interests of the Tibetan 
people and the common interests of all the nationalities of the
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In general, the incident of Tibetan uprising in 1959 was viewed by the
Chinese as a class struggle, and the armed rebellion was thus suppressed
in accordance with the general policy on the nationalities question. Under
the banners of humanitarianism and proletarian internationalism, as the
Chinese saw it, the general interest of the Tibetan people was saved and
the unity of the motherland was greatly consolidated.
In the case of Taiwan, the situation is more complicated than that
of Tibet. First, the Taiwanese people are of Han nationality and so not
a national minority. Thus, there is no question of national oppression.
Second, the Taiwan island is still held by the Chinese Nationalist (Chiang
Kai-shek's) government, supported by the United States and other western
countries. Ethnically and culturally, in fact, the Taiwanese people are
identical with the Chinese mainlanders. Although there were peasant rebellions
and nationalist resistance against the colonial rule of the Dutch and the
Japanese in Taiwan during the past few centuries, the character of these
movements was essentially the same as the older Chinese anti-foreignism.
Taiwan "was still intimately tied to the very same cultural values and
281the same patterns of loyalty that existed on the mainland". The spirit 
was not that of modern nationalism for, a separate national independence, 
but rather a feeling of Chinese patriotism. Even the extreme case of 
alleged Formosan nationalism, the declaration of a "Formosan Democratic 
Republic" in resistance to the Japanese occupation when the Chinese Ch'ing 
government conceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, did not represent a desire 
for the creation of an independent Formosan nation. Its purpose "was intend­
ed as a temporary device to achieve international support to resist the
282Japanese with the view to eventually re-uniting Formosa with the mainland".
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The current sentiment of Formosan nationalism for independence since 
World War II has been in fact due to the misconduct, dictatorship, and cor­
ruption of the Chinese Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.
This was shown particularly in the Formosan revolt of February 28, 1947,
283which crystallized Formosan nationalist feelings. In the view of the 
Chinese Communists, however, Formosan nationalism is simply a manifestation 
of the class struggle between the oppressed mass proletariat and the bour­
geois-bureaucratic reactionaries which existed similarly in the Chinese main­
land before the liberation of 1949. Thus there has been nothing different in 
the Taiwan situation in comparison with that of other regions of the Chinese 
Mainland in the past, except for the fact that Taiwan is currently controlled 
by the United States in collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary forces. 
This, of course, has been the main obstacle to Taiwan liberation. The major 
problem in Taiwan, therefore, is foreign imperialism and bourgeois reaction­
ary rule, not the issue of national oppression. In Chinese Communist eyes, 
there is no reason for the people of Taiwanese to claim national indepen­
dence. Formosan nationalism is inconceivable, as far as the general interests 
of the mass proletariat are concerned, unless inspired by plots of the foreign 
imperialists in collusion with local bourgeois reactionaries, aimed at nation­
al disunion.
Accordingly, the policy of the Chinese Communists on the Taiwan issue 
has been focused since 1950 on attacking the United States China-policy of 
supporting Chiang Kai-shek. China also acuses Japan of cooperating with the 
United States in a conspiracy to separate Taiwan from her motherland by 
supporting the Taiwan Independence Movement. In an official interview with 
James Reston, vice president of the New York Times, on August 9, 1971,
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai pointed out:
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Japan has ambitious designs with regard to Taiwan. Japan wants to 
control Taiwan in her hands. So it's not a simple matter that Japan 
is supporting Taiwan in the United Nations.
In fact, we can even go on further from there. That is, not only 
will there be a question of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan - it's 
even conceivable that they are trying to separate Taiwan from China 
and, under the direction of Japan and also possibly with support from 
some quarters in the United States, to bring about a so-called indepen­
dent Taiwan.
Pointing to the American role in the Taiwan question, Chou En-lai said;
If the United States Government withdraws all forces from Taiwan 
and the Taiwan Strait and no longer considers Chiang Kai-shek as the 
representative of China, then the logical result would be that Chiang 
Kai-shek and Taiwan would be matters internal to China. This would be 
recognition that the People's Republic of China is the only lawful 
government. There can be no possibility of two Chinas or one China 
and one Taiwan. ^
In brief, the Chinese viewed the true nature of the so-called "Taiwan
Independence Movement" as a plot of American imperialism and Japanese
reactionaries and thus urged the reunification of China in light of the
common interests of the whole Chinese people.
In addition to these two particular cases, Chinese nationality 
policies in other frontier areas are consistent with the same theory of 
nationalities. The general principles of national solidarity, equality 
and mutual assistance according to proletarian internationalism are 
propagated and enforced. Possible unrest or uprisings in the frontier 
areas are theoretically and factually blamed upon plots and subversion of 
foreign imperialism in collusion with local bourgeois reactionaries. In 
the case of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Russian revisionist 
social-imperialism was condemned and charged with conspiracy and subversion, 
agitating for the Uighur nationality to separate from China. This conspiracy 
was also shown in the Sino-Soviet border disputes. Since the Ch'ing dynasty, 
the Russians have recurrently interfered along China's Sinkiang and Mongo­
lian frontiers. Mongolia was technically and subversively separate from
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China as an independent "Mongolian People's Republic" in 1946 under Russian
286influence and control. The Chinese, therefore, are very sensitive to
Russian ambitions and activities in the Sinkiang area. Since the widened
border disputes in the 1960's, they have frequently accused Russia of
287subversive activities along the Sinkiang border area. With regard to 
the most important strategic frontier areas such as Sinkiang, Tibet and 
Inner Mongolia, where the major Chinese nuclear facilities are located, 
the Chinese are extremely careful in handling the nationality question 
and in watching the Russians, for obvious reasons of national security.
(2) The Implementation of Internationalism
1) The Spirit of Bandung
When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, China 
initially pursued a foreign policy of "leaning to one side" toward the 
Soviet Union. Under Russian control and influence, the general characteris­
tics of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1954 were unequivocally "revolu­
tionary" and "militantly nationalistic". The Chinese openly encouraged
armed struggle and subversion beyond their borders, especially in Asian 
288countries. This phase of foreign policy was partially in support of 
Soviet national interests and partially reflected the revolutionary senti­
ment of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism. However, since 1954, with 
the death of Stalin and the need for socialist rehabilitive construction 
after the Korean War, China has been more independent of Soviet control and 
influence in conducting her foreign policy. Thus, the traditional spirit 
of mutual assistance and nonaggression has dominated, along with the general 
"Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", the "panch shila", which were 
formalized in a treaty concluded between China and India in 1954.
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In April, 1955, China participated in the Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia with twenty-eight other Asian and African nations. In the tra­
ditional Chinese spirit of Wang Tao toward other states, and now more in­
dependent from Soviet control, the Chinese delegation presented a program 
calling for mutual assistance and peaceful coexistence, and urged Afro-Asian 
solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. Premier Chou En-lai spoke 
at the Conference:
The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek common ground, and 
not to create divergence.
There is every reason to make the five principles the basis for 
establishing friendly co-operation and good neighbourly relations 
among us. We Asian and African countries, with China included, are 
all backward economically and culturally. If our Asian-African Con­
ference does not exclude anybody, why couldn't we understand each other 
and enter into friendly co-operation?^®^
This appeal to proletarian internationalism brought China praise, and
friendship from the Afro-Asian countries thereafter. China acquired a new
image and an enhanced international status in the eyes of the developing
nations, thus paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the Third
World nations and peoples.
This appeal for pacifism and proletarian mutual assistance coin­
cides in nature with the classical Wang Tao theory and the Mohist spirit 
of "universal love and nonaggression". It is essentially the same as the 
Bandung spirit, which the Chinese frequently refer to as a major feature 
of their foreign policy. In addition to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, the Bandung Ten Principles were adopted, focusing on the 
principles of anti-colonialism and mutual respect for further consolidation 
of the Afro-Asian nations.
Through the Bandung Conference, China expanded her foreign relations 
with the Asian countries and began her first diplomatic activity in Africa.
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This diplomatic campaign for peace was impressive and powerful. It was 
further reinforced by Premier Chou En-lai's official visits to Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, More 
than a hundred cultural, trade, and technical treaties and agreements were 
concluded during the years 1956-57,^^^ With China's support the impact of 
the Bandung Spirit was enormous. Professor Bruce D. Larkin observed on this 
subject:
Institutions aside, China invoked the Bandung spirit to encourage 
Asians and Africans to join in initiatives which China favored. It 
stood for an aura of benignity. Guided by the Panch Sheela and the 
Bandung Ten Principles, on a plateform of anti-colonialism and mutual 
respect, countries as dissimilar as China and India could peaceably 
coexist and prosper. Real arguments aired at Bandung were mute. African 
leaders, prompted to do so in the proper context, readily affirmed 
their attachment to the spirit of Bandung.
The importance of the Bandung Conference for China was obvious. It 
brought China into the Afro-Asian group of nations and thus marks the be­
ginning of her influence in the Third World, including the Latin American 
states. Therefore, Professor Harold Hinton concluded: "The Bandung Conference
can be taken as marking the beginning of the CPR's transition from the status
292of an almost purely Asian power to that of an Afro-Asian power". More­
over, China began to present her revolutionary experiences and her program 
of socialist construction to the underdeveloped Afro-Asian countries as a 
model for their own nation-building and modernization. The Chinese Communists, 
in a traditional tone, have claimed that the Chinese experiences of revo­
lution and socialist construction would serve as a model superior to that 
of the Russians and, of course, to that of the Western capitalists, be­
cause Chinese economic and social conditions have been so similar to those 
of these Third Wrold countries. Not surprisingly, most of the Third World 
nations were impressed and attracted by this Chinese appeal and by China's 
performance and achievements in economic and social reforms. China's "popular
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diplomacy" with the Afro-Asian nations enabled communism to gain considerable 
approval among the peoples of these nations as a way of nation-building.
This appeal is discussed by Professor R. G. Boyd as follows:
In general, China's presentation of Communism as the ideal path 
of development has answered serious dissatisfaction in the South and 
South-East Asian countries about the slow rates of industrial and 
agricultural advancement achieved under politico-economic systems 
which have placed emphasis on the initiative of Western-style private 
enterprise. Communism has held out prospects of more rapid econoimc 
advancement than that possible by imitation of the West, and has thus 
offered a restoration of prestige to the Asian peoples who have felt 
humiliated by their failure to emulate Western material progress 
liberation from colonial rule.^^^
The intellectuals, and public opinion as well, of Japan and India 
were particularly affected. In Japan, Professor Boyd commented, "China's 
example in nation-building has seemed highly commendable because their own 
country's advances in recent years, although rapid, have involved the con­
tinuation of grave injusticws; in addition the Chinese example has been 
felt to reflect a more noble approach to the work of national development 
than Japan's own imitation of Western c a p i t a l i s m " . I n d i a ,  favored by 
extensive Western and Soviet assistance, has been in the best position to 
compete with China's model of nation-building and its appeal of communism. 
However, India's national development and economic advancement have been 
much less than that of China, so that many people in India have felt and
urged that only drastic Communist methods of social mobilization could
295enable India to advance her backward economy.
After the Bandung Conference, China began to promote her relations 
with the African countries. In 1956 and 1957 Chinese delegations launched 
a series of goodwill missions to African states and visited Ethiopia,
Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Ghana. Thereafter, the Chinese influence 
on these nations has particularly increased and thus paved the way for fur- 
ther contacts with other newly independent African countries. In the
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1960's, China further improved relations with most African countries, par­
ticularly the newly independent states.
In general, the Bandung Conference marked a decisive and far- 
reaching step for China's entry into Third World politics, enabling her 
to preach her revolutionary gospel of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. 
Thereafter, the Chinese have gained more popularity and a more influential 
status among the underdeveloped countries and peoples than have the other 
major powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Bandung spirit, with its emphasis on peaceful coexistence, equality, mutual 
respect and cooperation, was enthusiastically adopted by the Afro-Asian 
nations as the general basis of international relations. In restrospect, 
this spirit of Bandung fairly reflects the Chinese classical Mohist spirit 
of hsia and contemporary Marxist proletarian internationalism. Its doctrine 
of mutual assistance, especially assisting the weak against the aggressive 
strong, and its doctrine of equality with mutual respect fully coincide 
with the Chinese Communist policy of supporting the national liberation 
movements of the Third World countries. In addition, Chinese military and 
economic assistance to the Third World nations under the Ten Principles 
of Bandung further reflect the traditional spirit of goodwill and the 
policy of virtue in Confucian ethics. China's appeal on behalf of her re­
volutionary model and her ideological puritanism, as well as her superiority 
among the underdeveloped areas and peoples, all combine to remind us of 
the traditional Chinese Wang Tao theory in substance, though expressed 
(if not exclusively) in the modern words of Marxism-Leninism.
2) International United Front
On the basis of dialectical materialism, the Chinese have concretely 
analysed the major contradictions in the world and the essential obstacles
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which impeded her policy objectives. They concluded that since World War 
II the principal contradiction of all fundamental contradictions today has 
been that between the oppressed nations and capitalist imperialism headed 
by the United States. A quotation from Red Flag (a policy journal of the 
Chinese Communist Party) is appropriate:
Taking the world situation as a whole, the contradiction between 
the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and imperi­
alism headed by the United States is the most prominent and most acute 
of all the fundamental contradictions and is the principal contradiction 
in the contemporary world.
Accordingly, in order to defeat U.S. imperialism and its associates so as 
to promote Chinese nationalism and world revolution, China has called for 
the braodest possible international united front to oppose imperialism and 
colonialism. The vast areas of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America are regarded as the major potential members of this united 
front, since those nations share common ground and conditions with China.
In Chinese eyes, the major forces for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism 
depend upon these areas, which constitute the storm-centers of world revo­
lution.
Applying his theory of contradictions and revolutionary experiences 
to the international scene, Mao Tse-tung called in 1964 for the broadest 
united front to defeat the U.S. imperialism:
The people of the countries in the socialist camp should unite, 
the people of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should 
unite, the people of all the continents should unite, all peace-loving 
countries should unite, and all countries subjected to U.S. aggression, 
control, intervention or bullying should unite, and so form the broa­
dest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression 
and war and to defend world peace.
Mao received numerous delegations and visitors from different parts of the
world in May and June 1960, especially from the countries of Asia, Africa
and Latin America. In these receptions and talks, he stressed the need for
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the broadest united front, even including the people of the United States, 
to struggle against U.S. i m p e r i a l i s m . T h e  Chinese have carefully diffe­
rentiated between the imperialist policies of goernments and the friendly 
mass peoples of the world who all share common ground and interests.
The humanitarianism ingredient of proletarian internationalism is 
a familiar theme of the Chinese classics, which stressed it as the basic 
criterion of political value judgement. Mencius pointed out that man was 
born with human compassion, from which the theory of justice was developed 
to condemn aggressive war and imperialism. Although arguing that man was 
born evil, Hsun Tzu agreed with the theory of justice against imperialism. 
With deep sympathetic compassion. Mo Ti and his followers not only postu­
lated the justice theory but also enthusiastically provided concrete and 
tangible resue and assistance to the weak and small states in accordance 
with their doctrines of universal love and nonaggression. All these idealist 
principles of Chinese classics have continued to play a part in the for­
mulation of the theory of the justice and humanitarianism. The Chinese 
Communists today, influenced by the same principles, express their sympathy 
for the sufferings of the oppressed peoples and countries of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America at the hands of the imperialists. (Unlike the classical 
idealists, of course, they believe man's nature to be neutral, according 
to Marxism-Leninism). Owing to her past miserable condition, which was 
similar to that of the developing nations today, China's sympathetic appeal 
and support is more convincing to the peoples and nations of the Third 
World than that of the other Western powers. In his talks with the delegat­
ions from twelve African nations in May, 1960, Mao Tse-tung, on behalf of 
the 650 million Chinese people, expressed full sympathy and support to the 
African people against imperialism and colonialism. In September, 1970,
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the Chinese Government made a statement commenting on the Third Conference 
of Non-Alligned Countries attended by more than fifty nations, in these 
words :
Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The Chinese people 
regard victory in the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America as their own victory and give warm sympathy 
and support to all their anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist strug­
gles". ̂ 00
Moreover, with a similar attitude of sympathy and, of course, a realistic 
and conceivable strategy. Premier Chou En-Iai explained the logic of an 
international united front for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
against imperialism and colonialism. He urged:
We, peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, have had the common 
experience of suffering from imperialist and colonialist aggression 
and oppression, and have the common militant task of combating imperi­
alism and old and new colonialism. World peace and human progress will 
certainly be won if the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, if 
the people of all continents, become united in a resolute and unre­
mitting struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and 
war.
In general, the Chinese policy of the international united front has well 
reflected the connection of traditional Chinese humanitarian idealism and 
the current practical strategic concept of "people’s war".
The strategy of the united front has been a powerful weapon to 
manipulate the contradictions in international relations. According to his 
theoretical analysis of Chinese society and revolutionary experiences, Mao 
Tse-tung set up a general principle of the united front as a mass mobili­
zation against the enemy: that is, uniting the left revolutionary progressive
classes, neutralizing the middle-of-the readers, and attacking the extreme
302right reactionaries. In applying this strategy to the current world
situation, China is serving as the revolutionary vanguard while the under­
developed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are playing the leading
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and decisive role as the proletarian class in the world revolution. Some 
developed capitalist countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the 
states of West Europe could be regarded as the intermediate zone, corres­
ponding to the class of petty bourgeoisie or anti-revolutionary lackeys.
The capitalist U.S. imperialism and the Soviet revisionist social-imperi- 
alism, since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's, are considered as the 
reactionaries and targets for world revolution. For China, the broadest in­
ternational united front is to be achieved by uniting closely with the 
proletarian Third World nations, and associating with or neutralizing the 
intermediate zone nations according to their specific conditions, for a 
strong mass union to struggle against the leading imperialists, U.S. im­
perialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism. In his analysis of 
the East-West bipolar world contradictions, Mao Tse-tung pointed out in 1957:
It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached 
a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East 
Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East 
Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the 
East Wind", I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that 
the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the 
forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces
of imperialism.303
Mao's appeal and his confidence in the East Wind thesis are closely asso­
ciated with the strategy of a world united front to deter the challenge 
of the hegemony of two superpowers. Furthermore, as to the East Wind thesis 
a statement from PIA sources noted in 1966 that the prevailing wind from 
the East came predominantly from China and its proletarian allies, the 
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The East Wind is the anti-imperialistic revolutionary force of the 
proletariat and the oppressed people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: 
whereas the West Wind represents decayed imperialism and all other 
reactionary forces. ^
Incidently, it is interesting that this thesis not only represents the will
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of the proletarian international united front but also contains the general 
charateristics of the traditional Chinese concept of world order, the concept 
of the Middle Kingdom.
3) The Nature of Economic Aid and Foreign Trade
In modern international relations, the foreign aid program has been 
one of the major features of a nation's foreign policy, especially being 
used by the major great powers. Combining the traditional Chinese spirit of 
universal love and mutual benefit and the modern Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
of proletarian internationalism, the Chinese give a bitter criticism of the 
imperialist nature of the current foreign aid programs offered by the two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. They argue that a fore­
ign aid program should reflect the spirit of humanitarian internationalism 
and must be mutually beneficial and unconditional. The two superpowers, 
however, have been utilizing their foreign aid programs as a means for 
promoting their national self-interests, playing power politics at the 
expense of the small and weak nations. An official Chinese statement in 
1973 points out;
We hold that countries giving truly internationalist aid must strictly 
respect the sovereignty and equality of the recipicent countries, attach 
no conditions and ask for no privileges. If one thinks that by giving 
another something he is entitled to dictate everything to the recipient, 
or artitrarily tears up agreements, withdraws experts and sabotages the 
recipient's industrial effort when the latter refuses to be ordered 
about, this is out-and-out hegemonism and neo-colonialism.^®^
In this regard, Chinese spokesmen pinpoint the American control of a great
number of weaker countries and American attempt in the past to influence
and exploit them with foreign aid programs. This use of .American aid was
exemplified by the U.S. threat to cut off foreign aid to many Third World
nations when they opposed U.S. China policy and voted for the resolution to
restore China's legitimate rights in the United Nations in 1971. China also
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particularly condemns the imperialist character of the Soviet economic 
assistance to China during the 1950's, the true purpose of which was revealed 
when the Russians withdrew their experts and aid due to China's refusal of 
unreasonable Soviet demands. In criticizing the insincerity of the past 
Soviet economic aid to China, the Chinese argue that their view on the real 
spirit of foreign aid is in accordance with true proletarian internationalism:
While adhering to the policy of self-reliance in our socialist 
construction, we have highly valued and welcomed international assi­
stance. But life has taught us the lesson that it is important to dis­
cern the real nature of foreign aid before accepting it. The foreign 
"aid" provided by imperialism and old and new colonialism is nothing 
but an instrument of aggression. We Chinese people do not want such 
"aid". We welcome and accept aid given on the basis of proletarian 
internationalism, aid coming from socialist countries which uphold 
Marxism-Leninism as well as aid provided by the revolutionary people 
all over the world.
As to international trade, in Chinese eye, it should also be on
the basis of the general principles of mutual benefit, mutual respect and
equality rather than one-sided exploitation. A writer in the Peking Review
points out that in the past "imperialist exploitation by means of investment
is accompanied by exploitation in the form of unequal terms of trade with
307the 'underdeveloped' countries which are exporters of primary products".
Thus, the advanced capitalist countries, backed by gunboat diplomacy, laun­
ched the large-scale export of commodities to the underdeveloped countries 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America and destroyed their handicrafts and 
national industries. The economies of the underdeveloped countries thus 
become more lopsided through the unequal terms of trade enforced by military 
imperialism. In the Chinese view, the purpose of international trade is 
for exchange of different needs (hu-t'ung-yu-wu) for mutual benefit rather 
than one-sided imperialist exploitation. .
It is interesting to note that one major feature of the traditional
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Chinese concept of Wang Tao is the practice of the Confucian virtues, jen 
(benevolence), ^  (righteousness) and hsin (trustworthness or sincerity) 
in all kind of human relations. These are quite unlike the modern capitalist 
concept of profit-seeking and exploitation. Mencius strongly denounced the 
motive of profit-seeking, which was regarded as the typical characteristic 
of the small man (hsiao jen). Hsun Tzu approved and encouraged international 
trade relations on this ethical basis. To practise the virtues of and 
hsin in international relations in order to uphold justice and goodwill, 
has been considered essential throughout the Chinese tradition. With their 
idealist doctrines of universal love and non-aggression, the classical 
Mohists urged the performance of mutual assistance with equality for mutual 
benefit among nations and peoples all over the world. In the same spirit, 
the Chinese concept of suzerainty and the tribute system did not involve 
the purpose of profit-seeking from the peripheral areas or subordinate 
states but, rather the goal of a relationship based on brother and cultural 
harmony.
Perhaps because of this traditional ethical heritage and their 
experiences of suffering from modern imperialism and colonialism, the Com­
munist Chinese policies of foreign aid towards the underdeveloped nations 
since the 1950's are truly contrary to those of other major powers. In an 
interview with reporters of the Ghana News Agency in January, 1964, Premier 
Chou En-lai outlined the general principles of Chinese foreign aid policy:
The aid China offers to all friendly new emerging countries is 
based on socialist principles and the principle of respecting the 
sovereignty of the countries concerned. It never takes the form of 
the export of capital, direct investment and profit-seeking. It 
consists of providing economic and technical assistance to the gov­
ernments of these countries and helping these countries develop their 
own independent national economies.
He further pointed out "the eight principles" of foreign aid which the
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Chinese Government has strictly observed and performed since they were
309outlined during his first visits to the African countries in 1953-54.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that once quoting directly from
Confucius words, Premier Chou En-lai expressed Chinese good-will and the
nature of mutual assistance in the Bandung Conference in 1955: "As a Chinese
proverb says: 'Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire'. We
are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the
310internal affairs of others?" Speaking in a similar tone on the Chinese 
attitude towards the foreign aid program, Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the 
Chinese Delegation, spoke at the 27th U.N. General Assembly Session as 
follows :
The purpose of providing aid to other countries should be to help 
the recipient countries stand on their own feet and develop an indepen­
dent national economy. They must not reduce the recipient countries to 
dependence and subordination in the name of "economic aid" and "inter­
national division of labour", let alone placing them under their con­
trol on the pretext of "aid". China, too, received some foreign aid in 
the past and had direct experiences in this regard. Therefore, today 
when we provide aid to other countries, we endeavour to act on the 
above-mentioned principles. Of course, our capabilities in this respect 
are limited and the aid we can give is not much. But we hold that the 
above-mentioned principles should be propagated and applied universal­
ly. ^
The nations which China particularly accuses are the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In contrast to these two superpowers' foreign aid programs, 
the Chinese specifically set forth the terms which should apply to foreign 
assistance:
We hold that all countries which are sincere in providing aid to 
others, including multilateral aid through the United Nations, should 
help the recipient countries and not exploit them. Their loans should 
be interest-free or, at least, low in interest. They must not press 
for repayment but should allow its postponement. When providing a loan 
or other forms of aid, they should strictly respect the sovereignty 
of the recipient countries, attach no conditions and ask for no privi­
leges.
These are the terms on which China has actually conducted her pro-
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grams of international aid and her trade relations with the Third World
nations. The statistics give a positive impression of her sincerity and
goodwill. For instance, "by the end of 1965 China already had made total
of $2 billion in economic grants to some twenty-five underdeveloped countries,
out of which 74.5 percent were interest-free loans, 16.6 percent donations,
313and only 8.9 percent had a 2.0 - 2.5 percent interest charge".
In addition, several individual aid projects were particularly 
impressive and worthy of mention. One case was that of trade relations 
between China and Ceylon, a non-Communist country. After a Sino-Ceylonese 
trade agreement was concluded in 1952, China has continuously guaranteed 
a stable market for Ceylon's rubber with no sign of exerting direct politi­
cal influence or control although the Chinese are fully capable of doing so. 
Another striking case was China's decision to undertake the costly ($340 to
400 million) and difficult project of the 1,060-mile Tanzania-Zambia Rail- 
314way construction. This was especially impressive since the World Bank, 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other advanced powers had rejected 
this difficult and financially unfavorable project, while China accepted 
this self-sacrificing task on the basis of the spirit of proletarian inter­
nationalism. Combined with her traditional ethics, (righteousness),
China felt the obligation to undertake this difficult construction due to 
Tanzania's and Zambia's urgent needs. Thus, Professor George T. Yu commented:
"It can be seen as a role response to specific Tanzanian expectations which
315China felt obligated to perform, even at great self-sacrifice." Perhaps, 
in addition to her traditional idealist ethical motivation to accept this 
task, China also intended to show the Third World nations and peoples the 
essential differences between the real socialist country of Marxism- 
Leninism on the one hand and capitalist imperialism and the pretended
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revisionist social-imperialism on the other. Indeed, the Minister of Finance 
of Tanzania, Amir H. Jamal, commented on the Chinese assistance in con­
struction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway in July, 1970, in these favorable 
words :
Your massive assistance to the cause of developing countries, 
while engaged in a much needed reconstruction at home, is a clear 
demonstration of the commitment of the Chinese people to international 
solidarity in the struggle for the construction of a just and peaceful 
world order in which img|gialism, fascism and colonialism will have 
been banished for ever.
Obviously, from the capitalist profit-seeking standpoint, this peculiar 
Chinese behavior seems to be in conceivable. But the Chinese mean to con­
vince the peoples of the world that the pure model of ideal socialism and 
the correct ideology can only come from the center of the world, the Middle 
Kingdom.
However, besides the point of international aid for national deve­
lopment and modernization, the Chinese insist that the essential approach 
for a nation's economic growth is based on the principle of self-reliance 
and its own efforts. According to their own past experiences, the Chinese 
stress the vital importance of the role of self-reliance for national inde­
pendence and nation-building. Tseng Yun says on this subject:
Our experience in construction over the last 15 years shows that 
there can be no real political independence in the absence of economic 
independence. It is the implementation of the policy of self-reliance 
that has enabled us to withstand the pressures of imperialism, old 
and new colonialism and modern revisionism and preserve our national 
independence and sovereignty.
Incidently, the policies of self-reliance and national self-struggle, in 
retrospect, had already been suggested by the Chinese classical thinkers, 
such as Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti and the Mohist followers, Han Fei Tzu, and 
most of the Legalist thinkers. Their teachings have continuously contribut­
ed to the Chinese experiences of cultural development and modernization
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throughout history, especially in modern times. The Chinese Communists 
further emphasize that the principle of self-reliance would not exclude 
international assistance and economic cooperation on the basis of equality 
and mutual benefit. But they urge, as Kuo Wen puts it, that:
This is the road of pushing ahead the national-democratic revolution
uninterruptedly, the road of self-reliance. It is the only one which 
will enable the "underdeveloped" countries to become strong and pros­
perous.
The tone and conclusion of Chinese advice implies that only genuine revolu­
tionary experiences can lead to national independence and social prosperity 
for the Third World nations. The Chinese seem to believe that this model is 
the only correct one, not the model of U.S. imperialist capitalism, nor that 
of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism.
To conclude this discussion of the Chinese attitude on the foreign
aid program towards the Third World nations, it is appropriate to refer to
what Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said on the Chinese role in world progress 
and human relations. He said:
China ought to make a greater contribution to humanity. What we 
have done is far from adequate. We are determined to give stronger 
support to the just struggles of the Afro-Asian peoples and the people 
of the world against U.S. imperialism and all its lackeys, and stronger 
assistance to friendly countries in their cause of national construc­
tion.^19
It is this tone which reflects the essence of the traditional Chinese concept 
of world order, with China the center of the world, in current world politics.
-246- 
Map 4
CHINA: The World Order (Current Model)
CHINA 




I I II innef Asian Zone
m O uler AsKjn Zone




Source: Same as Map 3
- 2 4 7 -
Notes of Chapter Three
THE INFLUENCE OF CIASSICAL CONCEPTS 
ON CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN POLICY
1
Chang Tai-nien, A Brief Histoiry of Chinese Concept of Materialism 
(Peking: China Youth Press, 1956), pp.24-31; also see. Lu Cheng-yu, A History 
of Chinese Political Thought, pp.23-25, pp.55-59, pp.165-175.
2
Ibid., pp.41-43; Lu, pp.107-111; pp.123-129.
3
V. 1, Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in Collected Works 
(Moscow, 1960-1963), XIV, p.326. (It was quoted from George H. Hampsch,








Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1966), p.55.
8
Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.133.
9
Mu Fu-sheng, The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers (N.Y.: Praeger 
Publishers, 1962), p.117.
10
Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.102.
11
Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 1, p.302.
12
Li Jui, The Revolutionary Activities in the Initial Period of Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung (Peking: China Youth Press, 1957), pp.40-44. For English trans­
lation, see Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (N.Y.: 
Praeger Publishers, 1969), Revised and Enlarged Edition, p.26.
13
For details of the Taoist Yin-Yang concept, see Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, the School of Taoism.
— 2 4 8 —
^^Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.30.
^^Ibid., p.103.
^^Mao Tse-tung, "On Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People", Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung*s Works (Peking: People's Press, 
1965), p.359. For Mao's direct citation of Lao Tzu’s words in English trans­
lation, see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1972), p.190,
^^Ibid., pp.327-363.
^®Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality (N.Y.: Random House,
1968), p.70.
19gee Chapter Two of this dissertation, the Confucian School, the 
section of Mencius.
^^ao Tse-tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1966), pp.186-202. Hereafter, it will be cited as Quotations.
^^Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.103.
^^Mao, Quotations, pp.206-208.
^^Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice" (July 1937) Selected Works, I, p.304.
^^Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction" (August 1937), Selected Works, I, 
pp.311-346.
^^Ibid., pp.343-345.
^^See Chapter Two, sections of Kuei Ku Tzu and Sun Tzu's philosophical 
concept of military strategy.
~^MaO; "On Practice", p.304.
Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I (Three People's Principles), translated 
by Frank W. Price, (Shanghai: China Committee, Institute of Pacific Rela­
tions, 1927), pp.146-48.
29It is a very famous and popular quotation of Chairman Mao.
^ ^ao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the Na­
tional War" (October 1938), Selected Works, II, p.196.
31lbid., p.196.
32Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif. 
University of California Press, 1970), see related chapters.
^^Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p. 106
- 2 4 9 -
34Lucian W. Pye, China; An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1972), see chapter 12 and chapter 18, and p.354,




39Ibid., p.139. I agree with Mr. Hsiung's translation and therefore 
quoted his writings.
60Ibid., p.317, note no.43.
41Tachai; Standard Bearer in China's Agriculture (Peking; Foreign 
Languages Press, 1972). Also, Taching; Red Banner on China's Industrial 
Front (Peking; Foreign Languages Press, 1972).
^^Pye, China, p.211.
43lbid.
44Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.319, note 23.
^^Ibid., p.160.
^^The Chinese Communist leaders such as Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Tseng 
Yun and others, all expressed this point in their speeches and writings 
from time to time.
^^Hsiung, Ideology and Practice, p.164.
^®Ibid., p.165.
49lbid., p.164.
^Ojohn K. Fairbahk, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.; 
Harvard University Press, 1971), Third Edition, p.406.
^^Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist 
Party", Selected Works, II, p.331,
^^Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government", Selected Works, III, p.282.
53Mao Tse-tung, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the Na­
tional War", Selected Works, II, p.196.
^^Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.3.
-250-
^^Hou Wai-lu (éd.). The Ideal of Ta T*ung in Chinese History (Peking: 
Science Press, 1959), p.l. The English translation is by author.
^^Section of the History of Chinese Philosophy, The Research Institute 
of Philosophy, The Chinese Academy of Science (ed.). Materials on Chinese 
Concept of Ta T'ung (Peking: Chung Hua Book Company, 1959), p.l. The English 
translation is by author.
^^For Taoist utopian anarchism, see Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, chapter 80. 
For fundamental concepts of ideal communism, general descriptions can be 
found in various works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and other interpreters and 
commentaries.
58See Chapter Two of this dissertation about Confucianism.
59Hampsch, p.5; see also its cited notes for original source.
^^See Materials on Chinese Concept of Ta T'ung, p.2.
^^See Chapter Two of this dissertation about Confucius for the complete 
text on Ta T'ung society.
fi9 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", Karl Marx Selected 
Works, ed. V. Adoratsky, 2 Vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935-1936), II, p.566.
63For full text, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, 
pp.377-378,
64Hampsch, p.3.
65Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I, p.37.
^^Mo Tzu, Chapter of Universal Love and Chapter of Anti-aggression.
Also see Hou Wai-lu, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, pp.4-7. 
English translation is by author.
^^Hou, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, p.l.
68Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Selected 
Works, IV, p.412. Hereafter cited as "People's Dictatorship".




73Ibid., p.414. For the text of Ta T'ung Shu, see Laurence G. Thompson 
(trans.). Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei (London: 
George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1958).
-251-
^^See the contents of Ta T'ung Shu. 
^^Mao, "People's Dictatorship", p.414.
^̂ Ibid.
^^Hou, The Ideal of Ta T'ung in Chinese History, pp.i-ii.
7 0 Ibid., p.54. English translation is by author.
79Mao, "On New Democracy", p.344.
®°Ibid., p.340.
®^Ibid., pp.343-344.
82Confucian Analects, Book VI, Chapter 28.
0 0 See Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I, the first principle "Nationalism".
®^ao, "People's Dictatorship", pp.414-415.
G^ibid., p.415.
Mao, "Role of CCP in the National War", p.196.
87Joseph Alsop, "Mao's Revolution Follows Pattern", Daily Oklahoman 
(Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), January 16, 1973.
88Mao, "On New Democracy", p.340.
^^"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at 27th U.
N. General Assembly Session", Peking Review, October 13, 1972, p.8. Here­
after cited as "Chiao's Speech at 27th UN Session".
^^The Great Learning (Ta Hsueh), "The Text of Confucius".
91Frank Russell, Theories of International Relations, pp.20-22. For 
detail, see Chapter Two of this dissertation about Mencius.
92See Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order" 
and Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay" in 
The Chinese World Order edited by John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.20-23, pp.63-89.
QOC, P. Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", The World 
Today, Vol.19 (January 1963), p.10.
94ibid., pp.11-12.
95Mao Tse-tung, "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", 
Selected Works, III, p.272.
-252-
^^Irresistibel Historical Trend (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971),
p. 8.
^^Mao Tse-tung's speech (September 21, 1949) to the People's Political 
Consultative Conference. For English translation, see K, Fan, Mao Tse-tung 
and Lin Piao, p.91.
^^Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.214.
^^Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", p.10.
l°°Ibid., p.11,
^^^Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp.209-216; also see 0.
Edmund Clubb, China and Russia (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.389.
102Chou En-lai, "Refuting Truman's Statement" (June, 1950), Oppose 
U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two-China's" Plot (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1958), pp.5-7.
^^^"Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's 
Republic of China, at the Plenary Meeting of the 26th Session of the U.N.
General Assembly", Irresistible Historical Trend (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1971), p.10.
l^^Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p.214.
^^^Chou En-lai, Report to Central People's Government Council, August 
11, 1954 (in supplement to People's China, September 1, 1954, p.4).
^^^Jerome A. Cohen and others, Taiwan and American Policy (N.Y.: Praeger 
Publishers, 1971), p.14.
^^^William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan 
(Boulder, Colorado: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971), p.6.
lOSibid., p.7.
^^^Chou En-lai, "Speech on the Liberation Taiwan" (June, 1956), deliver­
ed at the Third Session of the First National People's Congress on June 28,
1956; see Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 
1958), pp.40-51.
^^^Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", pp.13-14.
^^Ibid. , p. 11.
112The Great Learning, "Text of Confucius".
112The Sino-American Joint Communique on February 27, 1972 in Shanghai. 
English text appeared in The New York Times, February 28, 1972. Also see, 
Sino-U.S. Joint Communique (Peking; Foreign Languages Press, February 28, 1972),
-253-
Sino-American Joint Communique on February 22, 1973 in Peking 
and Washington, The English text appeared in The New York Times. February 
23. 1973.
^^^Fitzgerald, "The Chinese View of Foreign Relations", p.15.
^^^Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People" (February 27, 1957). For English text see K. Fan, Mao Tse-tung and 
Lin Piao, p.190.
^^^Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: F.A. Praeger,
1965), p.44.
l^^Ibid., p.72.
^^^President L.B, Johnson's speech of October 18, 1964, text in The 
New York Times, October 19, 1964, p.14.
120 Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government— A Comment 
on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3", Peking Review. August 
15, 1963, p.14.
121 "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leader­
ship of the CPSU and Ourselves", Peking Review, September 13, 1963, p.12. 
Hereafter cited as "The Origin of Differences".
l̂ îbid.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In order to realize their immediate and long-range goals of foreign 
policy, the Chinese have formulated a set of practical strategies and 
approaches which reflects the synthesis of Chinese traditional concepts 
and modern revolutionary experiences for its implementation. These approaches 
and strategies contain certain peculiar features of Chineseness, so that 
they differ from those of other major powers in the world. These features 
have been attributed both to China's modern revolutionary experiences and 
also to a group of teachings and principly of traditional Chinese philoso­
phy. Examination of the extent of these influences on the implementation 
of current Chinese foreign policy is the task of this chapter.
I, IDEOLOGY AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY
A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background
It has well been pointed out that mind commands the body and thus,
ideology will decide one's attitude and action. This is also true of a
nation and its foreign policy. The importance of thought or Szu-hsiang to
a person and a nation has been traditionally emphasized throughout Chinese
history. In ancient times Confucianism taught: "The cultivation of the
person depends on rectifying the mind".̂  Thus the correct mind will direct
an individual's action correctly, and then correctness is extended to the
2family, the nation, and the whole world (t'ien-hsia, all-under-heaven).
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With this goal, the Hundred Schools of thought contended during the Spring 
and Autumn and the Warring States periods each attempting to present the 
correct thought and ideology to cure human problems. The interpretation of 
the Truth, the Tao, and the details of doctrine varied according to their 
different viewpoints and with different historical physical conditions.
Thus the thoughts and ideologies of the different schools rose and fell 
irregularly in popularity throughout these historic periods. After the 
great unification of China in 221 B.C. and later in the Han Dynasty, Con­
fucianism became the orthodox ideology in China. Scholars and political 
administrators advocated the extension of Confucianism to the rest of the 
world. Confucianism thus constituted the basic Chinese concept of suzerainty 
and culturalism. Throughout the past two thousand years, the implementation 
of this concept of suzerainty and culturalism was successful in maintaining 
the realm of Chinese world order in East Asia. Thus, Confucianism set the 
central pattern for the implementation of China's foreign policy in the past. 
In a similar way, ideology also plays an important role in today's China 
in its programs of national development and foreign policy.
B) Marxism-Leninism As the Means of World Revolution
Not satisfied with traditional orthodox Confucianism inherited from 
the feudal past, the Chinese Communists have also adopted and synthesized 
the progressive portions of the various classical schools of thought with 
modern Marxism-Leninism. The product of this ideological interaction is the 
"Thought of Mao Tse-tung" which is the application of Marxism-Leninism in 
the light of the concrete conditions in China. Mao himself has pointed out 
the spirit of synthesis: "The ancient wisdom is for present use; foreign
3knowledge is for Chinese use (ku-wei-chin-yung; yang-wei-chung-yung)."
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Maoism thus contains basic elements cf an idiosyncratic "Chineseness". 
Moreover, on an international level, a potential model for Maoism is designed 
to serve as a universal ideology and for the eventual world revolution. As
Liu Shao-ch'i pointed out early in 1960:
The Chinese Communist Party, which has led the Chinese revolution 
to victory, iu armed with Marxism-Leninism; this is epitomized in the 
famous words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung: "The integration of the univer­
sal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese 
revolution". ... Of course, revolution and construction in China have 
features peculiar to this country. But it is also possible that some 
of these important special features may reappear in some other countries.
In this sense, Chinese experience is to a certain extent of internation­
al significance.4
Parallel to the traditional concept of Chinese world order with China the 
"Middle Kingdom", the Chinese Communists today claim China as the world 
center, where the true ideology exists as an inspiration for world revolu­
tion. On the one hand, the Western powers, led by the United States, are 
condemned for their capitalist imperialism and colonialism. On the other 
hand, upholding the ideological Puritanism of Marxism-Leninism the Chinese 
condemn the Russians as revisionist social-imperialists, perhaps even 
worse than the capitalist imperialists. In the Chinese view, both imperialist 
superpowers are directed by incorrect ideologies, and thus are unable to lead 
the world revolution to universal human harmony.
Moreover, the Communist leaders, upholding the "correct" ideology 
inherited from classical idealism felt an international duty to "Rescue 
the weak, lift up the falien"^in opposing the aggressive great powers.
Thus classical idealism was transformed into the "noble spirit of proleta­
rian internationalism" and has been most appealling to the weak and develop­
ing Third World nations and peoples. Proletarian internationalism could also 
serve as a strategy for a massive and powerful world united front to "unite 
the many, defeat the few", that is, the two superpowers. The Chinese Commu-
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nists confidently present their ideology, the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung",
.IS .1 revolutionary guideline and a set of principles of socialist const­
ruction for the underdeveloped nations— now the stormcenter of world re­
volution, On this ideological confidence as the world center, Professor 
Robert North observes:
The political culture of the leading circles of the People's 
Republic consists of a subtle blend of traditional Chinese and Marxist- 
Leninist-Maoist elements that find expression in foreign policy. Among 
the more powerful traditional Chinese elements are the predispositions 
to view Chinese society as unique in the world and China itself as 
occupying a central position among all nations.^
Apparently, under the influence of tradition, the Chinese are convinced 
that correct ideology is the only vehicle to universal truth. All the 
ideological "pests" will eventually perish. The Chinese Thought of Mao Tse- 
tung, a synthesis of Marxist-Leninist principles and of lessons drawn from 
the concrete Chinese revolutionary experiences, is considered an dieology 
applicable to the similar conditions of the underdeveloped areas, and which 
will serve as the revolutionary spark to light the political consciousness 
of the Third World nations and peoples in their struggle for their rights 
and for justice. Only the correct ideology can serve as the necessary "sharp 
weapon" to eliminate the phenomena of human oppression and exploitation 
and help the peoples of the world to reach toward the realm of world com­
munism and universal harmony.
II, "NATION-BUILDING" AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY
A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background
Throughout history, "power" has played an essential role in deter­
mining a nation's position and its influence in interstate relations. 
Realizing this, leaders of most of the nations in the world, particularly 
of the major powers, have always sought means to escalate their national
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power. To China, this vital truth from her traditional teachings is enhanced 
by her modern experiences of national humiliation.
In the violent period of Warring States in ancient China, the realist 
thinkers of the Legalist School urged that a state's national power be 
maximized through a program of overall political, economic and social controls. 
For instance, Kuan Chung and Shang Yang, two great Legalist administrators, 
made their states. Chin and Ch'in, into great powers by channeling all 
economic, social, and political resources to the advancement of agriculture 
and the military. Their brilliant performances and the effective policy of 
"agriculture and war (nung-chan)" led to a number of changes in other states 
and had a lasting influence throughout Chinese history.^ Han Fei Tzu, a 
great Legalist thinker, observing the reality of power politics in his time, 
urged the need of realistic means and effective methods to promote a state's 
national power. He argued that national power was mainly generated by inter­
nal nation-building through political, economic, social and ideological 
discipline rather than the wisdom of a nation's foreign policy alone. This 
is so because "the weak state has no diplomacy", juo-kuo-wu-wai-chiao in 
Chinese terms. Like Kuan Chung and Shang Yang, he approved and encouraged 
the policy of complete state support for farmers and soldiers, "agriculture 
and war," which in modern terms correspond to are economic development and 
military preparedness, for military security and economic self-sufficiency.
In fact, Shang Yang had set the national foundation for a great Ch'in state. 
And it was Han Fei Tzu who contributed to the realization of unified Chinese 
empire in 221 B.C.
From the Han Dynasty down to the Ch'ing Dynasty, there were periodic 
important political, economic and social reforms proposed by various bril­
liant administrators inheriting the Legalist tradition, such as the reforms
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by Wang Mang in the Han Dynasty, by Wang An-shih in the Sung Dynasty, by 
Chang Chu-cheng in the Ming Dynasty, and others. Throughout these historical 
experiences, the Chinese have been convinced that internal disorder would 
lead to external calamity and aggression, nei-yu-wai-huan. This principle 
has been particularly true in the modern history of China, facing Western 
imperialist challenges from the Opium War to the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949. During this period a number of ambitious admi­
nistrators and intellectuals devoted their efforts to movements for national 
reform and national development, but in vain. Mao Tse-tung particularly 
pointed out this fact in his work, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", 
and concluded that, "They found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable 
truth, and the face of China began to c h a n g e . i n  this belief, accordingly, 
the Chinese today have not hesitated to give first priority to national 
socialist construction along with the struggles against imperialism. Thus, 
as observed by Philippe Devillers, Chinese foreign policy under current 
circumstances is governed by two factors: Chinese nationalism and Chinese 
socialism.
Chinese nationalism means to restore China's lawful and historic 
rights over all that foreign imperialism wrested from her throughout 
a century, and also to restore China's power so that she cannot again 
be humiliated.
Chinese socialism means definitely breaking the power of the "re­
actionary" propertied classes (landlords, big bourgeoisie, militarists, 
etc. )
B) Struggle for National Power: Socialist Nation-Building and
Modernization
The road of Chinese socialist nation-building since 1949 has not 
been easy and straight but fluctuating in general. As an overall effort for 
modernization, the economic development was launched along with the politi­
cal and social reforms and campaigns which were devoted for eliminating the
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out-of-date traditional feudalist and bureaucratic evils. During the first 
period of national rehabilitation (1949-1952) the Chinese began their basic 
economic devlopment and agrarian reforms for land redistribution in rural 
areas along with two campaigns in urban areas: the "Threa-anti movement 
(san-fan)" and the "Five-anti movement (wu-fan)'against bureaucratic and 
business "evils". These were accompanied by appeals to nationalism in order 
to resist U.S. imperialism in the Korean War (the "Resist America, Aid Korea 
Campaign"). The political system was organized on the principle of democratic 
centralism; education and political socialization were directed toward 
socialist construction.
The second stage of national development, the "Period of Transition 
to Socialism", involved the collectivization of agriculture, the introduction 
of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and the policy of socialized indus­
trialization. In industry, it was characterized by introducing a new heavy 
industrial system with the aid of Soviet advice, capital equipment, and 
credits under the Russian model and influence. This plan was generally re­
garded as basically successful in the industrial sector even with the Soviet 
vacillation and internal disagreement within the Chinese leadership. This 
stage of national construction was featured by economic steady growth inter­
nally, along with the soft line of the "Bandung Spirit" in foreign policy. 
Domestic social reforms continued in the democratic atmosphere of "Let one 
hundred flowers bloom; let one hundred schools of thought contend" as pro­
claimed by Chairman Mao,
The third stage of national construction was marked by the drastic 
campaign of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Three Flags" slogan. Together 
with the economic policy of the "Great Leap Forward" in agriculture and 
industry, the people's commune system was introduced and the spirit of
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willpower was emphasized under the slogan of "aiming high and achieving 
greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism" 
(duo-kuai-hao-shen-ti-chien-she-she-hui-chu-i-tsu-kuo) in an effort to 
"catch up with Great Britain". Due to certain mismanagement and three years 
of natural disasters (1959-1961) economic growth became economic ungrowth.
At this critical moment of Chinese socialist construction, the Russians 
betrayed Sino-Soviet socialist friendship by withdrawing all their economic 
aid and technical assistance from China. This caused further setbacks in 
the Chinese economy. By this episode the Chinese were taught the lesson of 
"self-reliance" again. The following stage was the "Period of Readjustment", 
a time of striving for economic development without foreign assistance. A 
social movement of "socialist education" was also launched in preparation 
for the next stage of the "Renewed Class Struggle and Socialist Education 
Campaigns", which began in 1962 and lasted throughout the Cultural Revolution. 
The Cultural Revolution was the most massive movement ever since 1949, 
involving a nation-wide effort to correct the overall policy of socialist 
revisionism and to purify the ideology of Marxism-Leninism under the prin-
Qciple of the class struggle, while continuing with socialist construction.
In general, the dialectical process of Chinese economic development 
and nation-building centered on the principle of self-reliance and on psy­
chological-social efforts to strive for Chinese nationalism under the 
doctrines of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung". Regarding the function and 
effectiveness of willpower. Chairman Mao teaches the spirit of "building 
our country through diligence and frugality" and "self-reliance and arduous 
struggle". This is necessary, he points out, because: "We must recognize 
difficulties, analyse them and combat them. There are no straight roads 
in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road which twists and turns
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and not try to get things on the cheap". However, "By uniting with the entire
people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and 
10win victory".
This key role of human willpower has been traditionally emphasized
in China. Confucius once said: "A man can enlarge the principles which he
follows; those principles do not enlarge the m a n " . A g a i n ,  "The commander
of the forces of a large state may be carried off, but the will of even a
12common man cannot be taken from him". Mencius also taught the importance 
of man's will in the struggle for prosperity and survival. He pointed out 
that when a mission is about to confer on a great man, his mind will be 
suffered and his sinews and bones exercise with toil in order to stimulate 
his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetencies. Similarly, 
if a state is not internally equipped with good laws and intelligent advisors 
and is then externally threatened with hostile states and other calamities, 
it will generally come to ruin. Therefore, "From these things we see how
13life springs from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure".
Mencius further taught that the principle of self-reliance will be the most
stable way for a nation's development. This view has been also supported by
other thinkers such as Hsun Tzu, Mo Tzu, Han Fei Tzu and a number of Legalist
followers. In fact, China had been self-reliant and self-sufficient for two
thousand years when internal order broke down under the Western challenges
of the past century. With the imperialist nature of Western capitalist
powers and revisionist social-imperialism of Russia, the Chinese learned
once more the value of self-reliance. Thus, Mao Tse-tung pointed out:
On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own 
strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts. We 
are not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to 
imperialism are our friends.
We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be
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dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power 
of the whole array and the entire people.
For the past two decades of efforts in nation-building and socialist con­
struction, the main theme of the Chinese developmental process has been 
self-reliance and arduous struggle with willpower armed with Marxism-Leninism 
and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. As observed by Tseng Yun, one of the leading 
officials in charge of economic policy, the policy of self-reliance is of 
key importance not only nationally but internationally in the process of 
building socialism.
As a result of our implementation of the policy of self-reliance 
and the smooth development of our national economy, we are now in a 
better position to fulfil our international duty. Our increased capa­
city for building socialism seIf-reliantly has directly strengthened 
the might of the whole socialist camp. Through the successful advance 
of our national construction, we have not only lightened the burden 
on the fraternal socialist countries but gained greater strength to 
assist them.
In general, the Chinese believe that, although China is still a 
developing nation and economically less advanced in comparison with the 
Western advanced countries, they are on the correct way and moving in the 
right direction for nation-building and socialist construction to fulfil 
their goals of nationalism and internationalism.
C) Struggle for National Power; National Defense System and
General Military Strategy
(1) The Nature of Military Preparedness and the Role of the Chinese 
Army
Traditionally, the Chinese concept of the military role is that 
should be under political and civil control. Throughout Chinese history, 
not only the realist thinkers such as Hsun Tzu, Mo Ti, Shang Yang, Han Fei 
Tzu, and Sun Tzu but also the idealist philosophers such as Lao Tzu, Mencius, 
and Chuang Tzu, all upheld this position. Without exception, the modern
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Chinese Communists are also following this view. In addition, it appears that 
efforts were often devoted throughout the dynasties to balance authority 
between civilians and soldiers. This historical cycle was particularly ex­
emplified by military weakness and political collapse in the latter part 
of the Ch'ing Dynasty when China was challenged by the Western powers. 
Accordingly, the Chinese Communists today are very serious about their 
national defense. The military establishment is to serve the domestic poli­
tical goals and the implementation of foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung pointed 
out; "Without a people's army the people have nothing".Therefore, "Our 
national defense will be consolidated and no imperialist will be allowed 
to invade our territory again. Our people's armed forces must be maintained 
and developed with the brave and steeled People's Liberation Army as their
foundation. We will have not only a powerful arny but also a powerful air
18force and a powerful navy". As to the civil-military relationship, he
said: "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must
19never be allowed to command the Party".
Moreover, as to the role of the armed forces, Mao Tse-tung outlined 
the multi-purpose tasks of the Chinese army, the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) as follows:
The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political 
tasks of the revolution. ... The Red Army fights not merely for the 
sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, 
organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary 
political power.2 ^
Beside the major task of national defense, the PLA is expected to perform
its international role for political purpose.
The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after 
country-wide victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the 
historical period in which classes have not been abolished in our coun­
try and the imperialist system still exists in the world.
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However, the general pattern of the PLA's role has been defensive as China's 
military deterrent against a possible attack by foreign nations, particularly 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The performance of its international 
role has been very limited in providing military aid, direct or indirect, 
to carefully selected friendly foreign governments, such as North Korea,
North Vietnam, Pakistan, Tanzania, Albania, and others. The PLA also gives 
certain concrete support to some national liberation movements of the Third 
World nations following the concept of people's war. But it has not engaged 
in any overt military mission to invade foreign states or to promote revo­
lutionary activities. Under the general policy of defense, the PLA has 
conducted certain strategic or tactical offensives, as in the Korean War 
and the Sino-Indian War. The tentative offensives in the case of Taiwan 
and the invasion of Tibet were basically for the purpose of national uni­
fication. On this defensive nature of the Chinese armed forces. Professor 
Harold C. Hinton observed;
To date, the PLA has not engaged in overt military action on or 
against foreign territory primarily for aggressive purposes or for 
the promotion of revolution. Any such action has been taken for reasonc 
of national security and has been, at least in Peking's eyes, essen­
tially defensive in nature. On the basis of this record, it is certainly 
fair to conclude that the CPC leadership does not regard overt military 
action across frontiers for either aggressive or revolutionary purposes 
as one of the PLA's missions.
In addition, the PLA has also participated in various civilian 
works for socialist construction during the past two decades. They have 
been involved in agricultural productions, industrial construction, the 
extraction of strategic minerals, socialist civil education, science and 
technical research, etc. During the period of the Cultural Revolution in 
the late 1960's, the PLA served as a neutral force to keep social order and 
also participated in administrative work in provincial and local organi-
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zations. This multi-functional role of the Chinese army is based on the
principle of a "people's arny", in which the peasants constitute the major
part of the array and thus the army is motivated to serve the common people.
Because of its homogeneity, the people's army is powerful enough to conduct
the people's war for national defense. Mao Tse-tung pointed out the general
characteristics of the people's army;
This army is powerful because all its members have a conscious 
discipline; they have come together and they fight not for the private 
interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests 
of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this 
army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them 
whole-heartedly.
In the Chinese strategic concept of national defense, the PIA is the major 
force for conduct of military activities, but is associated closely with 
the Production and Construction Corps in the inner border areas, and with 
the people's militia. In fighting a people's war, these two latter groups 
would be led by the PLA.
(2) The Modernization of the National Defense System
Due to their disastrous experiences with a weak national defense, 
involving a series of foreign invasions during the past century, the Chinese 
have devoted a great deal of effort to modernizing China's military capa­
bility in order to keep up with the major world powers. These efforts were 
not entirely successful until China exploded her first nuclear device in 
1964, more than a decade after the establishment of the People's Republic, 
and so became one of the leading nuclear powers in the world. Since the 
first Chinese hydrogen bomb was successfully exploded in June 1967, China 
has been ranked as the third among the nations as a nuclear power. As of 
July 1973, China has conducted fifteen nuclear tests in order to improve 
her nuclear capability. The substantial improvement of Chinese nuclear
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weapons was accompanied by China's effort in building a missile system.
The impressive development of her nuclear delivery system resulted by October
1966 in a test of a guided missile with a range about 500 miles and in the
two recent satellite launchings in April 1970 and March 1971. Thus, most
China observors anticipate a Chinese ICBM (inter-continental ballistic
missile) in the near future. It was remarked by some China observors, as
Charles Horner wrote;
Greater insight into the Chinese rocket program is provided by the 
two satellite launchings. The first, in April, 1970, is presumed to 
have used a rocket analogous to an IRBM, though it may have been the 
test of an ICBM prototype. A second satellite launching in March, 1971, 
revived speculation that the testing of an ICBM was imminent.
Furthermore, a current speculation, reported in March, 1973, is that China
was planning to conduct a test of huge ICBM thought to be "20 yar cent larger
25in volume than the Soviet SS-9". In order to improve the efficiency of
the nuclear delivery system, China was also reported to be constructing a
nuclear submarine with a Polaris-type missile system. In general, China
is attempting to keep up with the two superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, in modern nuclear military science and technology so as
to serve her political goals of national defense and international leadership.
In addition, without neglecting the function and capability of the
conventional forces, China maintains relatively strong regular armed forces
for possible conventional warfare. The PLA maintains about 2.5 million men
in ground forces, consisting of 140 divisions, including two airborne and
five armored. These units are well equipped with appropriate weapons, all 
27produced in China. China has been traditionally a continental rather 
than a maritime country. The major task of the Chinese navy is to defend 
the Chinese coast against foreign invasion and thus the naval forces consist 
of light and defensive vessels, such as submarines, destroyers, light
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cruisers, high-speed torpedo boats, and high-speed missile boats. The total 
number of combat vessels is about 1,530, The nuclear submarine armed with 
a Polaris-type missile system is under development and designed for possible 
defensive second-strike retaliation. With other associated naval units,
28including a marine corps, the Chinese naval force amounts to 240,000 men. 
Because of the great cost of a modern navy, and because of her traditional 
and geographic background, China has developed her navy in the direction 
of a defensive strategy, emphasizing high-efficiency light vessels in accor­
dance with the principle of "aiming high and achieving greater, quicker, 
better and more economical results in building socialism". The Chinese air 
force has about 3,500 combat aircrafts including sophisticated jet-fighters 
of the Soviet types MIG-21 and MIG-23, and strategic nuclear bombers produced
in China, The manpower of the Chinese air force is about 600,000 including
29the airborne and anti-aircraft combat units.
In general, the Chinese strategy' of building a strong military force 
is aimed at developing China's military capability to a maximum level of 
efficiency within a minimum time, in order to reach the point of marginal 
physical deterrance against the possible military challenges of the two su­
perpowers. The Chinese have developed their conventional forces to a degree 
of minimum national defense, supplemented by the people's militia and the 
Production and Construction Corps within the system of "people's war". They 
plan to by-pass and avoid the conventional costly heavy weapons such as the 
heavy tank, long-range heavy artilary, heavy bombers, and especially heavy- 
duty naval vessels like the heavy cruiser, the aircraft carrier and the 
battleship. Instead, the nuclear weapons system and modern sophisticated 
military weapons, ships and aircraft are particularly emphasized in order 
to keep up with the modernity of the two superpowers in military capability.
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The struggle for a "great leap forward" in building the Chinese 
military seems to reflect an old Chinese saying: "In order to advance ahead 
of others it is first necessary to hold a position where one cannot be defea­
ted". Or, in Sun Tzu’s words on military strategy: "Therefore the skillful
commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no
30opportunity to master his enemy".
III. THE CONCEPT OF PEOPLE'S WAR 
AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY
Early rays of sun illumine the parade grounds
and these handsome girls heroic in the wind, 
with rifles five feet long.
Daughters of China with a marvelous will,
you prefer hardy uniforms to colorful silk.
Mao Tse-tung, "Militia Women" 
(February; 1961)
The term "people's war" has been popular in modern times, particu­
larly in China and other developing Third World nations since World War II. 
The term has become familiar to Westerners during the past decades because 
of the East-West confrontation. Westerners have had substantial opportunities 
to observe the role and significance of the people's war concept as put into 
practice in recent world politics, and have been able to observe its merits 
in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the revolutionary national libera­
tion movements of the Third World nations and peoples since the 1950's.
The Chinese claim that people's war is the key strategy for revolu­
tionary movements directed against imperialism and colonialism. However, 
what are the essentials of the people's war concept and its real meaning? 
What are the substantive roots and peculiarities of the Chinese concept of 
people's war in terms of "Chineseness" and in light of China's conceptual
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traditions and modern background? Particularly, what are the contributions 
and influences of the traditional Chinese concept of people's war on the 
current practice in light of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's important instruction: 
"The ancient wisdom is for current use and the Western knowledge is for 
Chinese use, (ku-wei-chin-yung, yang-wei-chung-yung)?" Moreover, what are 
the basic characteristics of the Chinese concept of people's war and its 
applications in China's military strategy, and foreign policy? We attempt 
now CO answer these questions.
A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background
Since the 1920's the concept of people's war has been the central
factor in the general strategy of the Chinese Communists' revolutionary
movement. A "people's" war would involve the masses as the major force.
Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "The people, and the people alone, are the motive
32force in the making of world history." He continued: "The revolutionary
war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses
33and relying on them." Thus, in conclusion, he said: "Our strategy and
tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use
34
our strategy and tactics." Because, "The richest source of power to wage
35war lies in the masses of the people."
This notion of the people's role in waging a war or revolutionary 
movement derives from traditional classic teachings. The Chinese Confucian 
School regarded people as the core of the society and suggested the princi­
ple of "rule of man or sage". Mencius pointed out that the way to victory 
in war rested upon the people and their relationship with the ruler. He 
said :
Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages
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of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded 
by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men. 
... He who finds the proper course has many to assist him. He who loses 
the proper course has few to assist him.
Regarding war, he preferred defensive strategy, and argued that proper mili­
tary preparations and material resources and facilities might be necessary 
but were no guarantee of winning. However, Mencius concluded that "the most
important of all is a happy, contented, loyal, united, benevolently governed 
37people." Similarly, the great realist thinker, Hsun Tzu, also advised
that the people were the key factor in a nation’s survival. The people have
the characteristics of the water, he commented, "The ruler is the boat and
the common people are the water. It is the water bears the boat up, and
38the water that capsizes it." Furthermore, to win the general support of
the people it is necessary to practice the politics of Wang Tao, the way of
virtue, so that a people's war could be conducted with a united and harmonious
39will against foreign invasion.
An eminent military scientist in ancient China, Sun Tzu, recognized
the importance of people in waging a war. Among the five fundamental factors
that decide a war’s outcome, he regarded the Tao, or the Right Way (moral
influence), as uppermost. In explaining the Right Way, he said:
By the Tao I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony 
with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto 
death without fear of mortal peril.
This is to say that if the leaders deal with the people according to prin­
ciples of virtue, that is, with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, a 
people’s army would be united in mind and willing to fight a war for the
state. Thus, the Book of Changes says: "In happiness at overcoming diffi-
41culties, people forget the danger of death."
The classical Chinese Taoists such as Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu also
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suggested that to comply with what the people like will produce order, other­
wise there will be disorder; this is a law of nature, and whatever leader 
opposes this will be doomed to perish. To this natural law, Confucianism 
added the idea of the "Mandate of Heaven", an immortal humanitarian doctrine. 
For the past two thousand years, the fall of each ruler and the collapse of 
each dynasty, including the fall of Chiang Kai-shek*s government on the 
Chinese Mainland in 1949, has been regarded as resulting from a loss of 
the Mandate of Heaven because of the improper conduct of rulers against the 
people. During modern times, the leaders of the Taiping Revolution of 1840- 
54 and of the Revolution of 1911 attempted to capture for themselves the 
Mandate of Heaven, but such efforts were unsuccessful until the establish­
ment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949. The genius of the Chinese 
communist movement and its success rested upon the key role of the peasants 
in the revolution. The Chinese Communists recognized that it was the people, 
the mass of the Chinese peasants, who would generate the power to complete 
the revolution as taught by the classical thinkers. Furthermore, according 
to their past revolutionary experiences, they were convinced that only the 
people could defend the socialist system and complete the construction of 
Chinese socialism in the future by waging a people's war.
B) General Features of the People's War Concept 
(1) Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical materialism, the philosophical guideline of the modern 
people's war, is consistent with classical tradition. The Chinese Taoist 
philosophers pointed out the dialectical concept of Tao and Yin-Yang which 
is the law of unity of opposites. All things are constantly changing, revolv­
ing and transcending. This self-movement of Tao is the spirit of nature. To
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illustrate the concept of the dialectic, for instance, Lao Tzu said: "All
things under heaven are born of existence; existence is born of non-existence.^^
... "For is and is-not come together; hard and easy are complementary; long
and short are relative; high and low are comparative; pitch and sound make
43harmony; before and after are a sequence." Similarly, "Good fortune lieth 
within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."^^ This dialectical concept of 
Tao and Yin-Yang was adopted by Sun Tzu in his principles of military strate­
gy. He carefully analyzed the contradictory relationship between the ideas of 
advantage and disadvantage, direct and indirect, siege and release, weak and 
strong, offense and defense, action and inaction, norman and extraordinary, 
etc. According to the dialectic, all these are mutually reproductive and 
interlocked. The direct can be turned into the indirect and offense can be 
turned into defense under certain circumstances. Skill in military strategy 
depends upon an appropriate handling of the transformation of dialectical 
relationships. For instance. Sun Tzu taught:
...march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him 
with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before
him.45
Ground in which the army survives only if it fights with the courage 
of desperation is called "death".
To a surroundg^ enemy you must leave a way of escape. Do not press 
an enemy at bay.
All these strategic and tactical principles have expressed the dialectical
principle in a way that, "Apparent confusion is a product of good order;
48apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength."
Throughout the past two thousand years, all the eminent statesmen, 
military strategists, and generals of China have dedicated themselves to 
Sun Tzu’s principles of military strategy. Mao Tse-tung and his associates 
are not exceptions.
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1) Unite Lhe Many, Defeat the Few
In his works of military strategy, Mao Tse-tung adopted greatly 
from the classic teachings of dialectics and strategic principles. Follow­
ing the dialectical concept, he pointed out that weakness under certain 
circumstances can be turned into strength; defense rests upon offense, and 
offense upon defense. For instance, Mao discusses the relationship between 
general military strategy and individual military tactics as follows;
We use the few to defeat the many— this we say to the rulers of
China as a whole. We use the many to defeat the few— this we say to 
each separate enemy force on the battle-field.
Our strategy is "pit one against ten" and our tactics are "pit ten 
against one"— this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining 
mastery over the enemy.
The key principle rests upon "concentrating a superior force to
51
destroy the enemy forces one by one." Accordingly, retreat and attack 
are dynamic, dialectical, and flexible according to the general strategy 
or individual tactical operation. They are transformable and interreinforced. 
Mao continues:
We can change the converging attack directed by the enemy against
us on the plane of strategy into converging attacks directed by us
against the enemy on the plane of campaigns and battles. We can change 
the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over him 
in campaigns and battles. ... This is what we call exterior-line opera­
tions within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression 
within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the 
offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength 
within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within
passivity.52
2) Paper Tiger Thesis
Mao Tse-tung further elaborated the dialectical concept of military
strategy into his "paper tiger" thesis. Its general principle is that,
"strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should
53
take them all seriously." This thesis is important philosophically and 
psychologically and it was generated in Mao's mind by his experience with
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the Chinese Communist revolutionary struggle. In his words:
Just as there is not a single thing in the world without a dual 
nature (this the law of the unity of opposites), so imperialism and 
all reactionaries have a dual nature— they are real tigers and paper 
tigers at the same time... On the one hand, they were real tigers; 
they devoured people, devoured people by the millions and tens of 
millions... But in the end they changed into paper tigers, dead tigers, 
bean-curd tigers. These are historical facts... Hence, imperialism and 
all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long term point of view, 
from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are: paper 
tigers. On this we should build our strategic thinking. On the other 
hand, they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can 
devour people. On this we should build our tactical thinking.
Mao explained that if the people's army were not to despise the 
enemy strategically, revolutionary confidence would be lost and the error 
of opportunism would result in surrender to the enemy. If, on the other 
hand, the army fails to deal with concrete problems and with particular 
enemies seriously, it will commit the error of adventurism and the revolu­
tion will be d e f e a t e d . L a o  Tzu taught:
To underestimate the enemy's strength may cost a nation its survival. 
In the event of war, those who regard it as a lamentable necessity will 
win."’
Tlie influence of Sun Tzu's strategic teachings are evident in Mao's thought. 
He once quoted Sun's words to illustrate the character of dialectical 
materialism and its effect upon military estimation and preparedness and 
strategy:
There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military 
scientist of ancient China, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and 
you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat", which 
refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, 
both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and 
to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order 
to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying light- ly57
3) Man Versus Weapon
The "paper tiger" thesis shaped the ideas of the Chinese Communists 
regarding nuclear war which has apparently been central to China's foreign
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policy strategy. In his talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise 
Strong in 1946, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that although the nuclear weapon 
was a horrible device it was still a paper tiger in the strategic and phi­
losophical view, because the decisive factor determining the outcome of a 
war is not one or two new weapons or kinds of technology but the people 
themselves. He said:
The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U,S. reactionaries use to 
scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the 
atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is 
decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.
Obviously, the Chinese have not ignored the importance of nuclear weapons
to national defense. But they argue that the decisive factor in waging a
war is the one that controls the weapon, not the weapon itself. In their
eyes, the so-called theory of "weapons decide everything" is obsolete, and
deviates from the general principle of dialectical materialism. In his work
"On the Protracted War" written in May 1938, Mao elaborated this point in
his view of the people’s war. He said:
The so-called theory of "weapons decide everything" ... is a me­
chanistic theory of war, a subjectivist and one-sided view. Our view 
is contrary to this; we see not only weapons but also the power of 
man. Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; 
it is man and not materials that is decisive. The contest of forces 
is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of 
the power and morale of man. Military and economic power must be con­
trolled by man.^^
Some would challenge this view and argue that the Chinese emphasis on the 
man is attributable to their inferior nuclear weapons and their relatively 
low-power armed forces, concluding, therefore, that the Chinese man-power 
theory is only a psychological rationalization to build up revolutionary 
and national confidence. There is some truth to this position, but it is 
necessary to study Chinese conceptual perceptions and the cultural background 
influencing Chinese views and policies in order to comprehend the real
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meaning of their concept of people's war.
Many classical thinkers such as Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Confucius, Mo 
Tzu, and Kuei Ku Tzu emphasized the role of the people in waging war. Sun 
Tzu particularly regarded the man as the decisive element. Adopting teachings 
from his precedent thinkers and contemporaries, he believed that the moral 
strength and intellectual faculty of man would essentially decide the out­
come of a war. Therefore, Sun Tzu's general political-military strategic 
concept was aimed at defeating enemy's manpower and morale, and thus conqu­
ering his army without battle, and taking his cities and his state. Sun 
Tzu's concept of national morale and unity in a people's war was generally 
based on the Confucian teachings of "benevolence and righteousness", the 
concept of Wang Tao, which he particularly stressed in his notion of people's 
war.^^ Recognizing the importance of man's willpower, Mao Tse-tung has 
cited an ancient Chinese fable called "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the 
Mountains" to encourage the people to face the hardness and fight against
61imperialism and feudalism for socialist construction and world revolution.
4) The Art of Deception and Guerrilla Warfare 
According to the concept of dialectical materialism, all matters 
in the universe are dynamic, self-moving and changing in accordance with 
objective conditions and circumstances, that is, with the principle of the 
unity of subjective motivation and objective regularity. Warfare is no 
exception. The conduct of war is physically limited by objective conditions 
and elements, but dialectically, these objective conditions and factors can 
be altered appropriately by human subjective motivation, for they are inter­
related and mutually influenced. A c c o r d i n g  to the idea of subjective 
motivation, it is the man who can set the goal and wage the war. In realizing 
this principle, Kuei Ku Tzu teaches that in the process of unity and dis-
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sociation of all matters there exists a conversional gap or stage which
may be manipulated. He who can understand it and direct it will be truly the
63man of great wisdom, holding the Mandate of Heaven. Thus, man is the
essential key to the manipulation of the conversional stage according to
his direction and purpose. Kuei Ku Tzu further pointed out:
In the universe all phenomena are complicated with infinite change 
according to its own rule. ... Therefore, the exchange use of negative 
and positive ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may 
provide advantages for us.^^
An appropriate manipulation of this conversional stage will alter
the objective conditions and circumstances in a war, for instance, from a
weak position to a strong one, or to manage the few to defeat the many.
This dialectical process of alteration becomes the concept of deception and
the basic strategy of guerrilla warfare. Kuei Ku Tzu particularly emphasized
the use of cheng-ch'i (direct-indirect) principle. He reminded us that the
use of extraordinary or indirect force would be superior to that of normal
or direct force (cheng-bu-ju-ch'i), a principle that is always correct.
However, the dialectical concept of cheng and ch'i, the direct and indirect,
is revolving and reproductive according to conditions and human perceptions.
From this comes the art of deception based on human intelligence. As a
student of Kuei Ku Tzu, Sun Tzu was skilled in teaching the art of deception
in his military stratagem. He claimed;
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign 
incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that 
you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy 
a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. ...^^
Thus, the competent generals and political-military strategists must be
skilled in this art of deception and must manipulate the situation to seize
advantages in waging a war. As a matter of fact, this philosophical principle
of deception originated in Lao Tzu’s philosophy of Tao. He said;
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What is to be shrunken is first stretched out ; what is to be weakened 
is first made strong; what will be thfown over is first raised up; what 
will be withdrawn is first bestowed.
The best warriors are not warlike, llie best strategists are not 
impulsive. The best winners are not quarrelsome. The best leaders are 
not arrogant.
Taught the classical thoughts of military strategic principles and 
recognizing their importance in the revolutionary war, Mao Tse-tung and his 
associates did not hesitate to adopt them. The Chinese Communists hav« em­
ployed the principle of deception in particular in order to balance their 
inferior physical forces and equipment in their struggles against Chisng 
Kai-shek's superior troops and the Japanese aggression before 1949. In a 
tone similar to that of Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that war demands 
deception. He said:
It is often possible by adopting all kinds of measures of deception 
to drive the enemy into the plight of making erroneous judgements and 
taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and 
initiative.'^®
Furthermore, the general principle of guerrilla warfare depends upon deception 
and mobilization. For instance, Mao Tse-tung quoted Sun Tzu's teachings on 
deception in formulating his Chinese revolutionary war:
When Sun Wu Tzu said, "Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour, 
strike when he is fatigued and withdraws", he was referring to tiring 
and demoralizing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority. ...
In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own 
actions, for instance, by "counterfeiting an appearance", as Sun Wu 
Tzu called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attacking 
to the west (shen-tung-chi-hsi).
In discussing the strategy of guerrilla warfare, Mao pointed out 
that its importance is second only to mobile warfare in the conditions that 
existed in China during the revolution and the defense agianst foreign 
invasion. Mobile warfare was important because it was a step to a higher 
level. Of course, guerrilla warfare must closely coordinate with the masses.
On the basis of the concept of deception supplemented by their practical
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revolütionary experiences, the Chinese Red Army developed their general
tactics of guerrilla warfare according to Mao Tse-tung's sixteen-character
jingle which is similar to several of Sun Tzu's verses. These sixteen Chinese
characters constitute four slogans:
When the enemy advances, we retreat!
When the enemy halts, we harass!
When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack!
When the enemy retreats, we pursue!
The basic characteristics of guerrilla warfare, too, are dialectical, both
because of its deception, and because of its battlefield. As General Vo Nguyen
Giap pointed out, "There was no clearly defined front in this war. It was
72there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere,"
These concepts indicate the close connection between the classical
theory of a military strategy based on deception and the current Chinese
strategic application in their revolutionary wars. Professor Samuel B.
Griffith has commented:
Mao Tse-tung has been strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's thought.
This is apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and 
tactics and is particularly evident in "On Guerrilla Warfare", "On 
the Protracted War", and "Strategic Problem? of China's Revolutionary 
War", it may also be traced in other essays less familiar to Western 
readers.
In addition, Edgar Snow has pointed out in his Red Star Over China that the
Chinese classical stories and historical novels such as Shui Hu Chuan
All Men are Brothers) and San Kuo Yen Yi Romance of the
Three Kingdoms) have greatly influenced Mao Tse-tung's thought on military 
74strategy,
(2) Protracted War and Encirclement from the Countryside to the City 
The people's war is a total war of the masses, and also is a pro­
tracted war. Tt requires a total national mobilization politically, economi­
cally, socially and militarily. The Chinese concept of people's war is de-
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fens ive in nature. Because of its peculiar conditions and background such 
as the population, geography, social and economic characters, national morale, 
etc,, China can fight a protracted war against a foreign invasion. Although 
her national power was relatively weak in resisting Japanese aggression in 
Wrold War II, China could dialectically have converted her weak position 
into a strong one by appropriate strategic manipulation, Mao Tse-tung ana­
lyzed this situation and outlined concrete steps, "One of the special fea­
tures of this war is the interlocking 'jig-saw' pattern which arises from 
such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and her shortages of 
troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensive-
■7Cness of her territory on the other", he said,'"' The concept of protracted 
war did demonstrate merit in Chinese resistance against the Japanese inva­
sion during World War II,
Accorging to their theoretical analysis of defensive strategy and 
their past practical experiences, Mao Tse-tung and his associates have 
developed a system of strategy for people's war. It can be generally summed 
up as follows,
1) A Sound Mass Base and the Encirclement from the Countryside 
to the City
This requires a combination of political strategy and military 
strategy in order to gain mass support in the rural areas which contain 
the peasants who are the majority in China, Thus it can unite the many, the 
rural majority, to encircle the city and defeat the isolated few. In the 
"Ten Commandments" of the Red Army, Mao Tse-tung taught: "Take Su.all and 
medium cities and extensive rural areas first, take big cities later,
This strategy of encirclement, some China observers suggest, is similar to 
the general strategy of the traditional popular Chinese chess game theory
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of wei-ch*i. Furthermore, the strategy of wei-ch*i game theory has been 
considered to apply extensively to the global scene as China's foreign policy 
which includes a dialectical process for protracted struggle.
Today, in order to defend the broad Chinese territory and to consoli­
date the rural areas, especially the border areas, China is conducting a 
system of "Everybody is a Soldier" by civil organization and training the 
people's militia. The civil organization developed in the local and rural 
areas has been the establishment of the people's commune system, which com­
bines the political, economic, social and military functions into an inde­
pendent cell in the general framework of people's war.
The practice of making everybody a soldier is a major measure of 
consolidating our national defense and safeguarding our socialist con­
struction. ..
For this reason Chairman Mao Tse-tung said: "The militia is a good 
organization and should be promoted. It is a military organization, an 
educational organization, and also an athletic organization. As imperial­
ism oppresses us so much, we should consider it a serious challenge. We 
need not only a mighty regular army, but a large number of militiamen.
By so doing the imperialists \Aen invading us will find it difficult to 
step forward even an inch."
To make everybody a soldier is an important content of Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung's strategical thinking on the people's war gnd also a 
component part of his thinking on the people's communes. '
Since the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet border conflicts 
in 1960's, China has greatly improved her civil defense and people's militia 
systems. In the border areas such as Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and 
Manchuria, China has established the PLA Production and Construction Corps 
along with the regular art"’-. This producticn-defense system, in retrospect, 
is similar to that of the farmer-soldier policy initiated by the ancient 
Chinese Legalist thinkers such as Juan Chung, Shang Yang and Han Fei Tzu in 
their programs of reforms. The people's militia system does play an impor­
tant role in the Chinese strategic concept of national defense.
2) The Multiple-Strategy Concept of Strategic Warfare
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In order to promote favorable conditions and to "preserve oneself and 
destroy the enemy," a variety of military strategies need to be combined for
the appropriate operations. Thus, Mao Tse-tung suggested a series of strategies 
in his military teachings on fighting a protracted war, including the combi­
nation of conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare; mobile warfare and po­
sitional warfare; war of attrition and war of annihilation and finally, offense
within defense, quick decisions within a protracted war, and exterior lines
79within interior lines— a jig-saw pattern of warfare. The dialectic is the 
basis of these combinations.
3) The Unity of National Defense and Economic Development
Since 1954 the three "five-year plan" economic programs have been 
closely associated with the development of the national defense system in 
order to enhance national power sufficiently to deter a possible foreign 
invasion. The great efforts for socialist construction have always contained 
two-fold functions both for economic and defensive development under the 
principle of "civil use in peacetime, military use in wartime."
Sun Tzu teaches that a protracted war should not be conducted in an 
active offensive attack because what is essential in war is victory, not 
prolonged operation. For a nation with superior power, a quick attack and 
completion is the key to victory. Dialectically, however, it will be favo­
rable and advantageous for a nation with an inferior power to conduct a 
defensive operation. A protracted war could drain the enemy's superior 
strength and finally lead to victory. This theory has been proved in the 
Chinese Communist revolutionary wars against Chiang Kai-shek's troops and 
the Japanese invasion. It has also been proved correct in the two-decade 
revolutionary war of Vietnam against France and against the intervention 
of the United States.
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C) The Application of the People’s War Concept in the Strategy of Chinese 
Foreign Policy
(1) Dialectical Process of World Revolution
According to the concept of Tao and Yin-Yang, the world is always 
in a dialectical process of change. So is the stage of international rela­
tions and the world revolution. There exist contradictions among the social­
ist camp, the capitalist bloc, the non-alignment bloc, and also among the 
nations in each of these groups. An appropriate manipulation by subjective 
motivation may alter a currently inferior position into a superior one in 
the future. In applying the part of dialectics applicable to the idea of 
the people's war, the Chinese formulated their strategy of foreign policy. 
After a careful analysis of the world situation Mao Tse-tung claimed as 
early as 1946 that all imperialists and reactionaries were paper tigers. 
Strategically, he taught that China should despise all enemies to provide 
the psychological self-confidence necessary to dare to fight in the long 
run. This stems from the Chinese view that the real power rests with the 
people, the man, rather than physical or material force. Mao explained his 
paper tiger thesis as applied to imperialism in this fashion:
I have said that all the reputedly powerful reactlon-aries are merely 
paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the people.
Inçerialism will not last long because it always does evil things.
It persists in grooming and supporting reactionaries in all countries 
who are against the people, it has forcibly seized many colonies and 
semi-colonies and many military bases, and it threatens the peace with 
atomic war.°^
Thus he believed that the existing oppressive situation would eventually 
change because imperialism pushed the majority people of the world to the 
side of its enemies. The great world revolution would finally come as the 
condition became ripe.
Tactically, however, imperialism can only be torn down gradually
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piece by piece. As Mao put it, "Strategically, we take the eating of a meal
lightly--we know we can finish it. But actually we eat it mouthful by mouth- 
82ful," It is necessary to take account of the concrete problems seriously
and solve them one by one. According to the strategic principle "unite the
many, defeat the few" of the people's war, China has aimed the real mass
power at the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which
contain the majority of the world's population,
(2) Protracted Struggle— Encirclement From the World Country-side to 
the World City
The Chinese believe that their current struggles will duplicate 
their past domestic revolutionary experiences, and that their conflict with 
other nations, especially the two superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, will be a protracted one in which their strategy must be simi­
lar to that of protracted war. They believe it is necessary to build a sound 
base for world struggle around the world's mass-populated rural areas in the 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, The Chinese interpret these vast 
areas to be the real storm-centers of world revolution where powerful forces 
will be generated to overthrow imperialism.
The various type of contradictions in the contemporary world are 
concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 
these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the 
stogm-centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism
In applying the concept of people's war to the global scene, the Chinese 
regard the Third World nations as the rural areas of the world which will 
accept the mission to encircle the advanced industrialized capitalist nations 
in North America and Western Europe— as in the Chinese revolutionary model of 
the past. In his famous article "Long Live the Victory of People's War", the 
former Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao extended the general strategy of 
"encirclement from the countryside to the city" into a global-view strategy
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for the protracted struggle against imperialism and for the world revolution.
He pointed out :
Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western Europe can 
be called "the cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin 
America constitute "the rural areas of the world",.. In a sense, the 
contemporary world revolution (as compared with domestic revolutions 
in developing countries) also presents a picture of the encirclement 
of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause 
of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, 
African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majori­
ty of the world's population.
Following thi? global strategic guideline, therefore, the first 
priority of Chinese foreign policy has been aiming at building friendly re­
lationships with the Third World nations, and further to form an internation­
al united front to struggle against imperialism and colonialism, China has 
expressed her intention to support the national liberation movements in the 
Third World nations with political, economic and military assistance. The 
Chinese are not hesitant to indicate that the decisive matter for the success 
or failure of the current stage of the world revolution depends on the outcome 
of the national liberation struggles of the peoples of the Third World, So 
far the achievement of friendly Chinese relationship with the Third World 
nations, along with the global strategy of people's war has been quite success­
ful, as evidenced by the outcome of several world issues including the achieve­
ment of Chinese representation in the United Nations in 1971. Moreover, Chinese 
prestige and status in the international system have been increasing for the 
past two decades. It seems that they are convinced that the application of 
the people's war concept in their strategy of foreign policy is on the correct 
track of the Tao, the universal truth. It follows, they feel, that the future 
is progressive and optimistic and on their side.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF HO-TSUNG AND LIEN-HENG. THE 
BALANCE OF POWER. AS AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY
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Kunlun,
you don't need all that height or snow.
If I could lean on heaven, grab my sword, 
and cut you in three parts,
I would send one to Europe, one to America, 
and keep one part here 
in China 
that the world have peace 
and the globe share the same heat and ice.
Mao Tse-tung, "Kunlun Mountain" 
(October 1935)
The basic themes and concepts of social science contain similarities 
between ancient and present times, in both the Western and Eastern worlds. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the modern Western concept of balance of power 
which mainly originated in European politics of the nineteenth century, there 
did exist a similar concept of "balance of power" during the ancient classi­
cal period of Warring States (403-221 B.C.) in China. This Chinese concept of 
"balance of power" has been traditionally referred to as Ho-Tsung (Vertical 
Alliance) and Lien-Heng (Horizontal Coalition) and thus was identified 
(combining the two final characters) as the philosophic School of Tsung-Heng.
Attempting to explain the original international situation and sys­
tem of the Warring States period. Professor Burton Watson translated and 
explained the meaning of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng as follows: "The Horizontal 
Alliance (Lien-Heng) was an east-west alignment of states under the leader­
ship of the powerful state of Ch'in in the west. The Vertical Alliance (Ho- 
Tsung) , a north-south alignment, was designed to preserve the independences 
of the weaker states and block Ch'in's expansion". However, an ancient 
leading Chinese realist thinker, Han Fei Tzu, substantially defined the 
meaning of Tsung-Heng politics as "the Vertical Alliance (Tsung), in which 
one joins with a number of weak states in hopes of attacking a strong one".
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and "the Horizontal Coalition (Heng), in which one serves a strong state
87for the purpose of attacking a number of weak ones". As a matter of 
fact, if we translate the basic theme of Tsung-Heng theory into a modern 
idea, it is the concept of the balance of power in which the policy of 
Ho-Tsung could be regarded as "alliances for balance" or "collective de­
fense system" and the Lien-Heng as "divide and rule" or the strategy of 
attacking opponents one by one.
Modern international politics, prior to the World War II, was 
characterized by the balance of power system. But the post-war bipolar 
international system between the Western bloc led by the United States 
and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union was not generally regarded 
as fitting the classical or typical concept of the balance of power until 
the development of a multi-polar international system with several existing 
power centers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in 
the I960’s. Today, world politics tends to be reviving the classical con­
cept of the balance of power.
Consequently, playing the role as a major power center, what is 
the Chinese perception of the balance of power concept and what are their 
responses? What is the classical Chinese concept of the balance of power 
and how much has it been applied to current world politics in light of 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s general principle of synthesis: "The ancient wisdom 
is for current use and the Western knowledge is for Chinese use"? To answer 
these questions and to provide a theoretical and brief analysis is the 
task of this section.
A) Conceptual Heritage and Current Background
(1) The Concept of Power and the Balance of Power
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The classical Chinese concept of power was emerging as international 
relations became anarchism during the Warring States period. The classical 
realist thinkers such as Kuan Chung, Shang Yang, Hsun Tzu, Shen Tao, Sheng 
Pu-hai, Li Ssu and Han Fei Tzu all contributed to the system of power con­
cept. Han Fei Tzu, who has been regarded as a "Chinese Machiavelli" by 
modern scholars and who was a leading figure of classical Chinese Legalism, 
was the most eminent among them. In general, his view of history as a pro­
cess of dialectical materialism based on economic factors is similar to 
the modern Marxist theory. Han Fei Tzu saw his age as one of struggle for 
power because of the chaotic international system and frequent wars. He 
criticized idealists and moralistic thinkers as daydreamers seeking for 
utopia without facing reality, and concluded that they were doomed to 
fai'inre as the victims of history. He observed:
Thus he who has great power at his disposal may force others to 
pay him court, but he whose power is weak must pay court to others.
For this reason the enlightened ruler works to build up power.
King Yen practiced benevolence and righteousness and the state 
of Hsu was wiped out; Tzu-kung employed eloquence and wisdom and 
Lu lost territory. ...°^
Therefore, Han Fei Tzu urged the ruler to concentrate upon nation building 
and overall reforms to develop a powerful nation before entering the inter­
national game of power politics.
Another prominent realist thinker was Kuei Ku Tzu, who synthesized 
the Taoist concept of dialectical materialism and the Legalist concept of 
power into a philosophical science of method. His doctrine of the science 
of method was applied by his student. Sun Tzu, in the principles of mili­
tary strategy laid down in the immortal work "The Art of War", discussed 
above. Two of Kuei Ku Tzu's other students, Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, by 
applying his concept to international relations, contributed to the con­
cept of the balance of power, an elaboration of the principles of Ho-Tsung
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and Lien-Heng.
The concept of the balance of power is dialectical in nature, the 
unity of opposites as Tao and Yin-Yang. The defensive and responsive sys­
tem of collective defense alliance, Ho-Tsung, represents the phase of Yin 
and the active and challenging system of "divide and rule", Lien-Heng, 
represents the phase of Yang. The dialectical process of revolving the Yin 
and the Yang, constitutes the balance of power, the Tao. The operations 
of the policies of "collective defense" and "divide and rule", if applied 
to diplomatic manipulation according to the principle of subjective moti­
vation with objective regularity, would finally develop a power balance to
one's advantage and would achieve one's goal as Kuei Ku Tzu taught in his
90science of method and dialectics. That is, an appropriate diplomatic
manipulation would tip the transforming stage of dialectical change to a
favourable position, namely, from weakness to strength, a subordinate
position to a leading status, etc., for one's benefits and goals. Kuei
Ku Tzu concluded: "Therefore, the alternate use of negative and positive
ways and the dialectical interactions of Yin and Yang may provide advan- 
91tages for us". Incidentally, it is interesting to note that one of the
modern leading realist thinkers, Hans J. Morgenthau, also argues that
diplomatic manipulation is the key to a maximum development of national
power, although he does not present his concept as one based on dialectical 
92materialism.
(2) The Role of the Balance of Power Concept in International Politics: 
Past and Present
Tiie importance of the role of the concept of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng 
in international politics was evidenced by the Ch'in state's emerging status 
as a result of ic 5 having implemented these concepts dialectically in the 
international system during the ancient Chinese Warring States period. In
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brief review, during the early part of the classical Spring and Autumn 
period (771-483 B.C.) in ancient China, the international system was an 
east-west bipolarity between the predominant Ch'i and Chin states surrounded 
by less powerful states. In the latter part of this period the bipolar sys­
tem turned to a system of north-south bloc politics, with considerable 
antagonism between the Chin group and the Ch'u group accompanied by other 
minor powers, such as Ch'i, Ch'in, Sung, Wu, and Yueh; this was similar to 
the modern international system of the 1950's and I960's. Bipolar bloc 
politics finally collapsed when the Chin state was dissolved and became 
three states, Han, Chao, and Wei, thus creating a multi-polar international 
system at the outset of the period of Warring States. Thereafter the struggle 
for power was characterized by wars among the power centers— wars which 
represented extreme political action but which nevertheless were tempered 
by Tsung-Heng diplomatic manipulation. All major powers at that time were 
actively devoting their efforts to the internal political, economic and 
social reforms and the external application of Tsung-Heng diplomacy. In 
the History of Warring States (Chan Kuo Shih), it was pointed out:
The alternation of the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng was the 
key to the transformation of feudal wars during the Warring States 
period. ... Under an antagonistic bipolar situation the two big powers, 
Ch'i and Ch'in, adopted both the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng 
according to the variable conditions and circumstances. If the policy 
of Ho-Tsung was successful then it consequently shifted to the policy 
of Lien-Heng. When the policy of Lien-Heng was impeded, the policy of 
Ho-Tsung was adopted a g a i n .  ^
At first, Ch'in was a less powerful major state. When Ch'in inter­
nally adopted Shang Yang's Legalist reforms and externally implemented the 
Tsung-Heng policies, her national power increased rapidly. Because of sound 
application of diplomatic manipulation and military attacks, Ch'in was 
finally able to annex its contemporary states into a unified Chinese empire.
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In the middle age of the Warring States period, Ch'in constantly 
annexed territories along with the alternative policies of Ho-Tsung 
and Lien-Heng. ... When Ch'in conducted the Ho-Tsung policy to defeat 
Ch'i, the Ch'in-Ch'i bipolar situation collapsed and Ch'in became a 
predominant power. ... At this time, Ch'in set up its foundation for 
the victorious "annexation o f  t h e  world" in the future.
Two eminent scholars, Liu Hsiang of the Han Dynasty and Su Hsun of the Sung
Dynasty, both commented on this historic event and pointed out that the
systems of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng did play the vital role in Ch'in's uni- 
95fication of China.
One group of Chinese scholars has regarded the ancient Chinese
international system during the periods of Spring and Autumn and Warring
States as a precedent for the modern international system, especially the
96post-VJcrld War 11 situation. For instance, V.K. Wellington Koo, formerly
a Judge of the International Court of Justice, once wrote: "Diplomacy is
an ancient art, as it was much practised in China as early as the period
of Warring Kingdoms about 2500 years ago. In the Occident it is of more
recent origin. But the nature and method of old diplomacy were much the
97same in the East and West." Professor Winberg Chai also presented a
similar attitude on this point, saying: "From a Chinese point of view, so
far as international politics is concerned, modern history seems to be
repeating Chinese history of the Eastern Chou period (771-221 B.C.), a
98period of intensified warfare".
Thus, when we take a close look at the post-World War 11 inter­
national situation, there appear certain parallels with ancient Chinese 
historical situations. During the immediate post-war period of the 1950's, 
the system of world politics was charaterized by the two superpowers' 
bloc bipolarity with cold-war antagonisms between the Western camp led 
by the United States and the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union. Within
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the decade of the 1960's certain power centers have newly emerged along
with the two leading powers: namely, China associated with the Third World
nations, those Western European nations associated with the Common Market,
an,’ Japan. These five power centers constitute the current environment of
99the international political system.
This change in the international power balance system of course has 
greatly affected the nature of world policies, particularly after the Sino- 
Soviet conflicts and the U.S.-France controversy in the 1960's. Currently, 
world politics embraces a pattern of multi-polarity similar to the classical 
power-balance manipulation. This situation has enhanced the Importance of 
the individual power center in the system of balance of power. Consequently, 
after the American frustration of the Vietnam War and the severity of the 
Sino-Soviet conflicts in 1969, American foreign policy has gradually shifted 
from the containment policy to one of balance of power, in which the "Nixon 
Doctrine" dominates, accepting today's world as "an era of negotiation 
rather than confrontation". This fundamental change in iunerican policy was 
evidenced by the substantial improvement of Sino-American relationships, 
beginning with the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971 and highlighted by President 
Nixon's China trip in 1972. It has also been demonstrated by the improvement 
of Russo-American relationships, leading to two summit meetings, Nixon's 
trip to Moscow (May, 1972) and Brezhnev's visit to Washington (June, 1973). 
Further bilateral summit conferences and talks on general policies are 
scheduled among the three crucial power centers, the United States, the 
Soviet Union and China, and others may be anticipated. In addition, there 
have been a number of other summit meetings between each of these three 
power centers and their allies. These current international activities and 
other developments tend toward a dialectical conversion of the conflicts
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among nations; the notion of power balance in today's world politics is 
a revival of classical traditions, and dominates the minds of the leaders 
and policy-makers of the major powers. Limited by its current physical 
conditions and external environments, as a leading power center, China, 
although persisting in her long-range goal of idealism, was inevitably 
drawn into this pattern of realistic international politics. China now 
engages in diplomatic manipulation in an attempt to use classical techniques 
to accomplish what her leaders perceive as her essential missions--national 
reunification and the promotion of world revolution.
B) China's Implementation of the Policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng 
in Current World Politics: A Brief Review
During the development of international politics throughout the 
past quarter century a tentative pattern of Chinese foreign policy emerged 
in the form of a balance of power concept that is compatible with the 
classical Chinese international system and the concepts of Ho-Tsung and 
Lien-Heng. Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the 
general pattern of Chinese foreign policy can be viewed as a dialectical 
process in applying the policies of Ho-Tsung and Lien-Heng. This dialectical 
development of Chinese foreign relations has brought China from the status 
of a regional and subordinate country at the beginning to her present 
position as a global power. China's potential influence on international 
politics is considerable, and her role is likely to be crucial. The subs­
tantial employment of the concept of balance of power in China's foreign 
relations falls into several stages, as follows:
(1) The First Stage of the Lien-Heng Policy: 1950-1953
When the communist government of China was established in 1949, 
the regime was relatively weak and faced the turmoil of an internal post-
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civil-war situation. Domestic rehabilitation was the first priority of 
national policy. Thus, the main foreign relations emphasis was to obtain 
substantial assistance to promote and protect national reconstruction.
Along with this task China's foreign relations in the early 1950's involved 
a commitment to "lean to one-side" in associating with the Soviet Union.
The unexpected Korean War in the early 1950's not only impeded China's 
opportunity for broadening her foreign relations with major world 
but also intensified the multi-dimensioned American containment policy which 
reinforced Chinese reliance on the Soviet Union for assistance and protection.
In this period, therefore, Chinese foreign policy was subordinated 
to that of the Soviet Union, a situation that led to a radical mood intent 
upon encouraging militant revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped 
areas. Its motivating principle was the strategy of Lien-Heng, to associate 
with a great power to protect national security and to seek other assistance 
while working toward "divide and rule" in international politics. China's 
status at this stage was simply that of a regional Asian power with a 
second-rate position in the socialist camp.
(2) The First Stage of the Ho-Tsung Policy: 1954-1959
After the death of Stalin and the armistice of the Korean War 
China gained more independence from Soviet influence and control. On the 
one hand, China continued to concentrate on her domestic nation-building 
and economic development by introducing the first five-year plan. On the 
other hand, her foreign policy was shaped with the "Bandung Spirit" of 
peaceful coexistence in order to ease international tension and give a 
favourable image of Chinese foreign policy to the Afro-Asian countries, 
for it was this group of nations that China sought as her basic allies.
On this point, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out that China's basic attitude
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towards the Third World nations was "friendly cooperation", "mutual under­
standing and respect, mutual sympathy and mutual support" on the basis of 
proletarian internationalism.
In addition to the general principle of peaceful coexistence which 
was based on the famous "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", China 
further proposed an "international anti-imperialist united front" among 
nations with common interests with China as the center. During this period 
China actively engaged in diplomatic manipulations to persuade the Afro- 
Asian nations of Chinese sincerity and achieved a great deal of success 
in winning support from the Third World nations in international politics. 
Thus, this Chinese Ho-Tsung policy has turned China from a regional Asian 
power to a popular member of the Afro-Asian group.
Moreover, China in this period not only urged the Afro-Asian nations 
to form an international united front according to the Ho-Tsung strategy 
against Western imperialism and colonialism, but also devoted her efforts 
to breaking the American encirclement resulting from the containment policy 
which, in the form of SEATO and a number of bilateral military mutual- 
defense treaties with various countries and regions in Asia, was aimed 
at China, On the basis of the Lien-Heng strategy, China tried to convince 
Afro-Asian nations of the imperilist nature of the American role in the 
underdeveloped areas, and urged them to reject any kind of cooperation and 
alliance with the United States, or at least to keep neutral. This effort 
was evidenced by China's close relations with India, Indonesia, Egypt, and 
other non-aligned countries during this period of time.
(3) The Second Stage of the Lien-Heng Policy: 1960-1964
When Khrushchev stablized his political power in the Soviet Com­
munist Party and adopted "peaceful coexistence" as the general Soviet
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foreign policy, the Soviet Union began its collaboration with the United 
States on various world issues, such as nuclear weapons control, the test- 
ban treaty, Middle-East affairs, disarmament, etc. The Chinese eyed this 
Soviet attitude toward the United States and the Western capitalist powers 
as "socialist-revisionism", an attempt to share imperialist hegemony with 
the United States at the expense of the Third World nations. Certain Soviet 
actions lent credence the Chinese suspicions, such as the U.S.S.R.'s refusal 
to assist China's nuclear weapons program in 1959 and its withdrawal of all 
economic aid and technical assistance from China in 1960 even when China 
faced a serious natural disaster. The Soviet motivation appeared to be to 
undermine the Chinese nuclear weapon development and her leading position 
in the Third World. This complex and sometimes contradictory interaction 
of ideology and national interests has been a factor in the Sino-Soviet 
conflicts since 1960. From then on, the Soviet Union has attempted to iso­
late China not only at the level of state relations in the socialist camp 
but also in the international communist movement. For instance, in the 
International Conference of Communist Parties of 1960 each side launched 
severe attacks on the other. Up to 1963, the Soviet Communist Party had 
conducted campaigns to mobilize the Communist parties of its satellite 
states to attack the Chinese Communist Party with charges of "dogmatism" 
and "adventurism".
In coping with this Soviet political challenge and with its diplo­
matic encirclement, China responsed with the Lien-Heng strategy. Chinese 
leaders began to criticize Soviet imperialism, charging the U.S.S.R. with 
revisionism and neo-colonialism toward Eastern European nations which was 
a deviation from Marxism-Leninism. In order to break the Soviet political 
and diplomatic encirclement, China began to exploit the tensions between
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the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, especially Albania 
and Romania. The Chinese open support of Albania's challenge to Soviet op­
pression and hegemony provided great motivation for the rest of the Soviet 
satellites to weaken their ties with the Russians. The Sino-Albanian allian­
ce constituted a Lien-Heng pattern aimed at increasing the divisions be­
tween the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites in order to 
make the Russians face pressures from both front and rear. The aim was to 
reduce direct Soviet pressure upon China by diverting attention to its 
satellites in the rear. In general, the Sino-Soviet conflict has provided 
opportunities for the Eastern European countries to take some advantage 
and has led to more independence from the Soviet Union.
On the global scene during this period China continued its policy 
of Ho-Tsung to associate with the Tlirid World nations against imperialism 
and colonialism, particularly against the Western capitalists led by the 
United States. Toward her old ally but new rival, the Soviet Union, China 
directed the policy of Lien-Heng to break the Soviet diplomatic and phy­
sical encirclements by allying herself with certain Eastern European nations 
and manipulating contradictions to agitate their revolts against Soviet con­
trol and oppressions. Concurrently, in the global front line of the Third 
World areas, China promoted relations with most Afro-Asian countries, wh;.cn 
efforts were crystalized by Chou En-lai's visits to fourteen Afro-Asian 
nations in 1963 and 1964. Particularly, China concluded a friendship treaty 
with India's rival, Pakistan, on the basis of contradiction-manipulation 
so as to restrain and deter India's possible alliance with the Soviet 
Union at China's expense, especially after the Sino-Indian border conflicts 
in 1962.
(4) The Second Stage of Ho-Tsung; 1965-1969
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In this stage the major contradiction of the world, as far as China’s 
interest was concerned, was the American intervention and military escalation 
in the Indo-China War. The appearance of a half-million American armed forces 
in Vietnam in the late 1960’s signified danger and was a serious threat to 
China's national security, suggesting the possibility of an American take­
over of the whole of Indo-China would still constitute a viatl threat to 
China’s national security. In coping with this great challenge, China turned 
her focus of foreign policy to the Vietnam issue and lowered the Sino-Soviet 
controversy to a  secondary contradiction. Thus, the strategic principle of 
Chinese foreign policy began to shift from the policy of Lien-Heng to the 
policy of Ho-Tsung in order to form a world-wide united front, at least of 
the Third World nations, to deter the American invasion of Indo-China, par­
ticularly Vietnam. In assisting in the Vietnamese struggle China provided 
whole-hearted political, economic, military and diplomatic supports to North 
Vietnam and to the Viet Cong. China further called upon the whole people 
of the world to defeat the U.S. policy of war and aggression in Indo-China.
Chou En-lai expressed chis policy in these words:
The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out:
"The 700 million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the 
Vietnamese people; the vast expanse of China’s territory is their 
reliable rear area". ... The three fraternal Indo-Chinese peoples
may rest assured that in the common struggle against U.S. imperialism,
the Chinese people will always stand by their side. Together we unite, 
together we fight and together we will win victory.
In a statement of May 20, 1970, Mao Tse-tung personally appealed to the
people of the world, including the American people, to stop U.S. imperialism
in Indo-China on the basis of the "people’s war" concept.
By the end of 1969, the American military operation in Vietnam was 
seriously frustrated not only militarily but also politically because of 
world-wide condemnation and criticism, which included massive domestic
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anti-war campaigns by the American people. In facing these internal and
external pressures, the United States was led to retreat from Indo-China
and President Nixon designed the American withdrawal according to the "Nixon 
103Doctrine".
So far as the Chinese national interest was concerned, the American 
retreat from Indo-China eased the Sino-American military tension and con­
tributed relative peace to the area of Southeast Asia. Dialectically, how­
ever, the incident of the Sino-Soviet border conflict at Chen-pao Island 
in Chinese Manchuria in March 1969 escalated the Sino-Soviet military ten­
sion seriously along the border areas. This new development caused China
to shift again from the policy of Ho-Tsung to the policy of Lien-Heng. This
condition has encouraged the improvement of Sino-American relations in an 
attempt to deter the Soviet threat. In a sense it appears that the world 
politics of 1970's is returning to the classical concept of balance of
power as some scholars have observed.
(5) The Third Stage of Lien-Heng; 1970-?
1) The Severity of Sino-Soviet Relations
Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated severely since the military
border clashes in March, 1969. Since that time, the first-strike proposal
has been debated among Soviet policy-makers. The Soviet military build-up
along the Sino-Soviet border areas has resulted in serious military tension
104and psychological insecurity. Furthermore, the Soviet Union launched 
a political and diplomatic campaign in an attempt to encircle and isolate 
China under Brehznev's "Asian Collective Security System". The proposed 
major "chain nations" in this system included Mongolia, Pakistan, India, 
the Southeast Asian states, Japan, North Korea and even Taiwan headed by 
the Soviet Union.
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Tc cope with this Soviet military and political challenge, China 
on the one hand terminated her domestic Cultural Revolution campaign in order 
to concentrate every effort to face the external threat. On the other hand, 
the Chinese began to intensify the development of nuclear weapons, and other­
wise strengthen the military by stressing the system of the people's militia 
under the people's war concept, and developing a broad system of civil de­
fense including tunnel-digging all around the country. Regarding political 
and diplomatic responses, China further strengthened relations with Pakistan, 
the Indo-China states. North Korea and other Third World nations in order 
to break down the encirclement-chain of Brehznev's plan, particularly aim­
ing at improving Sino-Japanese relations in the Far East. Directed to this 
end, were Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's visits to North Korea and North 
Vietnam, his presentation to the Summit Conference of the Three Indo-Chinese 
Peoples in 1970 and 1971, and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations 
in 1972.
As to the Eastern European states, China has concentrated on fri­
endship with Albania and Romania. Meanwhile, the Chinese condemned the 
"Brezhnev Doctrine" as imperialist hegemonism and neo-colonialism, as evi­
denced by the 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. To support the 
Eastern European nations' struggles against Soviet oppression, China esta­
blished normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, another tough ideolo­
gical rival of the Soviet Union.
In Europe, China was encouraging a powerful anti-Soviet force 
including the NATO system to prevent the concentration of Soviet power 
eastward at China's expense. Thus, China endorsed British participation 
in the European Common Market to strengthen the power of Western Europe.
China also persuaded France to support the European collective defense
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system of N A T O . A s  a matter of fact, in this sense, China is currently 
participating in the diplomatic competition in Europe. There have been three 
general strategic tasks for China; first, to agitate the Eastern European 
states to revolt against Soviet control; second, to make Western Europe as 
powerful a force as possible to restrain Soviet capability on its eastern 
front; third, not to allow any form of Berlin agreement or Soviet-European 
compromise in order to prevent the Soviet Union from concentrating its 
efforts on the East.
However, the most drastic breakthrough for the Chinese policy of 
Lien-Heng has been the dramatic improvement of Sino-American relations since 
the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in April, 1371, the first approachment between these 
two rivals in two decades.
2) The Improvement of Sino-American Relations
In order to deter the vital Soviet threat to China's immediate 
national security, the Chinese began promoting Sino-American relations.
This effort concluded in Nixon's China trip in 1972 and the subsequent 
establishment of diplomatic "liason offices" both in Peking and Washington 
in 1973 as an immediate step toward normal diplomatic relations. This 
direction was reinforced by U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger's 
recent trip to China in November 1973 and concluded in a joint communique. 
Accompanying the improvement of Sino-American relations, the world power 
balance has undergone a change in relations among the three major power 
centers. It has led to the normalization of diplomatic relations between 
China and Japan and a great number of other Western and Third World nations. 
Most damaged by these developments has been Chiang Kai-shek's government 
in Taiwan, as evidenced by the Sino-American Shanghai Communique in Febru­
ary, 1972. As far as American interest is concerned, the strategic position
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of Taiwan was doomed by the developing Sino-American friendship.
China's strategy of "associate with the afar and attack the near 
(yuan-chiao-chin-kung)" comes under the policy of Lien-Heng, and has broa­
dened her diplomatic manipulation onto the global scene, greatly increasing 
China's international status and reputation. As to Chinese management of 
global power relations, Professor Harold C, Hinton observed:
In its propaganda, Peking still maintains the dual-adversary stra­
tegy and claims to be opposing both "superpowers". In fact, however, 
it has tilted strongly toward the United States. One reason for this, 
and the U.S. Government would like to think the only reason, is Peking's 
fear of the Soviet Union. But Peking also knows that the Nixon Admini­
stration is eager, for domestic purposes, to get help in reaching a 
political settlement for Vietnam, believes China could be useful toward 
this end if only it were willing, and is in the process of reducing 
the American military presence in Asia and the Western Pacific in part 
on the theory that previous American administrations had overrated the 
Chinese threat to Asia. Hence, there are vulnerabilities in the Ameri­
can position, and Peking has been trying to play on them, not only to 
achieve a positive political relationship that might help to counter­
balance the Soviet threat, but also to exploit the rift between the 
United States and Japan, get concessions on Taiwan and possible on Viet­
nam, and promote American military withdrawal from the region before 
the Soviet Union or Japan is in a position to fill the vacuum."
(6 ) Conclusion
In conclusion, under the implementation of the politics of Ho-Tsung 
and Lien-Heng policies, China's foreign relations have dialectically deve­
loped from a regional and subordinate position to a global and independent 
one which virtually reflected the dialectical process and spirit of Tao 
and Yin-Yang. The first stage of China's foreign relations was concentrated 
on gaining foreign protection and allies for domestic construction and re­
habilitation because of her disadvantageous position and weak national 
power. The second stage of China's foreign relations was to implement a 
policy of peaceful coexistence to attract the Third World nations' friend­
ship and cooperation so as to develop a partially independent role for the 
regional Afro-Asian areas. The third stage of China's foreign relations
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rose to an independent level from the dialectical alternation of the first 
and second stages in order to break the diplomatic monopoly of the two super­
powers, The Chinese independent role associated with the Third World nations 
in world politics has altered the international system from one of bipolarity 
to one of multipolarity, at least to a tripolarity, which has been tending 
toward the classical system of balance of power. The fourth stage of China's 
foreign relations was concentrated on the international united front to 
stop the American invasion in Indo-China for the sake at least of China's 
national security. The fifth stage of China's foreign relations has ripened 
to a level of global diplomatic manipulation of the power balance among 
nations for China's national interest and security. The immediate goal of 
China's foreign policy, national reunification, thus has reached a point 
of breakthrough and is nearing realization with China's admission to the 
United Nations and the improvement of Sino-American relations.
For the past five stages of China's foreign relations, the dialec­
tical process of development has been in a vertical dimension from the point 
(nation) to the line (a group of nations) and to the surface (world-wide 
areas of countries) level. Horizontally, it has developed from the local 
people (the area of Asia) to the regional people (Afro-Asian and the Third 
World nations) and to the global people (a world-wide nations) level in­
cluding the American people, (see Figure 3 and Figure 4)
In general, to the Chinese, times are advancing; the world is chang­
ing; and the future is optimistic and progressing, just as taught by the 
ancient wisdom of Tao and Tin-Yang in the Book of Changes,
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Figure 3
Diagram of the Dialectical Development of 
China's Foreign Relations 
(Vertical Process: point, line, & surface)
Abbreviations of Figure 3 and Figure 4
L. - Lien-Heng 0 . - Oceania
H. - Ho-Tsung N.A. - North America
S.U. - The Soviet Union U.S. - The United States
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A.A. - Afro-Asian countries I. - Italy
F. - France C. - Canada
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION
I, TRADITIONS AND INFLUENCE
Every society in the world has its own traditions, and they have 
played an important role in influencing the people's way of life and of 
thought. Even nations engaged in modern times in radical ideological and 
political changes are still affected greatly by their traditions, customs 
and usages. This is particularly true for certain countries with deep-rooted 
cultures and civilizations. The case of China is no exception.
The essentials of Chinese civilization blossomed in the classical 
age of the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods. A hundred 
schools of thought contended and a hundred states employed them to seek 
power and hegemony or peace. Thus these schools of thought gained their 
currency variously in accordance with the fluctuations of social change 
and :he conditions of interstate relations. Nevertheless, it is these con­
tending schools of thought which constituted the fundamentals of Chinese 
culture and civilization for the last two thousand years.
Isolated from other major civilizations in the world by self- 
sufficiency, China developed her self-contained culture, her concept of 
world order and her system of foreign relations, summed up in the concept 
of the "Middle Kingdom". This uniquely Chinese worldview, or Weltanschauung, 
lasted for two millennia until the challenges of Western ideology and civi­
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lization in the mid-nineteenth century. To cope with these challenges to 
China's very survival, Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries alike 
were put to the test of searching for means and approaches to meet the 
challenges. They finally found and adopted Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung 
and his Communist associates applied the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to 
the conditions of Chinese society, to save China from total collapse. This 
synthesis, formed by blending a foreign ideology and Chinese social condi­
tions with tradition and classical teaching is the basic theme of Mao Tse- 
tung Szu Hsiang, or the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung", or Maoism. There is a 
certain unique political element contained in this synthesis: the "Chinese- 
ness", traceable to the classical philosophers of China. The Chinese approach 
to public policy thus differs from that of other major countries. Professor 
0. Edmmund Clubb has commented on this unique feature of Chinese politics 
as follows:
It is this writer's proposition that the Chinese Communists are 
Chinese first and Communists only second. In other words, instead 
of being a corpus inherited from Marx and Engels via Lenin and 
Stalin, the Chinese Communist doctrine is shaped by China's past.
Both "Communism" and "China", of course, are important factors in 
the composition called "Chinese Communism"; but the Chinese element 
is the more important.
... The introduction of new concepts into Chinese is like putting 
new wine into old bottles; the wine is often somewhat changed, if 
not spoiled. And past political concepts deeply influence contemporary 
thought.
In general, the traditional ideal of the Ta-T'ung society (Great 
Harmony), advocated by various classical schools of thought such as Taoism, 
Confucianism and Mohism has been injected into and contributed to the con­
temporary Chinese political ideal of constructing Chinese socialism and 
world communism. It is compatible with the Marxist idealist goal of communism. 
The Chinese classical idealism of the Great Harmony reinforces current Chinese 
efforts for long-range goals in politics and foreign relations. Another step
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to fulfill the Chinese concept of internationalism, the Great Harmony, has 
set the pattern of performance in terms of the traditional concept of the 
"Middle Kingdom". In support of this point, another quotation from 0. Edmund 
Clubb is appropriate:
The evidence indicates that the men who came to power in Peking 
in 1949 were true sons of the Middle Kingdom and felt as did their 
forebears that Chinese culture in its totality was superior to all 
others. To that philosophic constant there is now added the messianic 
conviction that the Chinese, as a "leading" cultural group, are 
destined to guide the world’s "oppressed" peoples, and especially 
their fellow Asians, into a New Era—  to be determined by Maoism.
On the other hand, the immediate task of Chinese foreign policy 
is to respond to imperialism and colonialism. The ideological basis for 
such response is simply Chinese nationalism, which has an impact on current 
world politics and the international system because of China’s place in the 
world. China has resolutely struggled against the imperialist major powers, 
especially the two superpowers, on the basis of anti-imperialism and anti­
colonialism, a struggle which reflects the traditional Chinese attitude of 
anti-Paism (anti-hegemonism). Meanwhile, China has wholeheartedly supported 
the national liberation movements of the Third World nations against im­
perialism and colonialism on the basis of Chinese internationalism which 
consists of elements of the traditional Chinese concept of Wang Tao (the 
politics of virtue). Following this policy of internationalism, China has 
established friendly relationships with the Third World nations and peoples 
for an international united front under the str- .egy of the people’s war 
concept against imperialism and colonialism.
In order to realize Chinese nationalism and promote the ideal of 
world communism, China has applied various realistic approaches: ideology, 
nation-building, military power, the people's war strategy, and balance-of- 
power manipulation. These approaches actually contain certain features
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which are attributable to various classical Chinese concepts in each of 
these areas. Because it is unique, current Chinese foreign policy differs 
from that of other major world powers in its nature, its attitudes toward 
world order, and in its international behavior.
Thus, the Chinese cultural heritage plays an important role in 
forming contemporary Chinese foreign policy, a role not to be ignored by 
any student of international relations or of Chinese politics.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE FUTURE 
OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
One of the major Chinese cultural legacies, from the "ancient wisdom", 
is the philosophical concept of dialectics which was particularly advocated 
and adopted by the classical schools of Taoism, Mohism and Legalism. Through­
out Chinese history the concept of dialectics has had a great influence on 
the Chinese way of life and on Chinese ideologies. Dialectics is thus a 
major philosophical key to the understanding of the development of Chinese 
history and the evolution of the Chinese view of world order.
The development of the Chinese concept of international politics 
has been dialectical in the sense of changing with changing conditions 
and changes in the international environment. Especially, the emergence, 
popularity and the rise and fall of the contending schools of thought through­
out Chinese history depended upon variations in environmental changes. In 
other words, the various contending schools of thought in China were initiated 
and developed throughout history to cope with the environmental challenges. 
Thus, the philosophical trends have dialectically swung between idealism and 
realism according to historical needs.
When the ancient Chinese Chou feudalism collapsed it was followed 
by the period of Spring and Autuuin, dominated by various independent feudal
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states. Thus, in this period there developed the first Chinese concept of 
international relations. During this period the international system became 
gradually chaotic, each state struggling for power and hegemony, but the 
competition was relatively less drastic in comparison with the later period 
of Warring States. To cope with this international disorder, the idealism 
of Taoism and Confucianism emerged and became the leading philosophy of 
this period. This was the first stage of a philosophical trend of idealism 
with the goal of international peace and order.
As interstate wars and power politics among the major states became 
more drastic, featured by military conquest, diplomatic maneuver and terri­
torial annexation the international system began its second stage of develop­
ment, the classical period of Warring States. The contending schools of 
thought at this time were particularly flourishing, so that the period be­
came the golden age of classics. The domestic political system and the ex­
ternal environment during this period inspired realistic and practical 
national reforms and statecraft to meet the challenges. Among the contending 
schools the realist School of Legalism thus dominated the scene at this 
period and the philosophical trend shifted from idealism to realism.
When China entered into a long pacific period, beginning with the 
Han dynasty and continuing to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, the philosophic 
systems of idealism (that is, Taoism and Confucianism), revived in response 
to Chinese internal and external conditions. Particularly, during the Han 
dynasty, Confucianism was adopted as the national orthodox ideology and it 
has since guided Chinese concepts in domestic politics and foreign relations. 
For two thousand years in this period China developed her concept of 
suzeraignty and the tribute system of foreign relations on the basis of 
idealist Confucianism. It was this culturalism, the concept of the "Middle
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Kingdom", which constituted the third stage in the Chinese concept of inter­
national relations.
Due to challenges from the West and China's frustrations in world 
politics during the past century, Chinese Confucian idealism has again 
given way to the realist nationalism. This new version of realism is essent­
ially a blend of certain classical Chinese Legalist concepts and modern 
Marxism-Leninism, and serves as the ideological basis for policies of 
opposing foreign imperialism and aggression and of restoring China's past 
prestige and place in the world. Thus, Chinese nationalism has been the 
major trend of Chinese politics today. Its spirit is reflected in the Thought 
of Mao Tse-tung which is regarded as the application of Marxism-Leninism to 
Chinese conditions and Chinese society. On this point, the essence of 
Maoism is the synthesis of classical Chinese thoughts, modern Marxist 
idealism and Chinese nationalism. In accordance with this conceptual guide­
line, China's policies of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and of 
support for the national liberation movements of the Third World nations 
have become the basic themes of foreign policy, and constitute the fourth 
stage of the Chinese concept of international relations.
In general; the development and variation of Chinese concepts of 
international relations has been dialectical in process throughout history.
By and large, a nation's foreign policy depends mainly upon its national 
goals, capability, and the external environment. The balance among these 
factors determines the practical foreign policy of that country. China is 
no exception. On the one hand, China anticipates the future trend of world 
order and sets up her immediate and long-range g ;als, the construction of 
Chinese socialism and the ideal of world communism. On the other hand, 
limited by the current international system and politics, China seeks
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practical means and approaches to realize her national goals. To achieve 
both immediate and long-range goals, China has adopted both old and new 
concepts and approaches in forming her foreign policy.
In addition, pursuant to the theory of dialectical materialism, 
the Chinese regard national goals and practical approaches as being inter­
related and mutually reinforcing. They believe that the correct handling 
of contradictions and an appropriate manipulation of approaches could 
alter the external environment and thus minimize the international limi­
tations, so as to strengthen China's capability, and thus enhance the 
feasibility of achieving national goals. In this "critical conversional" 
stage of the dialectic, the Chinese believe that human willpower and 
intelligence play a vital role in bringing about the desired alterations.
In conclusion, Chinese foreign policy is largely determined not 
only by China's current political system, national goals, the international 
system and international politics, but also by her traditions, conceptual 
heritages and present perceptions of world order. This special combination 
of determinants results in peculiarly Chinese political policies, approaches, 
and characteristics, differing from those of other major world powers. The 
student of Chinese politics who wishes to have a better understanding and 
more accurate grasp of China's foreign policy will find, perhaps, in this 
very element the most valuable guideline. Once a person catches this key 
point, as Confucius pointed out: "Although he might not have reached his
3goals exactly, he is not far from the target (sui-pu-chung, pu-yuan-yi)" .
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